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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1Background and Outline of Research Problem 
The beginning of the 21st century came with a number of changes in the South African 
political landscape which eventually affected the country’s foreign policy towards Southern 
Africa, Africa and the rest of the world. However, there are two major factors which helped 
to shape post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy.  Firstly, it was the demise of 
apartheid inside South Africa in 1994. This enabled South Africa to rebuild relations with 
other states based on equal terms. Secondly, it was the changes at the international level as 
informed by the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. This brought about many changes especially in the economic sphere as superpowers 
started to withdraw their support for proxy states. South Africa as a leader in terms of 
economy, political stability and military capabilities meant that other Southern African 
states relied on its role to lead in socioeconomic and political advancements. Due to this 
new development, many states were determined to enter into bilateral relations with South 
Africa   a trend which has continued unabated to-date.   
 
Since South Africa is perceived as a regional leader in many respects, it is then expected 
that it should demonstrate its leadership capabilities within the sub-continent. In line with 
that, there is a global and regional anticipation for South Africa as an emerging economy to 
assume a developmental role in the continent. Since then, substantial research has been 
done which relates to South Africa’s foreign policy and its implementation in Southern 
Africa and Africa as a whole (Ogunnubi, 2013). Due to this state of affairs, there has been 
much controversy surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy especially its implementation. 
It has been argued that South Africa has not assumed the role of being a regional leader; 
instead, the feeling is that it has assumed that of being a self-interested player who seeks to 
control its neighbours within the context of the theory of realism. South Africa has mainly 
been accused of pursuing a Western-oriented agenda on the African soil.  
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The research problem of the study arises from the controversy relating to South Africa’s 
foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. For the 
purpose of the study the research problem is demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a 
conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa and looks at 
whether it suits the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical 
demarcation. This relates to South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. Included in the 
discussion is South Africa’s role and subsequently Africa’s representation in the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This relates to the 
period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a democratic country 
to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa’s democracy. However, a reference to 
South Africa’s pre 1994 foreign policy decisions is made for background purposes and to 
provide the context within which the study should be conceived.                                        
 
The broad research question the study seeks to answer is: “What has informed post-
apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy during the twenty years of democracy?”           
 1.2 Preliminary literature study, and reasons for choosing topic: 
a. Preliminary literature study. 
Democratic South Africa carefully chose to establish new relations with Southern African 
states which are different from those of its predecessor government. According to Pfister 
(2005), apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Southern African region was 
based on destabilization. It aimed to punish and weaken the frontline states which were in 
favour of the liberation movements. The Southern African region was only important in 
providing South Africa with labour reserves in industries and mining (Adebajo, 2007).     
The end of the Cold War came with massive changes in the domestic political landscape of 
South Africa and led to the shift of political dynamics. The then president, F.W. de Klerk 
(the last president under the old dispensation) released all political prisoners and unbanned 
their liberation movements. According to Chhabra (1997) immediately after his release, 
Mandela and de Klerk embarked on an African journey. They traversed the continent 
meeting heads of states, albeit with different positions to lobby for. On the one hand, de 
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Klerk was lobbying for the relaxation of sanctions and the recognition of the National Party 
government’s legitimacy. On the other hand, Mandela lobbied for the continuation of 
sanctions until true democratic transition. Both positions shaped the nature of South 
Africa’s relations with the African continent.           
Mandela prior to assuming the presidency of the Republic conveyed his concern that if 
human rights issues were to be neglected that would bring about disaster in the international 
arena (Mills, 2000). He further guaranteed that “new” South Africa’s foreign policy would 
be based on human rights and democracy. He held that South Africa’s future depended on 
the African continent particularly Southern Africa and that South Africa would pursue 
regional cooperation as opposed to domination (Mandela, 1993). In that sense, South 
Africa’s renewed relations with the rest of Africa was conceived even before the historic 
1994 general elections. Due to its political history and re-admission to the international 
arena South Africa was seen as a “beacon of hope” especially for the oppressed (The 
Economist, 2008). This meant that South Africa had moral obligation to protect and 
promote human rights (Mills, 2000).     
During Mandela’s tenure in the presidency of the Republic, South Africa’s foreign policy 
was widely criticized for lack of clear direction (Chhabra, 1997). This can be attributed to 
many factors such as the newness of the administration in office; and lack of enthusiasm on 
the side of the ministers responsible for effecting the anticipated policy changes. Most 
importantly was the staff of the old regime which did not share the view of the new 
government.  As informed by its past experience of apartheid, human rights were at the 
centre of South Africa’s new foreign policy imperatives. Mandela’s main concern was the 
idea of universal human rights (Barber, 2005). Mandela’s administration took a harsh 
position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996, Mandela openly called for the 
sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria’s Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the 
execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and 
Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of 
states. South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in Nigeria. In turn South Africa 
suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South 
Africa’s call (Barber, 2005).  
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South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high moral ground. 
According to Kebemba (2007) when Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) was attacked by opposing forces Southern African states intervened but South 
Africa isolated itself and maintained neutrality. This non-participation in the collective 
intervention is usually contrasted with the country’s military intervention in Lesotho to halt 
the 1998 military coup. This double standard faded the country’s proclaimed moral high 
ground in its foreign policy (Ley, 2005). A number of scholars like Baregu and Landsberg, 
(2003); Nel and Van der Westhuizen, (2004) and Landsberg, (2006) questioned South 
Africa’s decision to supply arms in conflict areas like Rwanda and Uganda. Mandela 
heavily depended on his personality while his successor Mbeki depended on quiet 
diplomacy in softening rivals behind the scenes (Landsberg, 2006).  
During Mbeki’s tenure as the president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being 
part of the continent. He consulted with other heads of states in the decision making 
process. This signalled a clear shift from unilateral decision making as embraced by 
Mandela’s administration towards multilateral decision making (Buhlungu, et al., 2007). It 
can be argued that Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe should be 
understood in this sense. South Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy decisions 
relating to the region and the continent will be taken within the mechanisms of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and, since 2002, the African Union (AU), 
respectively.  
Addressing parliament in March 1995 the Minister of Foreign Affairs1, the late Alfred Nzo 
stressed the importance of South Africa in promoting regional and continental economy. He 
said that for South Africa to drive economic development without the partnership of its 
neighbours was a wild dream. Nzo emphasized that South Africa would involve the 
corporate sector with the intention to establish development to its fullest. With these vows 
from the minister, South Africa was expected to be at the centre of Southern Africa’s 
economy (SAGI, 2008). Some of the foreign policy expects have attentively looked at the 
South Africa-Nigeria relations and the partnership aimed towards achieving the “new” 
Africa (Baregu and Landsburg, 2003; Ogunnubi, 2013). The assumption is that good 
                                                          
1 Department of Foreign Affairs ( DFA) currently known as the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO)  
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governance and sound economic policies ought to be implemented within the New 
Partnership of African Development’s (NEPAD) mechanisms. 
President Zuma followed on his predecessors’ footsteps; South Africa maintained its 
contribution to the AU and its organs (Ogunnubi, 2013). Among many accomplishments so 
far, the formation of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) stands out. 
The agency in principle takes the form of President Mbeki’s African Renaissance and 
International Co-operation Fund. This fund is geared towards the integration of national 
government departments on human resource development to establish one solid and viable 
entity which will enhance state intervention (Ogunnubi, 2013).        
Despite all these mechanisms, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa and 
Africa as a whole and its role has been characterized by flaws. Scholars like the ones cited 
above have tried to analyse post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy in general and with 
regard to Africa. However, none of them has provided a comprehensive analysis which 
covers the full twenty years of democracy. It is this gap that the present study will fill. The 
recent PhD thesis by Ogunnubi (2013) came close to achieving this goal but did not use oral 
interviews to supplement archival and secondary data. The present study will address this 
gap too and supplement the findings made by Ogunnubi. 
b. Reasons for choosing the topic.    
 South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa and Africa as a whole and its role 
has been characterized by flaws. South Africa’s human rights approach and other operations 
have triggered controversy amongst other players especially from the continent. It has been 
labelled differently by different players. While others maintain that it is a hegemon aimed at 
advancing self-interests, others maintain that it is only a team player. The study is important 
because it seeks to contribute to the range of policy options available to South Africa’s 
foreign policy actors in quest to contribute meaningfully in the Southern African region. 
The findings of the study will shed light on South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern 
Africa during the entire twenty-year period. The findings will help in determining whether 
South Africa is a hegemon or just a partner.   
c. Justification for Study  
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South African foreign policy literature is very rich. This is evident in the vast literature 
available which ranges from articles, books to discussion papers. However, one would 
suggest that it is just a misleading fiction. The volumes of available literature cannot be a 
substitute for proper foreign policy analysis. Despite the abundance of literature, South 
African foreign policy remains vague and ambiguous. This is in line with Habib’s assertion 
that “post-apartheid South Africa has not taken kindly to critical scrutiny” (2003: 56). This 
on its own is worrisome; however, the major problem is the African National Congress’ 
(ANC) failure or lack of political will to establish a clear foreign relations modus oparandi. 
According to O’meara (1996) and Williams (2000) the ANC is suffering from ‘intellectual 
inertia’ in relation to foreign policy. Foreign policy analysis has failed to effectively shape 
South Africa’s foreign policy making. Seemingly the only writings which get ruling party’s 
attention are the ones which reflect ANC’s early idealist goals. South Africa’s pledge to 
regional initiatives is perpetually me with diverse critics. To recall Winston Churchill’s 
assertion “foreign policy operates in strange paradox, decided only to be undecided, 
resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful  to be impotent” 
(cited in James, 2008: 4).   
 
This study seeks to contribute towards reviving South Africa’s foreign policy ills as 
identified by leading scholars like Habib, Vale, Landsberg and Adebajo. The importance of 
the study is informed by first-hand information to be gathered directly from representatives 
of countries concerned, think tank organizations and academics. The findings will add to 
the already existing literature which has failed to influence policy making. The findings will 
shed light on South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa. They will help in 
determining whether South Africa is a hegemon or just a partner. The study comes at the 
right time when as a country South Africa celebrates twenty years of democracy and 
freedom. This is indeed an appropriate time to review the country’s progress in different 
sectors including foreign policy making.     
                                                                                                                                                     
1.3 Research problems and objectives: Key questions to be asked 
a) Statement of the problem: 
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The research problem of the study arises from the controversy relating to South Africa’s 
foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. For the 
purpose of the study the research problem is demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a 
conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa, whether it suits 
the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical demarcation. This 
relates to South Africa’s role in Southern Africa.  
 
Included in the discussion is South Africa’s role and subsequently Africa’s representation 
on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This 
relates to the period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a 
democratic country to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa’s democracy. However, 
a reference to South Africa’s pre- 1994 foreign policy decisions is made for background 
purposes and to provide the context within which the proposed study should be conceived.                                        
  
 b) The objectives of the present study are: 
Key questions to be asked: 
The study seeks to address the following questions: 
 
Main questions: 
 What has informed South Africa’s foreign policy agenda during the past twenty 
years? 







 What has been South Africa’s role in Southern Africa?  
 Who have been the major actors in South Africa’s foreign policy making?  
 What role is South Africa expected to play regionally and continentally by its 
neighbours?  
 Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor 
in the multilateral setting?   
 To what extent has there been nexus between South Africa’s foreign policy 
articulation and implementation? 
c) Research problems and objectives: Broader issues to be investigated: 
 To analyse South Africa’s foreign policy imperatives for the past two decades; 
 To establish what informed South Africa’s foreign policy agenda during this time; 
 To find out who were the key role-players in the country’s foreign policy 
formulation; 
 To identify factors responsible for inconsistencies in South Africa’s foreign policy 
agenda; 
 To find out how other African countries and the international community have 
viewed South Africa’s foreign policy. 
 
1.4 Research methodology and methods. 
This study better suits the qualitative method as opposed to the quantitative approach 
because it deals with the clarification of terms and concepts as attained through literature 
review. It also applies deductive methods starting with analysing dominant terms as foreign 
policy. It moves from the general account of South Africa’s foreign policy making and 
actual implementation narrowed to the specifics in order to answer the key question 
whether South Africa is a partner or a hegemon.  The proposed methodological approach is 
in line with Creswell (2003) who acknowledged that qualitative research is used in various 
academic disciplines but was traditionally used in social sciences. Qualitative researchers 
strive to get a thorough understanding of human behaviour and the rationale behind it. This 
approach is more suitable as the study seeks to understand the variation of South Africa’s 
behaviour with regard to foreign policy making options. It explores every detail of the 
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decision making and usually a smaller sample is required. Qualitative research has several 
meanings, for example, the term can be used interchangeably with the terms such as 
naturalistic, ethnographic, subjective, and post-positivistic (Babbie & Mouton, 2003). 
According to Wolcott (1990), qualitative research is geared towards gaining an 
understanding of human systems.  
The study analytically describes the relationship between South Africa and other Southern 
African states. In pursuit of this an “inside out” approach is used. The study deliberates on 
both policy making and actual implementation of South Africa’s foreign policy. Through 
literature, it seeks to explain South Africa’s decision to give priority to issues of human 
rights and peace and security.        
In conducting the study, a number of sources were used. Sources were divided into primary 
and secondary sources, respectively. Primary sources included document analysis. Some of 
the documents were be Jacob Zuma’s interview with Patrick Smith; speeches and addresses 
by Ministers and other officials; and DIRCO website and other relevant websites. Some of 
these documents were obtained from the archives of the former Department of Foreign 
Affairs (now DIRCO). Secondary sources used will included a number of analytical 
materials examining South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. The material included the 
works of leading scholars and commentators in the field in question. These are among 
others: Landsberg (2006), Cox (1995), Habib, (2010) and Selinyane (2004), Keohane 
(2004), Schoeman (2007) and Adebajo (2007). Recent dissertations such as that of 
Ogunnubi (2013) and Naidoo (2010) were also used. In these sources, the scholars gave an 
account of the foreign policy in broader sense then specify on South Africa’s foreign policy. 
They also gave different conceptual clarification of terms like hegemon and foreign policy.  
In addition to that structured open–ended interviews were conducted with purposively 
selected informants. This enabled the researcher to get first-hand information directly from 
the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. The study had a sample of ten informants 
categorized as follows: four officials from SADC countries with embassies in South Africa, 
four academics that are well inclined with the South African foreign policy and two 





Table 1.1: Standard Interview Questions  
 
 
Question 1:  How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern African 
countries? 
 
Question 2:  Assess South Africa’s foreign policy options in Southern Africa. 
 
Question 3:  How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region? 
 
Question 4: What role is South Africa expected to play regionally and continentally by its 
neighbours?  
 
Question 5:  Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one 
actor in the multilateral setting?      
 
Source: Author’s Compilation  
1.5 Structure of dissertation: 
The dissertation has been organised under the following seven chapters:  
Chapter One: Introduction and background 
Chapter one provides background information to the study. It states the study’s 
aims/objectives as well as the research questions addressed in the study. The chapter 
introduces the dissertation stating what each chapter entails. 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review existing literature on the subject of the study 
to provide the context within which the present study could be understood. The trend in the 
discussions and existing gaps in the literature were enumerated as a justification for the 
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present study. Moreover, conceptual framework and key terms were addressed. The terms 
defined included foreign policy, national interests, state actors, non-state actors, partner as 
well as hegemon.   
Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter the theoretical frameworks on which the study is grounded were outlined. In 
this regard, development and hegemonic stability theories were discussed and their 
relevance to the study spelt out.  
Chapter Four: Role-players in South African Foreign Policy Making 
The chapter discussed role-players central in South African policy making and 
implementation – including state and non-states actors – and demonstrated how each role-
player had contributed to the country’s foreign policy over twenty years. 
Chapter Five: South Africa and Multilateral Institutions 
This chapter scrutinized South Africa’s role in multilateral institutions such as SADC, 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), NEPAD, and the UN Security Council. The role 
played by former President Thabo Mbeki was examined and compared to President Zuma’s 
first term in office (2009-2014).     
Chapter Six: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in the SADC Region: The case of Zimbabwe 
This chapter specifically assessed South Africa’s foreign policy making and 
implementation regarding the SADC region, using Zimbabwe as a case study. This was 
done in an attempt to test the extent to which South Africa acted as a partner or a hegemon 
in regional politics.  
Chapter Seven: South Africa’s Foreign Policy between 1994 and 2014: A critical 
reflection 
This chapter provided a general assessment of South Africa’s foreign policy during the 
period in question in an attempt to paint a broader picture which demonstrated how the 
country’s foreign policy should be perceived, i.e. whether it epitomised a partnership or a 
12 
 
hegemonic stance. In a nutshell, this chapter will constitute the research results, data 
analysis and interpretation. After that a chapter contained the research results.  
Chapter Eight  
This chapter provided analysis of the data presented in the preceding chapter and gave an 





















2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Literature review is more than just the summary of the existing literature in a certain field 
of study. It is a combination of an assessment and evaluation of the already existing body of 
knowledge with intent to respond to the research question or hypothesis. It is an indication 
that a researcher has thoroughly engaged literature and reveals knowledge that is already 
known regarding a particular topic. In some cases it can point out areas which remain 
unanswered or contentious, therefore opening a space for further research to fill the 
identified gap. According to Neuman (2000:80) “a literature review is based on assumption 
that knowledge accumulates, that we learn from and build on what others have done. 
Scientific research is not an activity of isolated hermits who ignores others’ findings”.  
 
 This chapter is made up of two distinct but relevant sections. The first one provides a 
review of the vast literature in the field of post-apartheid South African foreign policy. Duo 
to its vastness one will divide it into three categories. The first category is predictive in 
nature mostly produced from 1990-1993. The second category relates to the actual time of 
transition. The third category emerged after transitional period which institutionalized the 
idea of ambiguity in South African foreign policy. The second one seeks to clarify terms 
and contextual issues relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa’s relations with other 
SADC countries. Concepts to be clarified include foreign policy, national interests, partner 
and hegemon. It should, however, be noted that the terms are explained to enhance the 
understanding of the reader. The reader needs to know the intended meaning of the term 
used by the researcher in this study. It is of no importance that the reader submits to the 
definitions given here. However, it is of cardinal importance that there is a shared 
understanding of each concept.           
2.2 Contextualizing post 1994 South African Foreign Policy 
Democratic South Africa carefully chose to establish new relations with Southern African 
states which are different from that of its predecessor government, the apartheid 
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government. According to Pfister (2005), apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy towards 
the Southern African region was based on destabilization. It aimed to punish and weaken 
the frontline states which were in favour of the liberation movements. The Southern African 
region was only important in providing South Africa with labour reserves in industries and 
the mining sector (Adebajo, 2007). As such, South Africa’s foreign policy under apartheid 
towards Southern African countries was confrontational and destructive in nature.        
The end of the Cold War came with massive changes in the domestic political landscape of 
South Africa and led to the shift of political dynamics. The then president, F.W. de Klerk 
(the last president under the old dispensation) announced his intention to release all political 
prisoners and subsequently released them and lifted the ban on their liberation movements. 
One such leader was Nelson Mandela. According to Chhabra (1997), immediately after his 
release, Mandela and de Klerk embarked on an African journey. They travelled meeting 
heads of states; however, they had different positions to lobby for. On one hand, de Klerk 
was lobbying for the relaxation of sanctions and the recognition of the National Party 
government’s legitimacy. On the other hand, Mandela lobbied for the continuation of 
sanctions until true democratic transition took place in South Africa. Both positions shaped 
the nature of South Africa’s relations with the African continent. De Klerk was in a position 
to shape the country’s foreign policy by virtue of his position as head of state. For his part, 
Mandela could only influence African countries not to embrace South Africa’s foreign 
policy imperatives until full democracy had been entrenched in the country and all-
inclusive elections were held in a free political environment.          
Mandela prior to assuming the presidency of the Republic conveyed his concern that if 
human rights issues were to be neglected that would bring about disaster in the international 
arena (Mills, 2000). He further guaranteed that “new” South Africa’s foreign policy would 
be based on human rights and democracy. He held that South Africa’s future depended on 
the African continent, particularly Southern Africa, and that South Africa would pursue 
regional cooperation as opposed to domination (Mandela, 1993). In that sense, South 
Africa’s renewed relations with the rest of Africa was conceived even before the historic 
1994 general elections. Due to its political history and re-admission to the international 
arena South Africa was seen as a “beacon of hope” especially for the oppressed (Economist, 
15 
 
2008). This meant that South Africa had a moral obligation to protect and promote human 
rights (Mills, 2000). This would transcend South African boundaries and apply to Southern 
African countries which had provided sanctuary for the liberation movements which 
relentlessly fought against the notorious apartheid regime. The day of the election came on 
27 April 1994 and Mandela assumed the presidency on 10 May 1994 following the ANC’s 
landslide victory by 62.65%, with the New National Party (NNP) only managing 20.39% of 
the votes. 
But during Mandela’s tenure in the presidency of the Republic, South Africa’s foreign 
policy was widely criticized for lack of clear direction (Chhabra, 1997). This can be 
attributed to many factors such as the newness of the administration in office; and lack of 
enthusiasm on the side of the ministers responsible for effecting the anticipated policy 
changes. Most importantly was the staff of the old regime which did not share the view of 
the new government.  As informed by its past experience of apartheid, human rights were at 
the centre of South Africa’s new foreign policy imperatives – something that was in direct 
contrast to what prevailed under apartheid. Mandela’s main concern was the idea of 
universal human rights (Barber, 2005). His administration took a harsh position against 
dictatorial and oppressive regimes in line with the new foreign policy. For example, in 1996 
Mandela openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria’s Sani Abacha This 
stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro- Wiwa and the Ogoni nine activists 
opposed to Abacha’s dictatorial powers (Vale and Maseko, 1998; and Baregu and 
Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states 
who saw Mandela’s call as “un-African”. South Africa went on to withdraw its 
representative in Nigeria. In turn South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers 
continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa’s call (Barber, 2005). This incident 
marked early signs of the hurdles South Africa’s new foreign policy would face in a 
continent that was tolerant of dictators and the West which had no backbone, saying one 
thing and doing the other. 
South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high moral ground. 
According to Kebemba (2007), when Laurent Kabila in DRC was attacked by opposing 
forces Southern African states intervened but South Africa isolated itself and maintained 
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neutrality. This non-participation in the collective intervention is usually contrasted with the 
country’s intervention in Lesotho to halt 1998’s military coup. This double standard faded 
the country’s proclaimed moral high ground in its foreign policy (Ley, 2005). A number of 
scholars like Baregu and Landsberg (2003); Nel and Van der Westhuizen, (2004), and 
Landsberg (2006) questioned South Africa’s decision to supply arms in conflict areas like 
Rwanda and Uganda. Mandela heavily depended on his personality while his successor 
Mbeki depended on quiet diplomacy in softening rivals behind the scenes (Landsberg, 
2006).                           
During Mbeki’s tenure as the president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being 
part of the continent. He consulted with other heads of state in the decision -making 
process. This signalled a clear shift from unilateral decision making as embraced by 
Mandela’s administration towards a multilateral decision making approach (Buhlungu, et 
al., 2007). It can be argued that Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe 
should be understood in this sense. South Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy 
decisions relating to the region and the continent will be taken within the mechanisms of 
SADC and, since 2002, the AU, respectively.  
Addressing parliament in March 1995 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the late Alfred Nzo, 
stressed the importance of South Africa in promoting regional and continental economy. He 
said that for South Africa to drive economic development without the partnership of its 
neighbours was a wild dream. Nzo emphasized that South Africa would involve the 
corporate sector with the intention to establish development to its fullest. With these vows 
from the minister, South Africa was expected to be at the centre of Southern Africa’s 
economy (SAGI, 2008). Some of the foreign policy expects have attentively looked at the 
South Africa-Nigeria relations and the partnership aimed towards achieving the “new” 
Africa (Baregu and Landsburg, 2003; and Ogunnubi, 2013). The assumption is that good 
governance and sound economic policies ought to be implemented within NEPAD 
mechanisms. 
On occupation of the presidency in mid-2009, the South African citizenry was expecting a 
number of changes in South Africa including new policy directions. This meant that the 
foreign policy direction was also expected to take a new direction. The new administration 
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immediately changed the name of Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) into the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). This fuelled the 
perception that South Africa’s foreign policy was due to take a new direction which would 
prioritise domestic issues. The incumbent in the office minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, 
explained that the change of name was in line with the new direction which would be to 
enhance partnership and co-operation. According to Landsberg (2012:77), Nkoana-
Mashabane articulated that the move was “largely motivated by international trends which 
require states to put emphasis on co-operation over competition, and collaboration over 
confrontation”. Landsberg (2012) suggest that the change of name was an indication that 
the new administration was coming with a new style of leadership towards foreign policy 
making and implementation.  
President Zuma followed on his predecessors’ footsteps; South Africa maintained its 
contribution to the AU and its organs (Ogunnubi, 2013). Among many accomplishments so 
far, the formation of South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) stands out. 
The agency in principle takes the form of President Mbeki’s African Renaissance and 
International Co-operation Fund. This fund is geared towards the integration of national 
government departments on human resource development to establish one solid and viable 
entity which will enhance state intervention (Ogunnubi, 2013).         
 Despite all these mechanisms, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa and 
Africa as a whole and its role has been characterized by flaws. South Africa’s human rights 
approach and other operations have triggered controversy amongst other players especially 
from the continent. It has been labelled differently by different players. While others 
maintain that it is a hegemon aimed at self-interest others maintain that it is only a team 
player.   
 
2.3 Post-1994 South African Foreign Policy Literature 
 
According to Naidoo (2010), Peter Vale a reputable writer on South African foreign policy 
pointed out in 1991 a need for an all-inclusive study on South Africa’s future foreign 
policy. Since then, a plethora of South African foreign policy literature has proliferated. 
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Academics and practitioners in the field have engaged on this dynamic topic; as a result 
three major categories of literature can be identified. 
 
“The first category of literature was predictive in nature. It was produced during 1990-1993 
period and it aimed at predicting and influencing the direction post-apartheid South African 
foreign policy would take. Prominent to those were: Mills and Baynham (1990) “Changing 
the Guard: South African Foreign Policy into the 1990s” Evans (1991), “Myths and 
Realities in South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy” Vale (1992), “Points of Re-entry: 
Prospects for a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy” and Du Pisani (1993), “Post-Settlement 
South Africa and the Future of Southern Africa.” 
 
The second category of literature was at the point of actual transition. Prominent among 
others were:  Mills (1994), “From Pariah to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign 
Relations, 1990-1994” Bischoff (1995), “Democratic South Africa One Year After: 
Towards a New Foreign Policy” Landsberg (1995), “Selling South Africa: New Foreign 
Policy” and Vale (1995), “Continuity rather Than Change: South Africa’s ‘New’ Foreign 
Policy”. 
 
The third category emerged in 1997 which institutionalized the idea of ambiguity embedded 
in South African foreign policy. This idea continues to characterize South African foreign 
policy even today. This literature revolves around the contradiction between theory and 
practice of South African foreign policy. Prominent literature includes, among others: 
Heywood (1997), “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems” Le Pere, 
Lambrechts and Van Nieuwkerk (1999), “The Burden of the Future: South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy Challenges in the New Millennium” Taylor (2001), “Stuck in Middle Gear: South 
Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations” Sidiropoulos (2004), “Apartheid Past, 
Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1994-2004”  and Adebajo et. Al. 
(2007), “South Africa in Africa: The Post-Apartheid Era.”  
 
One might propose that foreign policy academics and scholars are very keen to explore new 
directions for South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy towards Southern Africa and 
19 
 
Africa in general. The expectation was that post-apartheid South Africa would use its 
relative stronger economy to its advantage and subsequently be imperialist and 
interventionist more than the past regime. There were further expectations that an already 
established hegemon would take a leadership role. No matter what ambitions were, all 
directions were bound to have their own loses and gains. Despite all ambitions and 
obsessions regarding South Africa’s relations with the Southern African region they remain 
ambiguous. However, they can be broadly summed up in the manner presented below. 
 
Table 2.1: Scenarios on SA’s presence in the region  
 






South Africa as a major 
actor in the Southern African 
region is at the forefront of 
attaining regional 
cooperation and integration 
in line with its national 
interests and ambitions of 
being a regional hegemony. 
As a result, the region’s 
political economic structure 
is asymmetrical benefiting 
South Africa. According to 
McGowan and Ahwireng-
Obeng (1998), the status quo 
enables South Africa to act 
as hegemon as opposed to a 
partner. This might open 
space for marginalization 
and fragmentation leading 
towards uneven 
This approach is likely to be 
fruitful for South Africa in 
the near future; however, it 
is likely to blow out and 
contradict its long-term 







development. Flowing from 
this, one might suggest that 
South Africa is 
implementing a ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ policy. This 
policy is of unbalanced 
integration where by South 
Africa raises the  
African Renaissance flag 
while its corporations 





The South African 
government together with 
South African corporations 
are advancing their narrow 
business interests at the 
expense of their regional 
counterparts. This neo-
mercantilist route on one 
hand allows South Africa to 
pursue its own bias interest 
while on the other hand 
being adamant to the general 
necessities of the region. 
This approach contradicts 
South Africa’s long-term 
goals of bridging the gap and 
addressing the current 
imbalances among the 
member states. Davies, Keet, 
This approach is the most 
non-compatible route 
towards the establishment of 
the favourable conditions for 
growth and sustainable 
development. Overnight 
benefit will not be of 







and Nkuhlu (1993) proposed 
that the nerve of South 
Africa’s foreign policy 
towards it neighbours would 
be of asymmetry and non-
symbiosis. South Africa 
would infiltrate the region’s 
market but remain adamant 
in addressing other issues of 
importance.         
 
Partnership 
South Africa  is currently   
 implementing parasitic 
policies, entering into non-
mutual beneficial alliances  
 and partnerships with the 
expectation that all parties 
will benefit in the near 
future. The aim is to 
establish a regional capacity 
and to create an environment 
suitable for the sustainable 
development as well as 
political and economic 
growth.   
  
This is in line with state 
officials who constantly 
reiterate the ANC’s position 
as outlined in the ANC 
Foreign Policy 
Perspectives “ …we address 
our own problems as part of 
a family of Southern African 
nations, our destiny 
inextricably linked by 
geography, history and our 
huge collective potential” 
(ANC Foreign Policy 








A number of academics and 
scholars in the foreign policy 
arena seem reluctant to 
accept the possibility of 
South Africa playing no key 
regional role. Regardless of 
This might work in early 
stages but in the long run it 
is likely to be cost 
ineffective.   
According to Cheru (1996, 
















South Africa’s scarce 
resources and huge domestic 
responsibilities, its interests 
in Southern Africa remain 
suspicious. This is informed 
for an example by its 
decision to intervene 
militarily in Lesotho and its 
non-interventionist stance in 
the case of Zimbabwe.                                                                                                                                                                   
  This might cause South 
Africa to redirect its interests 
to other places like Asia, 
Europe and North America.                                                                                                                   
This would mean minimum 
participation in sub-regional 
initiatives.  
relationship will facilitate 
South Africa’s integration 
into the world economy but 
will undermine the 
possibility of reversing the 
century old structure of 
dependence and 
marginalization and is 
unlikely to bring 
development to Southern 
Africa”.     
 
Source: Author’s compilation; adapted from Naidoo (2010)  
 
The above scenarios offer a necessary but basic outline of what is or should South African 
foreign policy be. Nonetheless, it restricts policy analysis to traditional categories and 
norms of sovereign states and their interrelationships. As Kissinger (1994:17) proposed 
“What no leader must ever do is suggest that choice has no price or that no balance needs to 
be struck”.  
 
 
2.5 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTUAL ISSUES UNDERLYING 
THE STUDY  
 
2.5.1 Introduction   
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In the field of political science scholars tend to use the same term to refer to different events 
or processes. This means that one term is likely to have different meanings. This is contrary 
to natural science, which has fixed definition of terms which are universally accepted. This 
submission is in line with McGowan and Nel (2000:15) who hold that:   
 
Scholars in international relations are very eclectic, and they use methods 
and conceptual tools from a whole range of disciplines to carry out their 
investigations. As such, concepts form the basic tools with which 
researchers can describe, interpret, explain, predict and make normative 
judgments.  
 
These scholars suggest that international relations scholars should come up with 
“appropriate” meanings for the terms to be used. Owing to the complexities of the 
international relations discipline even “common” terms are given different meanings by 
different scholars. It is therefore, important to explain terms when used for the purpose of 
clarity. According to Olivier (2009) concepts and theories emerge to explain existing 
realities of the society. Flowing from this, one can conclude that there are a number of 
terms which are used to analyse South Africa’s foreign policy. This section seeks to clarify 
terms and contextual issues relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa’s relations 
with other SADC countries.  
 
2.5.2 Foreign Policy  
According to De Plussis (2002) international relations scholars generally agree that foreign 
policy is a contested and ambiguous concept. It is therefore important to state that this study 
does not seek to give a comprehensive and single definition; instead it seeks to offer a 
general but detailed conceptualization of this term. Russet and Starr (1996) hold the view 
that the variety of interpretations, arguments and statements on foreign policy are as a result 
of the absence of the universally agreed upon foreign policy definition. It is because of this 
“vacuum” that scholars from different schools of thoughts have coined different definitions 
and interpretations. Foreign policy decisions based on “hot” issues like human rights, 
democracy and international law can be better interpreted through the application of certain 
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theories” (GCIS, 2009).  Orwa and Utete (1985) hold that foreign policy is a sum of policy 
goals and interests persuaded by a state. However, this definition has its own discrepancies. 
It creates a false impression that foreign policy represents states’ interests only, therefore, 
side-lining the non-state actors. This is a realism orientated definition which assumes a state 
as the only rational and unitary actor in the international system. This definition leaves out 
other actors like the civil society and individuals (Hill, 2003). Du Plessis (2002: 112) 
submitted that foreign policy refers to: 
 
 [T]hose actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated 
directives, and performed by government representatives acting on behalf 
of their sovereign communities are manifestly directed towards 
objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-
governmental – which … lie beyond their sphere of territorial legitimacy.  
 
This definition is accommodative; it recognises the role of both state and non-state actors 
like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in foreign policy related issues. While the 
state was understood to be the central actor in the international system now NGOs like the 
International Red Cross and Human Rights Watch have come to play. State is still the most 
primary actor but this does not suggest that NGOs are not important actors (Hill, 2003).    
 
Foreign policy is different from domestic policies as it is a tool for attaining states’ policy 
goals outside the country. Perhaps the most suitable way to define it would be to split it and 
take into account sovereignty and territory (Russett and Starr, 1996). It is “foreign” because 
it seeks to develop and sustain relations outside the state’s borders (Hill, 2003). At the same 
time it is described by Russett and Starr (1996) as the decisions taken by diplomats to 
achieve foreign policy goals of their states.  
 
It will be useful to turn to the roots of the word “foreign”. It comes from the Latin word 
“foris” translated into English as ‘outside’. That is why foreign policy relates to issues 
outside the state’s borders. “Foreign” also serves as an indicator that the international 
system is divided into different components and that foreign policies seek to close the gap 
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between these components. This policy relates to the tactics which states employ in order to 
display their identity abroad. So, foreign policy is a medium through which states justify 
their international activities. Such activities can be economic or political (Hill, 2003).  
 
Du Plessis (2002) and Holsti (1995) refer to foreign policy as an activity. However, Russett 
and Starr (1996) reject such a claim. They (Russett and Starr) hold that foreign policy is not 
an activity instead it is a link between two activities; local and abroad activities, 
respectively. They argue that policies mere abstracts. However, they admit that policy 
related activities like diplomacy, mediation and negotiations can be understood as activities. 
Adar (2006) concurs that foreign policy remains a hypothetical statement awaiting 
implementation. It is also important to differentiate between foreign policy and diplomacy; 
the two are intertwined but different. The former entails interests and objectives and states 
outside a country’s borders, whereas the latter is the modus oparandi through which those 
interests are achieved. Foreign policy is taken as a policy mainly because it involves state’s 
interests and objectives. Foreign policy can be based on a number of aspects like security, 
economy and politics (Du Plessis, 2002). Now let one turn to stages of foreign policy.  
 
According to Knecht and Weatherford (2004) foreign policy making is a long process 
which involves different actors; they further break the process to the following five stages:  
 
 Stage one is Agenda Setting. Here policymakers compile a list of potential areas of 
focus and decision makers clearly point out the rewards and dangers involved.  
 Stage two is Opinion generation. This is more of a brainstorming session. Decision 
makers make a list of the most important and urgent areas of concern. 
 Stage three is Policy Design. Here policy decisions are made as per the issues 
identified in the latter stage. This is the important stage regarding foreign policy 
formulation.    
 Stage four is Implementation. This includes strategies and tactics through which the 
policy formulated is put into action. This stage involves a number of different actors 
both state and non-state actors.  
26 
 
 Stage five is Policy review. Here the decision makers evaluate the failure or success 
of the policy and make necessary amendments or abandon the policy depending on 
the outcomes of the evaluation process.   
 
2.5.3 Foreign Policy Goals and Anticipation  
Every state’s foreign policy is goal- orientated; as a result there are always objectives to 
assist in achieving such goals. Usually, foreign policy objectives reflect potential ambitions 
of the state and are set by the few elites on behalf of the entire group. The difference in 
states’ foreign policy is the manner in which each state pursues its objectives. As mentioned 
earlier, foreign policy is the policy guide for action (Landsburg, 2006). Success in attaining 
policy objectives is not given; other states fail to achieve their objectives. Foreign policy 
varies from one state to the other depending on the goals set.  
 
Taking into account the aforementioned stages of foreign policy making, Holsti (1995) 
identifies common foreign policy goals usually set by actors. Foreign policy is usually 
aimed at:  
 Ensuring security domestically and to a certain extent outside borders. This usually 
includes the prevention of insurgency, secession and violence. Depending on the 
type of government, some have suppressed political and civil rights in the name of 
national security. 
  Competency towards attaining prosperity. This may include provisions for public 
welfare. Governments seek to develop and maintain public welfare through 
economic and social services provisions. 
 Gaining international prestige. States want to be respected by other states in the 
international system and most states use military power to gain prestige.   
 Maintaining independence and autonomy. This involves the state’s ability to 
formulate and action its own policy without outside interference.         
 
Decision makers need to take into account issues of morality when deciding on their 
relations with others states. Despite the anarchic nature of the international systems there 
are actors who follow the rules while others just break them. Those who follow the rules do 
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that within organizations like UN and the AU (Hill, 2003). In moral terms, states are 
expected to act modesty and in good faith; this is in line with the international norms. This 
suggests that states’ foreign policies should mirror equality of all states and fairness. Issues 
relating to military intervention and human rights violations are highly controversial issues 
from the morality point of view (Holsti, 1995).   
 
Policy makers usually set too many goals which are way beyond the state’s capacity in 
terms of implementation. Over ambition on the side of policy makers raises hopes for the 
general public only to find that the goals are unachievable. In the same vein, setting very 
few goals might create the impression that there is a lack of competency on the side of the 
state and therefore result in the state losing its level of credibility. According to Hill 
(2003:45) “it should be borne in mind that it is common to have exaggerated political 
expectations of what can be done with foreign policy … just as there is an academic trend 
towards expecting too little”. However, it is risky to promise what is not achievable. 
Promising equal global distribution of wealth is suicidal as it is unlikely to be achieved 





2.5.4 Southern Africa 
McGowan (2002) suggests that Southern Africa is usually defined as a community of 
fourteen member states of SADC. It is a total of twelve countries located in the most 
Southern part of the African continent with DRC being the most Northern plus two islands 
located in the Indian Ocean: Mauritius and Seychelles, respectively. Naidu and Roberts 
(2004) concur with McGowan (2002) that Southern Africa is made up by most Southern 















Nonetheless, the division of Africa into Southern, North, East and West Africa is not based 
on any solid foundations. There is a view that “SADC’s original membership was defined 
by the apartheid state’s economic, political and military destabilization campaigns and 
therefore reflected both South Africa’s historical economic ties on the continent and its 
military reach” (McGowan, 2002:268). Tanzania for example, was a founder of the 
Frontline States and of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 





Table 2.2: Differentiating between SADCC and SADC  
 
 SADCC SADC 
ESTABLISHMENT  It came as a decision of the 
political formation of the 
Frontline States. 
It emerged out of deliberations 
of the SADCC Conference on 
the 17th of August 1992 in 
Windhoek, Namibia. 
  
OBJECTIVE  To achieve regional autonomy 
free of South Africa.  
To come up with Southern 
Africa’s united position in the 
dynamic international economic 








Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe  
  
Angola, Botswana, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, 




Source: Author’s compilation 
 
There is no dispute in terms of what constitute Southern Africa relative to physical 
boundaries. The definition adopted is basically helpful and of general usage (Simon, 1998). 
However, certain additional countries are included for particular objectives or context. The 
ten countries generally undisputed under any context are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These 
countries by all means make up the Southern region under any circumstances (Simon, 
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1998). For the purpose of this study the Southern African region will be understood as 
comprising the ten above mentioned countries as illustrated by the map bellow.   
 








2.5.5 National Interests 
National interest theory conceptualizes states as self-centred actors in the international 
system. States are seen as rational actors with interests just like human persons (Frankel, 
1963). Bullard (2006) claims that there is no universal definition of the phrase national 
interests; therefore it is defined differently by different people. As much as it has no 
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common definition it is, however, generally accepted that the term relates to foreign policy. 
According to Hill (2003:119) “national interests cannot be a guide to foreign policy goals 
because they are tautologous”. He holds the view that national interest is a yardstick 
because it determines whether a policy is domestic or international and whether it is public 
or private. This shows that foreign policy goals originate from people’s interests (Alden and 
Soko, 2005).    
 
In the conceptualization of national interests by the scholars of the realist school of thought 
the importance of power stands out. A realist Morgenthau (1978) holds that national interest 
can be defined on the bases of power. Defining interest as power might create an 
impression that politics as a field is independent and separate from fields like economy and 
security. National interests of a state are power orientated (Pham, 2008). States and other 
foreign policy actors justify their actions both good and bad as being carried out in the 
name of national interests (Adar, 2002).        
 
The elite-centric model upholds that there is little or no relationship between public and 
foreign policy. This is in line with the realists who hold that the public has no input in 
foreign policy formulation and implementation. Both these models suggest that the general 
public lacks competency to contribute to foreign policy making and its implementation 
because of their inherent human weakness. They stress that the general public is sometimes 
vulnerable to the point that it succumbs to weak personalities like inconsistent moods and 
irrationality. Both schools of thoughts suggest that decision makers should abandon the 
preference of the nation, however, continue using the phrase when referring to foreign 
policy goals (Knecht and Weatherford, 2004). This is a true reflection of the reality since 
decision makers in foreign policy hardly consult the public during the decision -making 
process. 
 
There is a concern regarding the correctness of the usage of the phase “national interests”. 
Dissidents submit that it is senior government officials who are direct custodians of the 
foreign policy formulation and implementation and that there is minimal or no input from 
the general public and the corporate sector. Hence, the phrase “goal of the government of 
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the day” would be more suitable than national interests (Adar, 2002). The phrase national 
interest is largely utilized by realists because it better explains the state’s behaviour. From a 
realist angle, “one country’s military presence in other conflict-stricken countries can be 
ascribable to that country’s power related national interests, let alone the motivation behind 
peacekeeping” (Schoeman, 2007:98). However, dissidents would reject this because most 
people do not know that their governments are involved in peacekeeping operation abroad. 
Despite this, decisions are conveyed as if they are based on the majority, the nation. 
 
2.5.6 State Actors      
The term actor might appear as complex and ambiguous, but for the purpose of this study it 
refers to the state and civil society which are involved in foreign policy making. According 
to Hill (2003) the state is a sum of public institutions responsible for order and social 
stability in a defined territory. A modern state is categorized according to its authority over 
the citizen of the given geographical space. This enables a hospitable environment for the 
operation of government on behalf of a state. One must stress that there is a difference 
between the state and the government. While the former is an embodiment of public 
institutions and citizens, the latter is the tool in which state authority is exercised. 
According to McGowan and Nel (2002:13) “State actors comprise the sovereign territorial 
states (STSs) in the world together with the intergovernmental organisations … that they 
form”. States in the international systems are results of different groups and individuals. 
These groups and individuals are not always agreeing with one another and therefore need 
to be treated as different rational actors. In addition to this, intergovernmental organizations 
that emerge from states’ effort like SADC and the AU can also be referred to as state actors.  
 
Realist scholars hold the view that states are rational and unitary actors because of the 
power they are commanding over their respective citizens (Hicks, 2004). States are usually 
not honest with one another in the bilateral and multilateral forums. Morgenthau (1978) 
believes that the selfish behaviour of states in the international system should be attributed 




Goodrich (2004) opines that the rejection of realism’s conception of the state as a rational 
and unitary actor usually meets with a lot of criticisms. Generally speaking, it is not easy to 
be rational in every issue every time. The rationality of any given state is subject to a given 
issue in a given time; states are not rational in everything they do. Likewise, according to 
Higgott, Underhill and Bieler (2001) the rejection of the realist assumption should not 
create a false impression that states’ role have been reduced, however, it has shifted. This 
shift is due to increasing challenges posed by non-state actors. Currently, states are 
dominant only at the domestic level where they provide for governance services.  
 
2.5.7 Non-State Actors  
According to Hornby (2005) the nature of non-state actors can be approached from the 
linguistic perspective. The prefix “non” means “not”, therefore, not state actors. The 
discussion here revolves around actors which are not state actors; these are neither 
established nor maintained by the state. However, they function within the domestic state 
laws. This alone shows the amount of power and authority states enjoy at least at the 
domestic level (Adar, 2002).  
 
There has been a substantial increase in number of non-state actors in the international 
system mainly due to globalization. The increase relates to the number of actors; size of the 
actors and the power they command. Idealist scholars reject that states are the most single 
important actors in the international system. Vincent (2002:147) submits that “… idealist 
scholars have argued that non-state actors have a significant impact on questions of politics, 
morality and peace, and that … the state might not be the most important variable for 
explaining world events”. As much as idealism advocates for non-state actors it, however, 
excludes unwanted actors like terrorist organizations.  
 
2.5.8 Partner   
South Africa’s foreign policy has found itself trapped in the controversy regarding its 
identity in the international system. This alone has led to disputes on whether South Africa 
is looking for partners in her neighbouring states or is just a self-interested hegemon. It is 
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therefore of paramount importance to explain these two concepts as they are at the centre of 
this study.    
       
Partnership can be understood to be meaning friendly political and economic relations 
between and among actors in the international system. The root of the usage of the term can 
be traced back to the colonialization period. It was used to refer to the situation where 
Britain had granted certain limited autonomy to its colonies which did not constitute full 
independence. They were granted minor powers enough though to manage own affairs. 
With the developments between the master and a colony the term partnership started being 
used interchangeably with dominions and dual policy (Duncan, 2007). In partnership, 
concerned actors are assumed to be sharing same goals and objectives with equal treatment, 
yet it is known that not all partners are equal in relation to power (Schoeman, 2007). It goes 
beyond just cooperation. Instead, “It is the highest level of reciprocal commitment between 
international actors. In partnership, there can also be mutual interests, “interdependency”, 
“cooperation and trust”, “quality control” and “standards” amongst allies. Although there 
ought to be some extent of interdependence among partners, there must also be a strong 
sense of sovereignty and independence” (Duncan, 2007:55). Similar to all partnerships in 
the international system, there is expectation of tolerance and commitment. It is however 
important to note that regardless of the goals and objectives partners do not agree on 
everything every time (Schoeman, 2007). Now it is important to turn to another concept, 
hegemon.   
 
2.5.9 Hegemon  
Hegemon comes from hegemony, which was derived from the Greek word hegemonia 
which translates ‘to lead’ in English. According to the neo-realists hegemon relates to a 
state which plays a strong and credible leadership role. It should also discharge 
unchallenged leadership (Schoeman, 2007). From this, one can infer that a hegemon is a 
state which has power to dominate and control other states (Evans & Newnham, 1998). A 
hegemon at times becomes monopolistic and implements its own interest although states 
become beneficial sometimes to other actors. The issue of unchallenged leadership can also 
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be exercised by any powerful actor, state or non-state alike. In most cases hegemony is 
linked with the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (McGowan & Nel, 2002).  
 
The term hegemony is more effective compared to other concepts it is usually equated to, 
like middle power or emerging power. Hegemony thoroughly explains the hierarchical and 
possibly the ideology of a predominant actor within that particular arena. While a hegemon 
has been closely related to the emergence of the US as a global hegemon, it has been 
principally used in international relations to refer to the bilateral relations between 
developing and already developed states (Prys, 2007). Currently the term hegemon is 
usually confined to regional relations. According to Prys (2007) this does not mean that a 
hegemon can be effectively used interchangeably with terms like regional leader or 
emerging middle power. This, however, does not seek to dispute that all these actors have 
the same goal that is to develop and coordinate the regions. The concept ‘hegemon’ can 
also be defined using normative and empirical evaluations. Regardless of the failure to 
provide a concrete definition of hegemony, it can be divided to several types like capitalist 
hegemony, regional hegemon and economic hegemon among others.             
 
A hegemon in a broader sense can be either positive or negative. Positive hegemony is 
usually characterized by the willingness to regulate and manage for the communal benefits 
of the hegemony and its subordinates. The legitimacy of the hegemon rests on its ability 
and strength to set rules to be followed by the subordinates without the use of force (Selby, 
n.d.). This kind of hegemon usually takes good care of public good and works towards 
educating its subordinates. Contrary to this, a negative hegemon desires repressive 
domination with the imminent use of force and power imbalances (Selby, n.d.). Adebajo 
(2007) adds that negative hegemons have bulling and arrogance tendencies. This behaviour 
is compared with that of Britain in the 19th century during colonialism. 
 
The global hegemon is understood to be an entirely dominant single actor obsessed with 
hegemonic desires. However, Taylor (2001) suggests that global hegemon relates to 
provisional partnerships which seek to change social forces. This term shows the power of a 
strong structure of economic and political forces and the exercise of leadership where there 
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is lack of potential alternative. In such scenarios, one dominant state within the collective 
assumes the supreme responsibilities, economic or political. Nevertheless, this does not 
seek to dismiss the idea that the major source of hegemony is based in the hegemon’s 
ability to address domestic and foreign challenges which culminate in a particular collective 
of actors relating with a dominant actor.  According to Gramscianism, being a hegemon in 
whichever sphere goes beyond material (military and monetary) possession to also 
incorporate “intellectual and moral leadership” on the grounds of ideological affiliation 
(Taylor, 2001:12). 
                                  
Hegemonic leadership can be comprised of cooperative and supportive actors within the 
particular forum; regional or international. In Gramscian terms hegemonic leadership is not 
dependent on material resources the hegemon possess but also depends on the capability to 
persuade other players to follow on ideological basis (Prys, 2008). Here a hegemon relies 
on the rational interests that need to benefit the hegemon together with the subordinates. 
The presence of a hegemon is likely to bring about political order and decreases the chances 
to use force, but this is not guaranteed everywhere and all the time. Prys (2008) 
recommends the following measurements which must be taken into account when 
attempting to fully understand hegemonic systems.  
 
 Perceptions: This relates to self-perception and perception by other actors 
concerned. 
Hegemons are generally perceived to be ready to assume the responsibilities of a         
hegemonic situation. It is because the failure to assume such responsibilities leads to 
confusion and regrets particularly where there is a huge vacuum between 
expectations and successes. Leadership requires followership; hence, there will be 
no hegemon without subordinates. Most likely, not all subordinate states welcome 
and accept the leadership of a hegemon. Some will defy, challenge and condemn the 
hegemon. The establishment of a hegemon relies on the individual actor’s response 




 Projection: A hegemon should demonstrate its interests to other actors as opposed to 
imposing on them. Hegemons need to be mindful of how they operate in pursuit of 
their vision. For example, if a hegemon wants to involve itself in conflict resolution 
it needs to do that in a multilateral setting through bodies like SADC and AU.  
 
 Provision: A hegemon in any level where it exists is characterized by unilateral 
provision of public good. Services commonly provided for by hegemonies include 
free market trade, security and infrastructure.   
 
A hegemon is not only determined by material resources. It can also be determined through 
its ideological allegiances. A hegemon pursues and defends what it ideologically believes 
in. The ideal image of what a hegemon stands for “can be identified as the way in which it 
views and interprets the world and its contents, perhaps partly influenced by its national 
interests” (Schoeman, 2007: 3). For the purpose of illustration, South Africa is the example 
of a regional actor in the SADC region and the continent to a limited extent, respectively. 
The US exemplifies both a continental and global hegemon. It is the regional hegemon in 
the continent North America and world hegemony. In the recorded history of the 
international relations three hegemonies have emerged: Holland, Great Britain (1800s) and 
the US (1990s). However, there are different views regarding the US’s global hegemonic 
status with some disputing it (McGowan and Nel, 2002). Thus, hegemonic status remains 
contested.  
 
2.5.10 Multilateralism        
The term multilateralism was traditionally defined as global government of the many; this 
definition was coined by the US in 1945. The US then was at the forefront in establishing 
multilateral and treaty organizations to face the common challenges. The advocates of this 
idea acknowledged the existence of one hegemon; however, they believed that 
multilateralism would benefit secondary actors for the purpose of stability. The major 





Currently there is a “hot” but stimulating debate among schools of thought regarding 
multilateralism. According to the constructivist point of view states are just actors playing 
in the multilateral relations with their objectives and behaviour shaped by the shared norms 
(Verdier, 2005). Contrary to this, realist scholars believe that morality has no standing in 
global politics. They aver that states’ behaviour is guided by their own interests as a result 
hegemons would remain dominant within the alliance unless secondary actors join forces to 
counter the hegemon (Verdier, 2005). However, if states are perpetually engaging in 
conflicts with one another there will be little chances of progress. If it happens that there is 
progress despite perpetual conflicts then the multilateral organization in question is likely to 
reflect the hegemon’s national interest. The institutionalists’ approach mirrors both realists’ 
and constructivists’ point of view. On one hand, they agree with constructivists that 
competition among actors can be regulated by institutional means. On the other hand, they 
concur with the realists’ that states are self-interested actors who only enter into multilateral 
bodies to pursue their own agenda (Verdier, 2005).   
 
With the prominence of the multilateralism, common challenges have revolved around 
global economy. Multilateral institutions came with several advantages. According to 
Wedgwood (2002) states with large pools of resources contribute largely in the multilateral 
institutions for greater good. Kegley (1995:11) submits that: 
 
A multilateral environment is a great platform where states are obliged to 
respect international law and cooperate in many areas of development 
including health, security, economic development and technology. They 
also get to exchange each other’s interests and concerns; simultaneously 
seeking to resolve their differences.  
 
However, multilateralism comes with its flaws. Decision making for example delays 
because of many actors contributing different views. It takes more time than in a bilateral 
forum. Sometimes important matters end up being not addressed mainly because decisions 
are often broadly taken; therefore, lacking practical implementation strategy. The idea of 
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independence distorts decision making because other actors do not reveal certain domestic 
information in pretext of national security (Wedgwood, 2002).  
 
Realists have consistently rejected multilateralism as a proper platform for interaction. 
Realists claim that super powers exploit relatively weaker states and pursue their individual 
interests (Wedgwood, 2002). Slobodchikoff (2009) asserts that the US is applying 
multilateralism in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while applying bilateral 
principles in multilateral forums like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). 
Slobodchikoff (2009) claims that should a state choose multilateralism as a preference it 
should go for it in all foreign relations. Neoliberalism also rejects the universalization of the 
idea of multilateralism. It prefers regional multilateralism over global multilateralism as a 
forum for interaction. Regional multilateralism is better equipped to address international 
problems. The reason is that cooperation and effective policy implementation is difficult in 
large organizations like the UN (Kahler, 1992). 
 
2.5.11 African Renaissance  
The term African Renaissance has been the centre of attention for many African statesmen. 
However, this seems to dwindle as a result of the departure from office of its advocates like 
South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki; Libya’s Muammar Kaddafi; and Nigeria’s Olusegun 
Obasanjo. These statesmen were at the forefront leading the road to the African 
Renaissance. Since President Mbeki resurfaced the term there has been an attempt to 
analyse and to define it (Okumu, 2003). African Renaissance refers to the state where 
Africa’s culture and economy experiences development (Hornby, 2010). In essence African 
Renaissance stresses that the African future is in the hands of the Africans themselves. This 
means that Africans ought to face socio-economic and political challenges that characterize 
the African continent (Maloka, 2011). In the South African context, the term African 
Renaissance emerged following the election of President Mandela as the head of state. It 
was thereafter popularized by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki particularly when he 





I am born of a people who are heroes and heroines ... Patient because 
history is on their side, these masses do not despair because today the 
weather is bad. Nor do they turn triumphalist when, tomorrow, the sun 
shines. ... Whatever the circumstances they have lived through and 
because of that experience, they are determined to define for themselves 
who they are and who they should be.   
 
 He further noted “I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, 
the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that 
define the face of our native land. …” (Mbeki, 1996). Mbeki was seriously worried about 
the continual conflicts in Africa in the age of an economically globalizing world (Ajulu, 
2001). More concerning was that the African continent has vast natural resources like gold, 
copper and uranium to name the few, but is still at the periphery of the world economy 
(Ayittey, 1999).   
 
According to Mbeki in order for the African Renaissance to succeed decision makers and 
policy makers need to focus on social cohesion, democracy and economic rebuilding. In 
addition to that is the institution of Africa as an important player in the geopolitical issues 
(Ayittey, 1999). President Mbeki’s aid Vusi Mavimbela characterized African Renaissance 
as a third moment in post-colonial Africa. The first moment is decolonization, the second 
moment being the widespread of democracy during the 1990s, and the third moment being 
the African Renaissance (Mavimbela, 1998). As much as President Mbeki recently 
promoted the idea of African Renaissance, the ability of Africa to rise above its seemingly 
embedded challenges was identified long time ago. Addressing the audience at Columbia 
University in 1906 one of the founders of the ANC (Pixley ka Izaka) Seme (1906) noted: 
 
The brighter day is rising upon Africa...Yes the regeneration of Africa 
belongs to this new and powerful period. The African people...possess a 
common fundamental sentiment which is everywhere manifest, 
crystallizing itself into one common controlling idea...The regeneration of 
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Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added to the 
world. 
  
The idea of renaissance itself pre-existed before Pixley ke Izaka Seme’s period; it can be 
traced as far back as the fifteen century in Europe. During the renaissance in Europe there 
was a renewal of Europe’s interests in Greek culture (Lotter, 2007). (Obonye, 2012) 
believes that the notion of African Renaissance is not a new development. He makes 
reference to Africans who have also talked about the same idea; they include Kwame 
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Robert Sobukwe. They preached among other things self-
reliance, democracy and sustainable development as the centres of African Renaissance. 
While the idea of African Renaissance is not a new invention, it remains one of the best 
ideas to emerge from the Africans themselves today.      
             
2.5.12 Conclusion  
This chapter was twofold; the first section reviewed the vast literature in the field of post-
apartheid South African foreign policy. Due to its vastness the literature was divided it into 
three categories. The first category was predictive in nature mostly produced from 1990-
1993. The second category related to the actual time of transition. The third category 
emerged after transitional period which institutionalized the idea of ambiguity in South 
African foreign policy. The second section attempted to clarify terms and contextual issues 
relevant to this study, pertaining to South Africa’s relations with other SADC countries. 
Concepts that were clarified included foreign policy, national interests, partner and 
hegemon. It was, however, noted that the terms were explained to enhance the 
understanding of the reader. The reader needed to know the intended meaning of the term 
used by the researcher in this study. It was of no importance that the reader submits to the 
definitions given here. However, it was of cardinal importance that there should exist a 
shared understanding of each concept. Having dealt with literature review and key 
concepts, the following chapter will give key theories in which the study will be 







3 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
3.1 Introduction 
According to Cox (1995) theories emerge out of reality because they are shaped by 
practical events and processes. However, they lead reality making since they shape the 
minds of those who change or reproduce the reality through their actions. In relation to this 
study, theories are helpful constructs for better comprehending shifting dynamics of the 
international politics. This study was guided by development and hegemonic stability 
theories, as well as middle power paradigms to better comprehend South Africa’s foreign 
policy hesitance between hegemony consolidation and promotion of an African agenda in 
the region. The study swerves from the conventional international relations theories like 
realism, idealism and globalism which have always been at the centre of South Africa’s 
foreign policy analysis. However, the aim is not to reject or dispute their significance and 
relevance in South Africa’s foreign policy analysis. According to Dunn and Shaw (2001), 
traditional international relations theories are not sufficient to help us to better comprehend 
the African inter-state relations and by application foreign policy. However, in the course of 
the study, reference to conventional theories’ assumptions was made. The idea is to offer a 
distinct theoretical understanding of South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma.    
                       
3.2 Conventional theoretical approaches 
3.2.1 Realism 
For the realist scholars the global area is anarchic by nature; this refers to the lack of central 
government with authority (Waltz, 1979). All traditional actors are sovereign and 
independent from one another and there is nobody to dictate relations among them. They 
act out of either own will or out of forcible means. Due to lack of the central authority 
power becomes very important. Power becomes a variable of interest since states would 
need it to defend themselves. Both soft and hard powers are important for states’ survival; 
however, military capabilities determine international politics (Waltz, 1979).             
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According to Mearsheimer (1994) this view of the international system is based on the 
following assumptions: Firstly, all states struggle for survival. All states are in danger of 
being invaded by outside military forces and being subjugated. This applies even if states 
reflect benevolent goals; anarchic nature requires power for self-defence and advancement 
of interests for survival. Secondly, states are assumed to be rational actors. Taking into 
account the eagerness of states to survive, they ought to act carefully in order to realise the 
goal for survival. Thirdly, realist scholars assume that every state has certain military 
capabilities since no state can tell what other states intend to do. This means that the 
international system is risky and full of imminent threats. Lastly, the international system is 
for the super powers to dominate (Mearsheimer, 1994).  
Realist scholars themselves differ on certain issues. The offensive realists hold that states 
seek to increase their power for the purpose of survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). They assume 
that if state A has more power relative to state B then state B is in danger. It is therefore the 
best option to strive for being a hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2001). Contrary to that, defensive 
realists hold that domination is a bad idea for survival (Waltz, 1979). Moving towards being 
a hegemon might threaten other states and subsequently cause enemies. Defensive realists 
advocate for stability through the balance of power. This entails a fairly equal distribution 
of power. This is likely to ease tension and it eliminates the perceived eminent danger of 
being invaded by other states (Waltz, 1979). However, the overarching obsession of the 
Realists by state of anarchy results in a shallow view of both international law and 
institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994). According to the realist scholars in the absence of clear 
central authority law can solely be enforced through state power.    
According to Sabine and Thorson (1973) realism sees international relations as a field full 
of competing states and when such competition becomes hostile it can lead to war. Dunn 
and Shaw (2001) acknowledge that African states usually do not militarily engage one 
another; however, in the early 1990s with the change of the world order tensions have been 
high. Nossal (1998) holds that realism sees the world realistically, that is, each state pursues 
its own interests and it is watching other self-interested states in the system. In the 
international relations, national security and state survival are at the centre of the foreign 
policy formation (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). In the view of realists, power is a 
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fundamental feature in the international relations while the state becomes the central player. 
However, Dunn and Shaw (2001) assert that notwithstanding the realists’ thought, most 
African states are weak.               
South Africa as a perceived regional power is an important player within the African 
continent particularly with the emergence of the so called African century. The major 
objectives of the foreign policy are to project and defend the national interests of the state 
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2003). Landsberg (2006) asserts that the application of the realists’ 
interpretation on South Africa’s foreign policy reveals that South Africa is pursuing to be a 
regional hegemony. Realist puts national interests before any other consideration. 
According to Hattingh (2007), the ANC’s foreign policy is formed on the basis of business 
expansion. It seeks to expand South Africa’s business’ interest all over the continent. Using 
this trajectory to interpret South Africa’s activities in Southern Africa, we could conclude 
that the country subscribes to the realist theory. 
3.2.2 Liberalism 
Liberalism provides for a complicated and interrelated analysis compared to Realism. The 
point of departure is that domestic features of individual states are important for their 
foreign relations. This is contrary to the Realists’ view of states being self-interested and 
being in the struggle for survival. According to Doyle (1997), the emergence of the 
democratic peace phenomena is the best development in the Liberalist circle. As earlier 
envisaged by Immanuel Kant democratic peace professes the absence of war between and 
among liberal states. The assumption is that mature liberal democracies do not wage war 
against one another. Statistical analysis shows that there are only few instances where 
mature liberal democracies have waged war against each other (Brown, Lynn-Jones and 
Miller, 1996). However, there have not been compelling reasons provided as to why liberal 
democracies do not fight each other. In addition to that, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) claim 
that the actual democratization process is a bloody one compare to autocratic regimes.  
Moravcsik (1999) provides a common outline of liberal theory in relation to global politics. 
The outline is based on three assumptions: Firstly, non-state actors as opposed to states are 
key actors in the international system. This emphasises the primary role being played by 
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NGOs, IGOs, individuals and private groups in the international system. Secondly, states 
are simply dominant actors out of many domestic actors in the society which merely serve 
society’s interests. Finally, the configuration of these preferences throughout the global 
arena dictates states’ behaviour (Moravcsik, 1999). Issues relating to power distribution are 
treated as non-dynamic limitations on the relations of socially-derived state preferences. In 
line with this view, states are not just objects struggling for survival in the anarchic world 
but a network of different actors whose interests are projected by government. Survival 
might be important too but not a primary goal; there are ideological and commercial issues 
in the equation (Moravcsik, 1999).                                  
Liberalism focuses on individual rights and freedom which is the base for modern civil 
society. It also emphasizes on democratic principles and capitalist economy (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 2003). By implication international relations are not centred on the struggle for 
power among actors. Instead, it is centred on states, groups and individual actors. What is 
important is that different societies are able to work together for the common good. 
Scholars like Ezeoha and Uche (2005) hold that South Africa’s advocate for democracy 
using the African Renaissance concept can be better understood within liberal 
confinements.    
 In comparison to the realist school of thought, liberals tend to have a positive view towards 
human nature, hence believe in human progress (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003; Nossal, 
1998). Sociological liberalism asserts that international relations go beyond states’ 
interaction to include international institutions and transnational groups. According to 
Landsberg (2006) in pursuit for peace and democracy in Africa, South Africa is acting out 
of good faith. South Africa strongly believes that it can simply export democracy as means 
to resolve conflict in places like Sudan and DRC (Hughes, 2006). Van Nieuwkerk (2006) 
notes that the shift away from Mandela’s universalization of human rights towards the 
promotion of neoliberal principles helps South Africa to better prioritize its national 
interest. This follows from the fact that it is much easier to pursue national interests through 
negotiation than war. Hence the African Renaissance project should be understood in this 
context. South Africa as a perceived regional power is involved in peace initiatives and it 
aims to be a “good global” citizen with its promotion of human rights (Hughes, 2006). 
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South Africa partakes in the collective initiatives like NEPAD, AU and SADC in the 
continent. Liberal conceptualisations of South Africa’s foreign policy on their own, 
unfortunately, do not sufficiently grasp the issue of national interests which at the end are 
the core of foreign policies. The link between the country’s foreign policy and liberalism is 
that South Africa believes in peaceful means of resolving conflicts which are not 
confrontational. This reduces the prospects for war but still guarantees the country’s safety. 
3.2.3 Marxism 
Karl Marx’s theory revolves around class struggle specifically over the production and 
distribution of the means of production. The capitalist class which owns the means of 
production tries by all means to keep the profit to themselves while oppressing the working 
class (Sabine and Thorson, 1973). According to Jackson and Sorensen (2003) capitalism is 
by nature exploitative: those in the capitalist class are dependent on exploiting the working 
class to make profit. In order to put Marxism into context, one might argue that there exists 
a political struggle not only between states but different classes in the society. Therefore, 
the class struggle is within and across states. According to Nossal (1998), imperialism 
should be understood as the last stage of development. Imperialists pay better wages for 
domestic workers in home country to defuse them while exploiting workers in the host 
country. Sabine and Thorson (1973) contend that democracy should be understood as an 
effective way of addressing contradictions embedded in production. They see politics and 
economics as binaries which provide space for class struggle. 
 
According to Landsburg (2006) South Africa’s foreign policy and diplomacy in Southern 
Africa and in Africa as a whole is seen by Marxists as a foundation for the capitalist to 
secure profit. Landsburg (2006) concurs with Tleane (2005) and points out to the South 
African media and information companies which are dominating beyond Limpopo borders 
in pursuit of maximum profit. Swartuk (2000) holds that South Africa is emerging as a 
bully in the region; however, its views are discarded. Although South Africa acts as a 
hegemon, it has a difficult time in commanding the block which has no clear direction. 
South Africa‘s hegemonic status exposes its interest to lead the region towards its own 




Buhlungu claims that South African companies operating abroad breach the code of ethics 
in host countries. He refers to South African companies which continued with extraction of 
resources especially during 1996 and 1998 DRC’s civil war (Buhlungu, et al, 2007). 
According to Swartuk, (2001), South African companies have secured for themselves labels 
like exploiters and neo-colonizers as evidenced in the case of Zambia where Shoprite was 
accused of exploiting workers to the extent that the Zambian government had to intervene 
(see Table 3.1 below). This is in line with neo-Marxist scholars who hold that capitalism by 
nature is exploitative and disregards host countries in pursuit of profit. Other actors who 
label South Africa as a sub-imperialist are not fooled by the pretence of the African 
Renaissance project. It is unfortunate that Marxist’s view on South Africa’s foreign policy 
reduces issues of national interest to class struggle. In doing this, it undermines South 


























Source: Naidoo (2010)  
 
 
In the spirit of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), African countries are 
nurturing an economic union, which will allow Africa to grow to greater self-sufficiency and 
economic stability. Shoprite wants to play a meaningful role in building a ‘United States of 
Africa’, dominated not by foreigners but African companies… Apart from offering consumers 
quality products at the lowest prices, the respective local economies also benefit from… retail 
property infrastructure, job creation, the upliftment of local producers. 
 
(Shoprite’s African Vision as cited in the Shoprite Checkers Annual Report 2003) 
Versus 
[excerpts from the studies conducted by Miller (2003) and Muneku  (2003)] 
They (these investors) are not helping Zambia to develop. Shoprite, whatever they sell, the monies 
are transmitted to SA right away. Even the government is aware that that these people, they are just 
using Zambia as a market, just to sell their things and send all their profits to SA. So Zambians are 
not benefiting from it….   
If we look at all the products, the merchandise they have, they all come from South Africa, which 
means that manufacturers in South Africa are on the benefit side, because they are the ones that 
receive the money … 
 
Control of Shoprite Zambia lie firmly with head office in the Western Cape and the six top jobs – 





3.2.4 Development Theories 
A number of development theories are based on the conviction that the foreign policy of 
states is based solely on the structure of international systems. This is also evident in the 
works of Myint (1954) and Myrdal (1957) who pointed to the strong political urgency 
relating to the promotion of economic development in less developed regions to ensure 
international stability post World War II. In line with this, South Africa’s foreign policy 
after 1994 towards Africa, particularly Southern Africa is similar to American Policy in 
Asia by Rostow who writes: “The United States must develop a more vigorous economic 
policy in Asia. Without such a policy our (American) political and military efforts in Asia 
will continue to have weak foundations…” (Rostow, 1955:43). This approach is based on 
inequalities in the international arena and links development with wider political issues like 
stability. Contrary to this, pluralists hold that the international system is a reflection of 
interconnectedness and interdependency that drives development. This line of reasoning is 
informed by developmental projects like the Maputo Corridor and Lesotho Highlands 
Water Scheme. The former links Mozambique and South Africa and the latter links Lesotho 
and South Africa, however, both projects benefit South Africa more than the partner 
countries. Just like other semi-peripheral states, South Africa’s influence stretches beyond 
its borders reaching the Southern African region. According to Graaff (2007) Lesotho and 
Mozambique’s economies heavily rely on providing South African mining sector with 
migrant labor. In addition to that, other industries like construction, manufacturing and 
transport have become widespread throughout the continent. In neighboring Namibia, for 
instance, all the above South African companies can be identified. This expansion makes 
South Africa to have characteristics of a sub-imperial state (Barber, 2005). Despite the 
increasing cooperation among neighbouring countries, there are still scepticisms in relation 
to unequal development between the interdependent partners. This can be better understood 






Figure 3.1: Developed-Underdeveloped Relations  
 
 
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d5/Dependency_theory.svg   
 
 
A central issue for the dependency school of thought is the dominance- dependence 
relationship. This is as a result of contestation between the poor and the rich countries, 
where the former is exploited and the latter benefit. If this analysis is to be adopted, then the 
question of how poor economies develop in the light of comparative advantage and capital 
accumulation arises. The success of the already developed economies cannot set precedent 
for the developing economies. During the 1950 -1960, there was a general understanding 
that growth strategies were uniform around the globe. The most influential proponent of 
this view is Rostow (1960) in Stages of Economic Growth. He suggests that the 
development of the core countries was largely dependent and based on specific events and 
processes. He cites colonialism as a process which was exploitative and dependent. For the 
countries developing now it is unlikely for them to follow the same suits of those developed 
earlier. It is therefore important for the dependent states to adopt self-reliance policies. This 
is in conflict with the neo-liberal models advocated for by the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
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A deeper integration into the international market is a bad choice for the underdeveloped 
countries and reflects the certification of autarky. The failure of Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa in 
Tanzania and Great Leap Forward in China reject autarky as a best policy option. 
Developing economies should only enter to partnerships where it is in the best interest of 
larger citizenry.  
 
 It is generally accepted that dependency theory is for analysing North-South relations; 
however, it can also be used to analyse South Africa’s post -1994 relations in the region, 
hence its relevance in this study. Dos Santos (1970) suggests that dependency happens 
where an economy of a country relies on the development of another country which it is 
subjected. According to Frank (1978) the poor countries will never develop unless they 
abandon any relations with the rich countries and undergo internal revolutionary change. It 
is this line of reasoning which creates perceptions of scepticism of African countries 
towards South Africa. 
 
According to dependency theorists, countries are capable of imposing uneven exchanges in 
order to delay the development of their partners. By doing this, they entrench dependence 
on them as developed countries. Faletto does not believe that dependency is as a result of 
only external factors imposed by rich countries, but also as a result of internal struggle. 
Cardoso and Faletto write: “Economic relations, including the impetus for development, are 
a product of the different class struggles to change or preserve interests” (Cardoso and 
Faletto 1979: 14). It can be said that the static South African economic relations can be 
credited to the capitalist class who want to maintain the status quo at the expense of the 
poor. This is in line with the studies done on the rise of the ‘black’ elite in South Africa. In 
his study Iheduru (1996) contends that there can never be assurance that the post- 1994 
foreign policy would be friendlier than pre- 1994 foreign policy when the interests remain 
the same. As much as dependency theorists believe that interests of transnational capital has 
a potential to bring about development to the poor countries, they however do not believe 
that the core-periphery relations lead to mutual benefits. Based on the above discussion, 




3.3 Theories which guided the study 
3.3.1 Theory of Hegemonic Stability 
The inequalities which are at the core of the core-periphery model which the development 
theories criticize have been misinterpreted. The theory of hegemonic stability rises above 
the traditional interpretation of these inequalities to realize that such inequalities can be 
used to bring about stability. Theorists from the different schools of thought in the 
international system agree that there is a need for hegemony to sustain liberal world order. 
The premise is that there is a need for one dominant actor in the international arena who 
will articulate, enforce and uphold the rules of engagement in the multilateral environment. 
In this way, issues of security are likely to be handled better because of the presence of the 
dominant power that can create multilateral security regimes and look out for rogue states. 
These thoughts are in line with Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1987) who hold the view that 
the uneven allocation of material and economic capabilities are more favourable to regional 
stability. In essence, as much as the liability to provide public good would heavily rest on 
the hegemon, it is far better off with the provision than lack thereof.  
 
In addition to that, scholars of the realist school of thought including Krasner (1976) and 
Gilpin (1987) point to the allocation of power among actors as a crucial aspect in the 
stability of the international economy. They concur with Kindleberger (1973) the forefront 
advocate of the theory of hegemonic stability in the 1970s. The theory holds that a clear 
hegemony guarantees an open and stable economy. The hegemony manages and 
reprimands other actors in order for them to feel secure and open their markets to it. On the 
contrary, the theory of hegemonic stability links the decline of hegemony with economic 
meltdown, instability and unhealthy competition of blocks. To drive the point home, the 
scholars quote Great Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century, 
respectively. In the course of the 19th century Britain as a hegemon sustained globalization, 
the emergence of multinational corporations and political stability in Europe. However, 
World War 1 put to an end both hegemony and conditions it had promoted. It replaced the 
latter with economic meltdown. Despite the fact that the United States was the strongest 
actor towards the end of the war, it did not take the leading role which had been abandoned 
by Britain. The United States opted to close its markets to imports (Kindleberger, 1973).  
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This isolationist policy option by the United States led to the economic meltdown as the 
international system lacked hegemony to coordinate the economies. The United States 
learned from the unintended consequences of isolationist policy option. As a result it 
assumed the leadership position after World War II. It adopted an open market model based 
on GATT and monetary system based on Bretton Woods’s system.  
 
On the other hand, Keohane (1989) and Lake (1993) reject the abovementioned relationship 
between hegemony and economic stability. They reject it on the basis that there is no 
universal barometer to major hegemony. This theory emerged despite the apparent fall of 
American hegemony and rise of Japan. The behaviour of the United States during the inter-
war period demonstrates that the availability of resources means neither beneficial outcome 
for the international system nor influence. According to these scholars, this shows that the 
allocation of power is not the only factor determining the international economy. However, 
Keohane (1989) accepts that hegemony can play a huge role in the establishment of 
regional and international institutions, but once up and running they take on a life of their 
own independent of hegemony. Keohane’s views do not hold water in light of the calls to 
reform institutions like the UN, UNSC, World Bank and WTO on the bases that they are in 
the hands of a few hegemonies.  
 
The theory of hegemonic stability stresses the necessity for cooperation. From this assertion 
it can be said that there are symbiotic relations between multinational institutions and 
hegemons. Institutions do not emerge and operate on their own, but they are established and 
driven by powerful players in the system. Hegemonies contribute more than ordinary 
players in the maintenance of the institutions. As a result they benefit more than other 
players. According to Kennedy (1987) multilateral institutions take some of the 
responsibilities of bringing about stability from hegemonies, hence covering their relative 
decline in global power. Taylor (2011) contends that a hegemon can be accepted since it 
offers certain services and goods benefiting its counterpart. This contention is in line with 
the Gramscian view. In an attempt to round up Triepel and Gramsci’s positions on 
hegemon, Ogunnubi (2013) submits that hegemons are based on both the nature and means 
adopted to exercise hegemony. Military over-stretch is the potential problem to be faced by 
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powers whose security ambitions exceed the resources available. These arguments 
rationalize South Africa’s decision to use multilateral mediums as the AU and SADC to 
push for their peace and stability agenda.      
 
These arguments rationalize South Africa’s decision to use multilateral mediums as the AU 
and SADC to push for its peace and stability agenda. However, this does not explain why 
South Africa does not partner with powerful countries like Nigeria to pursue its regional 
objectives. Gill (1993) asserts that the lack of undisputed hegemony as it is the case in 
Africa makes states to opt for coalitions. This can be seen as sharing hegemony. Alden and 
Veira (2005) hold that where there is no single hegemony the international community is 
likely to confer hegemon status to a middle power to guide other states. However, the effort 
to get international and regional legitimacy is difficult and leads to ambiguity in terms of 
identity, and South Africa is the classic example of such lack of clear identity.  
 
Ikenberry in Milner (1998) holds that hegemonies would usually opt for multilateral 
cooperation regardless of losing their autonomy. He insists that relying solely on material 
dominance without social frameworks to legitimize it becomes risky because it is likely not 
to last. Multilateral institutions come with a strong base for legitimacy. In multilateral 
institutions hegemonies bind and commit themselves to certain restrain while the weaker 
states accept their legitimacy (Milner, 1998). Wohlforth (2004:199) asserts: 
 
Legitimate hegemonies are far cheaper and safer to maintain over the long 
run than illegitimate ones. Institutionalized hegemonies are far cheaper 
and safer to maintain than over the long run than non-institutionalized 
ones. And hegemonic powers that find ways to accommodate the status 
drives of lesser states face fewer costs over the long run. Aggressively 
unilateral policies undermine legitimacy, corrode institutions and heighten 
status anxieties, generating higher costs and greater instability over the 




South Afriac’s role in Zimbabwe is a good illustration. South Africa’s role as per the 
mandate of SADC was acknowledged as having led to the 2008 elections as opposed to its 
bilateral quiet diplomacy.  
 
An evaluation of a state to test whether it can be characterized as hegemony or not should 
rest mainly on three aspects. The first one is dominance. This is the perpetual use or threat 
to use force on neighbours. Secondly is hegemony. This aspect appeals on the fact that 
hegemons usually use other means as opposed to the actual use of force when interacting 
with weaker states. Lastly is primacy. This relates to a country’s willingness to take a 
leadership role (Bull, 1977). This framework reveals the degree in which two terms, 
hegemony and dominance have been used interchangeably. To illustrate this, Schoeman 
(2002:228) is relevant. She submits: “hegemons are considered to be ‘natural leaders’ 
within particular international systems, such as a region and/or sub-region and this position 
of leadership is based on their relative strength (economic and in some instances military) 
vis-à-vis other states in the same system”. She then in her article titled “South Africa as an 
emerging middle power: 1994-2003” asserts that “hegemon in the pejorative sense belongs 
more to the idea of a behemoth: a big and powerful state (militarily and economically) that 
has very little sense of, or shows little care for, the effect of its actions on other states” 
(Schoeman, 2007: 93). Taking this into account, one would be receptive to Guzzini’s 
(1998) assertion that hegemonic stability theory is a modified realism as it is based on 
power. Greater powers coerce their relatively weaker counterparts. However, Foucault 
(1980:39) distinguishes between domination and hegemony: 
 
It [hegemony] differs from simple domination by being based on consent 
and legitimacy and thus presupposes a certain commonality of values. A 
prospective hegemon needs to behave in a manner deemed acceptable by 
those actors whom it wishes to lead, and it has to present its own 
objectives and strategies as furthering the public good. Such an ability to 
persuade is not so much an antithesis of power, but rather an integral 




 In the same vein Habib and Selinyane (2004) draw a direct link between hegemony and 
leadership. According to these aforementioned authors hegemon is an international or 
regional leader in terms of both soft and hard power. Hegemonies are not confined to 
military and economic power but go beyond boarders to consider transnational platforms 
and pursue them. Hegemonies would strive to implement their goals mainly of stability, 
development and security. This however does not seek to suggest that hegemonies operate 
on one man basis but they take it upon themselves to shape and lead the initiatives. A status 
of being hegemony can be limiting because every time, hegemony should display concern 
for public good as opposed to being selfish. It is therefore of paramount importance to 
suggest features of hegemony. Firstly, it is the capacity to enforce laws relying on fast 
growing economy, technological advancement and military power. Secondly, it is a 
political will to act in a mutually beneficial system. Lastly, hegemony must have an 
ideology which is acceptable to other actors. According to Van der Westuizen (2010), a real 
hegemony has consent from other states in the system. It imposes its own ideas to relatively 
weaker states and thereafter the ideas are conveyed as that of a collective institution.   
 
If one evaluates South Africa’s potential of being a hegemony against the points mentioned 
above, it is evident that it has the capacity and political will; however, it is not accepted by 
other actors as a hegemon. It is acceptable that it outplays its neighbours, militarily and 
economic wise. South Africa’s capabilities in relation to the enforcement of rules are 
indisputable. In relation to the last point, the commitment to mutually beneficial system, 
post- 1994 South African administration has put an enormous commitment. South Africa 
has worked hard towards the establishment of multilateral institutions like NEPAD and AU. 
President Mbeki lobbied extensively for the NEPAD to the G8, EU and the UN. Contrary to 
this, South Africa’s commitment has been undermined by its national interests. This was the 
case in the World Conference against Racism in 2001 where it rejected demands for 
reparations for slavery, colonialism and apartheid. In Mexico in 2002, during the UN 
Conference on Development Finance in Monterrey, South Africa rejected the proposal to 




Maybe the most practical scenario will be that of the tension between South Africa and its 
neighbouring Zimbabwe. The issue lied on South Africa’s decision to use economic muscle 
during trade negotiations, the issue which was reduced to personal differences between 
President Mugabe and President Mandela. The perceptions of rivalry which have emerged 
between South Africa and its long-time friend Angola can be interpreted as harbouring 
ambitions of being hegemony in the South of the Sahara. South Africa’s commitment to 
Africa raises concerns from its neighbours that it is likely to pursue its narrow national 
interests. However, Habib (2003:86)  believes that “…as the US relations with Western 
Europe in the post-World War II period indicate, national interests of hegemons can under 
certain circumstances coincide with those of particular regions”.  In this regard, Habib 
(2003:88) noted that: 
 
…a hegemonic role has to be undertaken by South Africa if we are 
committed to the realization of stability, security, and development in 
South Africa, in Southern Africa, and in Africa. Lesotho is the example 
we need to learn from. Zimbabwe is the example to avoid. 
 
Habib’s examples can be rejected instead be used to legitimize South Africa’s scepticism to 
totally assume the hegemonic leadership role. On one hand, South Africa was widely 
condemned for its military intervention in Lesotho while, on the other hand, its quiet 
diplomacy was fruitful in comparison to Britain’s confrontational approach. Despite being 
deemed as ineffective South Africa’s approach afforded the time and platform for dialogue 
which led to the 2008 Global Political Agreement. President Zuma lashed out those who 
criticize South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe saying that they have done nothing to 
remedy the situation until South Africa came into the picture.    
 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that post -1994 South Africa’s ambition to drive Africa’s 
regional agenda is hindered by the region’s lack of political will to have South Africa 
driving the agenda. African countries are neither prepared nor willing to give South Africa a 
driving role. The major problem with leadership is that it requires followership, that is, in 
order to lead you must be followed. This explains why South Africa cannot lead despite its 
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desire and commitment to lead; it lack followers. Perhaps one should differentiate between 
hegemony and leadership. Hegemony is the ability of a relative stronger state to dictate 
policies to its relatively weaker states. Leadership is the general ability to engage and 
influence relatively weaker states to adopt the leader’s goals and present them as their own. 
South Africa is generally taken as a regional hegemony, but it has not been successful in 
delivering on the African vision. According to Marais (1998) South Africa’s hegemony is 
limited to the economic aspect, and does not match Gramcian terms. Gramsci (1971), 
believes that in order for a state to be hegemony it must enjoy an active consent from other 
states. In this sense South Africa is a dominant actor but not a hegemon. As opposed to 
being labelled even as a leader perhaps it can be correctly labelled as a primus inter pares. 
This does not seek to dispute that conventional power attributes (economic and military 
muscles) are of importance, they are not enough to bring about hegemony.  
 
Convectional power attributes by all means contribute to the hegemony making, however, 
the key lies with acceptance of state’s goals and rules. To borrow Evans and Newnham’s 
(1998:221) words “a hegemon’s ability to lead is derived as much from what it stands for as 
from how it seeks to achieve its goals”. In line with this, the perception of being a hegemon 
is incorrectly measured by the ability of a state to imitate hegemony. Even here, the 
controversy over South Africa’s position towards neighbouring Zimbabwe is useful. The 
supposed failure of the South African government to be more decisive against President 
Mugabe’s administration received criticisms from both domestic and international. Alden 
and Schoeman (2004) held that obvious hegemonies are not real hegemonies; they cannot 
extend their influence on relatively weaker states unless their visions and goals are 
acceptable by relatively weaker states.  
 
This was not for the first time South Africa proved not to be hegemony. Mandela’s 
administration took a harsh position against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996 
Mandela openly called for the sanctions to be imposed against Nigeria’s Sani Abacha. This 
stance was a response to the execution of Ken Saro -Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and 
Maseko, 1998; Baregu and Landsberg, 2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by 
other African heads of states. South Africa went on to withdraw its representative in 
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Nigeria. In turn South Africa suffered a blow when Western superpowers continued to buy 
oil from Nigeria despite South Africa’s call for isolation (Barber, 2005). Adebajo (2006: 
78) believes that “It is probably not an exaggeration to say that this single incident greatly 
influenced Mbeki’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe. African efforts to 
depict Pretoria as a western stooge over Nigeria were a painful experience that Pretoria was 
determined never to repeat”. South Africa’s shameful experience might be one of the key 
factors which redirected Mbeki’s administration away from Mandela’s radicalism.  
 
Habib (2003) refers back to the piece of writing by Rob Davies in 1992 where he 
pinpointed South Africa’s role in the region. Firstly, it is a South Africa first approach. 
Secondly, it is integration under South African hegemony approach. Lastly, it is a non-
hegemonic and regional cooperation approach. Habib further draws from an article by 
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998). Here the authors explain South Africa’s options 
between hegemony and partnership. This shows the common assumption that the former 
and the latter cannot coexist. Habib (2003) carefully notes that any thorough observation of 
hegemonic behaviour shows that partnership is a method of engagement as other aggressive 
methods. Nonetheless, Habib and Selinyane (2006) maintain that South Africa’s combined 
abilities in terms of economy and military define South Africa as a hegemony or regional 
power. This status came with certain privileges and responsibilities which make it to be 
unique to both its African counterparts and other middle powers. Perhaps it is a benign 
hegemony which can bring about equitable and sustainable development provided its 
counterparts are willing to acknowledge its leadership. However, it can be argued that 
Habib’s conclusion is based on widely distorted South Africa’s capabilities. Regional 
hegemonic systems in Africa will not be driven by one actor, not South Africa and not 
Nigeria. Instead it will be shaped by regional powers together with other regional actors.   
 
Overall, being a hegemon does not mean having absolute and incontestable power. It solely 
lies to other states to accept or reject the hegemonic status depending on the kind of that 
particular hegemony and their own national interests. For example, South Africa’s 
diplomatic efforts in DRC were undermined by Namibia and Angola by sending armed 
forces to intervene in the troubled country in 1998. Above that, Adebajo (2006) believes 
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that as long as South Africa’s neighbours such as Zimbabwe and Angola have ambitions of 
leadership South Africa will not be able to affirm its regional leadership, not even in SADC. 
He holds that South Africa’s need for partnerships outside SADC as Nigeria contributes 
immensely to its failure to emerge as a clear regional leader in the conventional sense. By 
all accounts, the hegemonic stability theory best explains South Africa’s activities in the 
Southern African region.                
 
3.3.2 of Pivot States, Middle and Emerging Powers 
 
Hegemonic stability models prevent greater powers from leadership role except 
hegemonies. In line with this, there is an alternate theory which has not been deeply 
explored in the theoretical considerations, that is of pivot state. In Landsberg’s (2003:96) 
terms: 
 
A pivot state is one that in comparison to its neighbours is, ipso facto, a 
powerful state. From such relative powerfulness flows the capability to 
influence other states, events and regions. The pivot state is influential in 
a region because internal developments in such states or lack thereof, are 
so significant that it typically holds major implications for states in its 
immediate region.  
 
The two models, hegemonic stability and of pivot state are different. The former relies on 
its power to make laws and dominates the region, while the latter acts towards common 
good through cooperation with other actors (Landsberg, 2003). Here Landsburg committed 
an error which has been identified by Habib that of assuming that hegemonic leadership 
cannot co-exist with partnership or cooperation.  Flowing from this, it can be inferred that 
there is a little distinction between hegemonic leadership as articulated by Habib and pivot 
state as articulated by Landsberg.  Habib and Selinyane (2004) went on to claim that all 
hegemonic states are pivot states who want to be more. However, a thorough investigation 
produces a core distinction between hegemonic states and pivot states. The difference lies 




The pivot state is delicately poised between potential success and possible 
failure: it has the potential to work a significant beneficial or harmful 
effect on its region. While such a state might be stronger and more 
developed vis-à-vis others, it also suffers from its own significant 
socioeconomic challenges, such as deep inequalities and massive levels of 
poverty. 
 
Internal hindrances are a major cause of the pivot state’s scepticism to undertake leadership 
position which is central to hegemonic states. Taking into account both Landsburg and 
Habib’s arguments one can conclude that the pivot state model is more appropriate in 
explaining South Africa’s choice of multilateral action over unilateral actions.  
 
However, as pointed out above, the pivot state model has not been explored in comparison 
to the hegemonic model. The possible explanation for that is likely to be the abundance of 
literature on middle and emerging powers since they are based on the same theoretical 
foundations. The literature includes but is not limited to Habib and Selinyana (2004); 
Cooper et al. (1993) and Spence (2004). Distinctions between middle and emerging powers 
is summarized in table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1: Distinctions between middle and emerging powers 
 
MIDDLE POWER (SWEDEN)  EMERGING POWER (BRAZIL) 
Have a well-developed economy.   Have a stable and secure economy  
Morality elements accompany its foreign 
policy.   
Seeks to take a leadership role.  
Sets achievable and reasonable goals.  Seeks to emerge as a super power. 
Strategically involves itself where its 
presence would make difference.  




Source: Author’s compilation; adapted from Naidoo (2010) 
 
A number of scholars including Schoeman (2003) held that South Africa does not match the 
standards of being an emerging power. She suggests that it has unstable domestic dynamics 
and it further lacks both political will and the capabilities necessary to assume emerging 
power status. It is not a credible leader within the region as opposed to emerging powers 
whose credibility is acceptable to their neighbouring states. Another major factor which 
contributes to South Africa’s failure to qualify as an emerging power is its general 
geopolitical status. Chase’s asserts (1996:44) “in global geopolitical terms, South Africa is 
a rather small country. For example, its total GDP is about the same size as Ford Motor 
Company’s global sales. It has variously been labelled as insignificant, at worst and as a 
middle power or pivotal state, at best”. Le Pere and Nieuwkerk (2002) agree that South 
Africa might be a dominant regional actor in terms of economy, but internationally it is just 
a middle income placed on medium human development ranking on the United Nations 
Development Programme index. With this ranking, it is placed below Cuba and next to Sri 
Lanka. McGowan (1993) shares similar sentiments that in the international system South 
Africa is a semi-periphery state; however, due to its dominance in the region it is usually 
ranked with countries like Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Israel and Malaysia. Scott in Marais 
(1998) went as far as to suggest that South Africa is just one of the middle income 
developing countries without any special contribution to the international economy. He 
maintains that South Africa better suits middle power status than emerging power status.   
 
Robert Cox (1989) held that middle powers by definition are positioned in the middle rank 
in terms of their abilities, militarily and economically. Usually they seek to strengthen 
multilateral platforms in order to enhance cooperation. Therefore, middle powers are 
closely related to multilateralism. Prioritizing collaborative methods as opposed to 
competition is regarded as anti-hegemonic in the global arena. According to Keohane 
(1969) middle power states are those who lack the capacity to act effectively when alone 
but prefer to act under the umbrella of an international institution. It is therefore safe to 
suggest that South Africa’s choice of multilateral diplomacy is a reflection of lack of 
resources and its political will to be part of collaborative world. It is worth noting that the 
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apartheid South Africa was lacking in this area due to a number of reasons. It was no longer 
a member of the Commonwealth; it was already excluded by the UN General Assembly and 
other specialized agencies of the UN.                  
 
Post 1994 South Africa’s foreign policy has been the subject of multilateralism. Jackie 
Selebi, the former Director General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, while still in 
office was cited in Nel et. al.,, (2001) as saying: “South Africa attaches immeasurable 
significance to its multilateral engagements. Indeed, multilateralism is the cornerstone of 
this country’s foreign policy” (2001: 1). South Africa joined many intergovernmental 
organizations and entered into a number of treaties. South Africa further assumed 
leadership positions in the region and globally. This is reflected in Table 3.2 below. 
 
Table 3.2: South Africa’s Multilateral Engagements    
RESPONSIBILITY  ORGANIZATION PERIOD 
Chair  Southern African 
Development Community  
1995-1999  
Presidency  United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development  
1996-1999  
Chair  Non-aligned movement  1998 -1999 
Chair  Commonwealth  1999-2002  
Chair  Session of the UN 
Commission on Human 
Rights  
1998  
Chair  Oslo Diplomatic Conference 
on an International Total Ban 





Member  G 20  1999 
Member UN Security Council  2007  
Member  BRICKS  2010  
Chair  AU Commission (Nkosazana 
Dlamini Zuma)  
2012  
Chairperson  SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security 
Cooperation  
2014  
Source: Author’s compilation  
 
Taylor (2001) concluded that South Africa’s multilateral efforts can be organized as 
follows:  
 Full of activism within multilateral framework; reliance on multilateral platforms 
to pursue broader foreign policy goals and endorsement of multilateral forums as 
means for interaction.   
 Reinforcement of already existing regional and international institutions in order to 
represent developing world’s interests; and 
 An attempt to initiate changes to the already existing institutions to ensure that they 
better address developing countries problems including their marginalization.        
 
The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, once indicated that South Africa is fully 
committed to multilateralism as a tool for social security (Cilliers, 1999). This commitment 
was further intensified by President Mbeki when addressing parliament. He said that 
participating in multilateral affairs is the best option in an attempt to disjoint the negative 
impact of globalization on weaker countries. South Africa has played a huge role in G 20 
redirecting policy directions towards reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition 
to this, South Africa is committed to the transformation of the UN (Nel et. al. 2001). In line 
with this, President Mbeki drove the developmental agenda while participating in platforms 
such as: G 77 Conference held in Cuba; EU Summit held in Portugal; UN Millennium 
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Summit held in New York and G 8 held in Tokyo. Cited in Westhuizen et. al. (2001:111), 
Howard Barrell lamented that “as a result of his recent interventions, Mbeki has emerged 
over the past six months (January – June 2000) as the developing countries’ single most 
important voice in the world economy”.  
 
According to Black (1997) middle power leadership is usually grounded on moral 
principles. In this case, South Africa is suitable to be characterized as a middle power 
countries because of its ‘moral thrust’ approach in its foreign policy which prioritizes the 
developing world. However, a thorough investigation into the foreign policy of middle 
power including South Africa disputes the assumptions of high moral standing. Middle 
powers often fail to take a clear position in conflict situations even when they are appointed 
as mediators. Because of this usual failure they have secured themselves the label of “fence-
sitting”. Cooper et. al. (1993) draw the example of Australia and Canada to demonstrate the 
point of moral relativism of middle powers. These authors compare the two countries’ 
failure to intervene in 1990-91 Gulf conflict in Kuwait on the guise of sovereignty and their 
lack of capacity to  act or condemn the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in 1975. 
South Africa is seen through the same lenses. The above examples show the problem of 
assuming that middle powers are kind of caring actors who balance their national interests 
and general interests. In actuality, they reaffirm the notion that national self-interests are the 
major influence in foreign policy making of middle powers. Middle powers act as if they 
are honestly devoted to common interest; however, in cases where they contradict national 
interest, the former is abandoned and the latter emerged victoriously (Solomon, 1997). 
Scholars such as Cox (1989) and Black (1997) concur with one another that middle powers 
are not mere middle powers because of their role in mediation but it is because of their 
long- term interests. 
 
According to Van der Westhiuzen et. al. (2001) South Africa has been at the forefront 
advocating for global governance system which would see accommodation of the interests 
of the South. This is despite its approval of trade liberalization which reinforces its presence 
in SADC and the region as a whole. In the same vein, Naidu (2004) points out that the role 
of South Africa in multilateral platforms like WHO and G8 including regional initiatives 
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like NEPAD is founded on basis of sub imperial agenda. South Africa is pursuing its 
national agenda and advances its corporate agenda into Africa without taking into account 
its neighbours.  
 
South Africa finds itself in the dilemma parallel to the one of Australia which is a middle 
power. Australia’s support for the USA on the war on terror shows inconsistences in 
government decision making. This is taken as a major loophole since it has a negative effect 
on long held relationships with regional players (McKay, 2004). Above all, South Africa’s 
middle power status is controversial as other emerging powers or hegemons who use 
multilateral platforms to maintain flawed processes. This perpetrates deep rooted perception 
that South Africa is a selfish hegemon which sustains the system which favours it.   
 
3.3.3 Discourse Theory 
 
The analysis of realism, liberalism, hegemonic, middle power, emerging power and pivot 
states statuses shows that one state is likely to have different social identities. Such 
identities can be cooperative or conflictual. Among the advocates of this view are Adler 
(1997) and Wendt (1999) who held that the international arena comprises of social 
relationships and material capabilities. This view claims that identities and state’s national 
interests are dependent on the relationship states have with one another. According to 
Collins, “When social actors acquire resources, they seek to convert them into something 
that has more value to them than the mere possession of material things: social status. When 
this conversion process is blocked, the tension builds and status hierarchies become 
unstable” (1986:7).  
 
This approach gives a better analysis of South Africa-Africa relationship and the former’s 
failure to decisively pursue its transformative developmental agenda. Turner (2008) 
characterizes this as status dissonance. It is the failure of actors to arrange themselves 
hierarchically because they are not agreeing on all matters. The discourse theory is relevant 
to this study because it is centred on matters relating to status and identity which are also 
the basis for discourse theory. In Howarth and Stavrakakis words “discourse theorists are 
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not just concerned with the way in which social actors understand their particular worlds, 
but attention is focused more on the creation, disruption and transformation of the structures 
that organize social life” (2000: 6). Social antagonisms are important in political discourse 
theory. As Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000:4) note, “antagonisms show the points where 
identity is no longer fixed in a differential system, but is contested by forces which stand 
outside or at the very limit of that order”. Antagonisms emerge out of failure of actors to 
fully obtain their identity. It can therefore be reasonable to suggest that South Africa’s 
failure to position itself in the region is due to this. This failure to position has led to 
negative effects on South Africa’s regional transformative development agenda. 
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the major reason for failing to achieve a clear 
identity is dislocation events. It destroys the identity while at the same time forming the 
basis for new identity. This is in line with Howarth and Stavrakakis’s (2000:13) 
observations that “if dislocations disturb identities and discourses, they also create a lack at 
the level of meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to ‘fix’ the 
dislocated structure”. This analysis is useful in explaining the disloctory effects of both 
internal and external dynamics of post- apartheid South Africa which saw South Africa 
being no longer viewed as a selfish hegemon especially in the SADC. External and internal 
dynamics came with clear limitations in South Africa’s dominant discourse, hence the need 
for an alternative discourse. The failure of South Africa to secure the status of being a 
partner can be attributed to its neighbours’ refusal to allow for the construction of the new 
identity. Perhaps the contradiction between South Africa’s foreign policy on paper and in 
practice is responsible for this identity discourse. The former has concerns for the region 
and the latter is concerned with national and economic interests. The lack of a clear post- 
apartheid identity negatively affects its transformative developmental efforts (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000).     
 
3.4 Conclusion   
 
This chapter attempted to give a broader theoretical perspective relating to South Africa’s 
relations with its neighbours. It explored directly the contentious issue of South Africa’s 
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identity. In the process it became clear that there is no single theory which can fully grasp 
South Africa’s identity in relation to its foreign policy. The author deliberately swerves 
from the conventional international relations theories like realism and idealism which are 
dominant theories in international relations and consequently at the centre of South Africa’s 
foreign policy analysis. However, the aim is not to reject or dispute their significance and 
relevance in South Africa’s foreign policy analysis but to provide for the “new” and broader 
perspective. The choice to provide a wide range of theoretical scholarship is informed by 
the complexity of South Africa’s foreign policy identity. The study is primarily guided by 
development and hegemonic stability theories, as well as middle power paradigms to better 
comprehend South Africa’s foreign policy hesitance between hegemony, consolidation, and 
promotion of an African agenda in the region. The other theories discussed here are meant 
to demonstrate the complex nature of South Africa’s relations with other countries in 
Southern Africa. Secondly, they prove that as much as certain theories consciously guided 
this study, they are not the only ones but were chosen for the sake of convenience. Having 
enumerated and discussed the theories which informed this study, the next chapter will 
focus on a number of role-players central in South African policy making and 



















4. SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES & ACTORS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
In both the process of formulating foreign policy and that of trying to study the already 
formulated foreign policy, it is of paramount importance to understand and consider the 
domestic affairs of the concerned state. It is a general understanding that domestic affairs 
contribute to foreign policymaking. According to Holsti (1995:17), “issues such as wars, 
alliances, imperialism, diplomatic manoeuvres, isolation, and the many goals of diplomatic 
action “can be viewed as the results of domestic political pressures, national ideologies, 
public opinion, or economic and social needs”. In many instances, the foreign policy of any 
given state is a response to citizens’ grievances and values at domestic level as opposed to 
international dynamics. 
 
This chapter provides an overview of South Africa’s foreign policymaking with special 
reference to “foreign policy actors. It is a descriptive analysis of South Africa’s foreign 
policymaking under the new political dispensation since 1994 to 2014. The major argument 
is that South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy is multifaceted. This is informed by the 
fact that it involves a number of issues, numerous actors and follows a long policy 
formulation process. The first section of the chapter addresses general theoretical 
background of foreign policy decision making. The second section gives an analysis of 
South Africa’s foreign policy principles. The last section provides the discussion which 
revolves around South Africa’s foreign policy actors and their level of engagements in the 
foreign policy formulation process.               
 
4.2 Foreign Policymaking: Theoretical Background 
Actors in the foreign policy formulation form a crucial part of foreign policy making and 
are very influential. According to Holsti (1995), these are “state behaviour” determinants. 
These policy makers have discretion to decide on foreign policy purpose, aims and 
objectives and implementation of foreign policy on behalf of a state. “However, this does 
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not mean that they are free to do as they please; they are constrained by several domestic 
and international factors. They are guided by party leadership and principles among other 
things but are allowed to alter certain policy change to match their style of leadership and 
prevailing environment (Hill, 2000).  
 
According to the theory of bureaucratic politics, the process of foreign policy formulation 
encompasses different conflicting state actors. These actors include different government 
departments which influence policy “choices” using different power techniques (McGowan 
& Nel, 2006). In line with this, Graeme Allison in Hughes (2004) makes an argument based 
on interdepartmental and interpersonal difficulties in foreign policy making. The theory 
goes on to bring into scrutiny red tape factors such as national interests and foreign policy 
goals relating to foreign policy making. Allison in Hughes (2004) suggests that certain 
foreign policy components might at some point in time conflict even if they are good 
policies, and this might lead to discrepancies. This suggests that bureaucratic roles and 
contradicting foreign policy formulation usually end up with an undesired outcome. This is 
especially evident when there is no correlation between desired goals and objectives and 
actual outcomes. Frankel (1963) postulated that in such environment non- complementary 
foreign policies are likely to emerge. Competitive and hostile relations usually turn a good 
formulated policy to just a haphazard statement. In global politics” contradictory foreign 
policies are commonly seen where there is a democratic and developing state which 
consistently relates with its relatively powerful autocratic neighbour state (Hill, 2003).  
 
On the one hand, the bureaucratic politics model emphasises foreign policy formulation as 
being hampered by bureaucratic processes. On the other hand, the expected utility model 
stresses that policy makers advance national interests and their own inclinations. This 
model is comparable to realism and is based on the following principles: 
 
 Individual policy makers are rational actors who base their foreign policy choices on 
national interests. 
 Individual policy makers know and understand their national interests. 
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 Individual policy makers opt for the choice which is likely to yield anticipated goals 
(Russett & Starr, 1996). 
 
The expected utility model holds that foreign policy makers are usually uncertain when 
implementing their foreign policy choices. This doubt is caused by the unpredictability 
nature of such implementation. This scepticism has a potential to influence the psyche and 
confidence of the policy makers. This model stresses on willingness and capacity to action 
only foreseeable policy options as opposed to just predictions as the only base for policy 
formulation (Russett & Starr, 1996).    
 
In the terms of realism state actors are primary actors in the international relations including 
foreign policy making. However, the pluralist-interdependence model stresses that it is non-
state actors in the corporate world which set the agenda for policy making. Holsti (1995) 
concluded that policy making is a multidimensional and continuous process of engagement 
between private transnational groups, politicians and other role players. 
 
Russett and Starr (1996) offer six mandatory elements which have to be taken into account 
when doing any foreign policy analysis: 
 
 
 Individual Policymakers: Must know and be aware of individual policymakers, 
compare them with their predecessors to establish different patterns of decision 
making along generation lines. 
 Global System: Policy makers need to take into account the general order of the 
global arena before decisions can be made.      
 Functions of Decision-makers: The types of policy decisions policy makers take 
depend on the types of responsibilities entrusted to them. They have an already 
established duties and level of engagement which can limit their actions and shape 
their behaviour.  
 Social Characteristics: This relates to economic differences that exist in different 
societies. For example, well developed societies will find it easy to spend more 
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money on sophisticated weaponry. Contrary to this, developing or underdeveloped 
societies will generally find it difficult to spend more on weaponry making it 
relatively vulnerable to invasion compare to their developed counterparts. This 
means that decision to be taken by policy makers also rest on the economic 
capabilities of the country.         
 Government Formation: Type of government can largely shape policy makers. In a 
democratic society, for an example, policy makers can be seriously challenged by 
opposition parties, lobby groups and general society at large. In this case policy 
makers have limited and constrained authority to make policies. This is contrary to 
authoritarian policy makers who can formulate and implement policy without 
opposition playing any role whatsoever.    
 International Affairs: Policy makers need to pay special attention to decisions they 
make as they act on behalf of the state. Foreign policy decisions directly affect 
state’s relations with other states. Additionally, democracies generally relate better 
with each other and they are not likely to go to war with each other. Complications 
might arise in the case of democracy-dictatorship relationship because both parties 
embrace wholly different values and belief systems. The same applies to rich-poor 
relationship. The poor is likely to depend on the rich, hence being dominated.  
 
The above arguments necessitate deliberation on South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign 
policy principles as set by the ruling partly, the ANC within the broader context outlined 
above. The discussion now turns to South Africa’s foreign policy principles looking at the 
number of actors the country must respond to in executing its policy formulation agenda.         
                 
4.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Principles  
Just like in any other policy formulation, policy principles are vital in foreign policy 
formulation and decision making. Domestic values of general citizenry confine and shape 
personality and professional attributes of decision makers. This applies even to decision 
makers who do not subscribe to the idea that any ideology can influence the psych of any 
decision maker in the foreign policy arena (Hill, 2003; Hugh, 2004). According to Frankel 
(1963:117) values or principles remain as elements of the environment that exercise an 
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influence on and penetrate into the psychological environment of the decision-makers”. 
Given that these are social values and not personal values the influence they exert on 
decision makers varies depending on the decisional consciousness one possesses. Because 
decision makers act on behalf of the state and the general community, it then follows that 
the entire process should be based on public culture or interest. According to Hugh (2004), 
the ideas that are currently shaping foreign policy- making in the South African context are 
powerful and are ideas of the African Renaissance. Schoeman (2007) concurs with Hugh 
(2004). He claims that post -1994 South Africa’s foreign policy is by all means Africa- 
oriented. However, he acknowledges that South Africa did not adopt this position 
straightaway after 1994, it took time before the country could take this direction. He 
emphasises that pre-1994 South African foreign policy was never African but hostile 
towards it. According to Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2004) post-apartheid South Africa 
opted for a foreign policy framework which has been criticised for being more idealistic 
than practical. Despite being criticised, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy put 
forward the development of the African Agenda.  
 
There are a number of normative principles which post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign 
policy rests on. Paramount to them is the promotion and protection of human rights. This is 
not limited to the political arena but also encompasses the environmental and socio-
economic arena. It was President Mandela who prioritized the protection and promotion of 
human rights. It is generally understood that this stance on human rights issues was 
informed by the ANC’s long struggle for human dignity (Barber, 2004). However, a 
number of scholars and commenters such as Schraeder (2001) find Mandela’s advocacy for 
human rights inconsistent and self-contradictory. This is based on South Africa’s position to 
distance itself when SADC counties intervened in DRC to halt violation of human rights.   
 
According to Maluwa (2000), during Mandela’s tenure human rights considerations were 
an essential aspect of South Africa’s foreign policy. Such emphasis on human rights was 
not limited to the political arena but extended to economic and social realms. South Africa 
is also committed to the doctrine of peace, justice and international law. However, its 
commitment to regional security was not immediate but was only evident in the 1998 
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Lesotho’s intervention whereby South African soldiers entered Lesotho in order to bring 
political stability following an unstable political environment occasioned by differences of 
opinions around the elections. Thereafter, it joined the peacekeeping mission in the DRC in 
1999. It then aligned itself with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Africa contributed 
immensely both regionally and globally in the development of the global prohibition of 
anti-personnel landmines (Schoeman, 2007). Assessing how “African” South Africa’s 
intervention on the African soil is rests on the practical evidence as opposed to its principles 
and values.    
 
South Africa committed itself in conducting peacekeeping operations when these became 
necessary. According to Inglis (2008), South Africa became a relatively stronger military 
power on the African continent. In conducting its security operations be it negotiation or 
intervention it has been consistent in operating under the banner of the SADC, UN or AU. 
Among other African states there is an expectation for South Africa to be a “regional 
peacemaker and keeper”. Since 1994, South Africa participated in peace-making and 
peacekeeping missions in many African states which included DRC, Ivory Coast and 
Burundi (Adebayo, Adedeji & Landsberg, 2007). It also undertook peacekeeping operations 
in Lesotho in 1998 together with Botswana (Landsberg, 2000).     
 
South Africa devoted itself to respect and promotion of justice and international law in the 
SADC region and Africa as a whole. The security operations referred to above were based 
on South Africa’s value for justice and international law. According to The SA Yearbook 
2008/9 all foreign policy actors concerned with the justice and international law should 
“…identify and research legal questions that relate to matters pertaining to the 
administration of justice between South Africa and other states …” (GCIS, 2009b: 360). It 
must pursue international legal cooperation and mutual assistance treaties. South Africa 
further committed itself in participating and cooperating towards the realization of 
economic development both in the SADC region and the entire African continent. 
 
In 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Nzo reiterated the necessity of 
economic development in the African continent (SAGI, 2008). South Africa enhanced its 
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trade relations with other African countries sharply during the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. 
According to Schoeman (2007), South Africa is seen as an economic powerhouse in the 
sub- Saharan region with 35% of combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Rabobank 
(2009) adds that South Africa is also the biggest Foreign Direct Investor (FDI) which by 
implication is the core trading partner with many African countries. This is evidenced by a 
large number of South African transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in the 
continent. In 2002, South Africa’s exports to the continent exceeded combined imports 
from the entire continent of Africa. However, South Africa has been largely criticized by 
other African trading partners for trade asymmetries which characterize their contact with 
South Africa. According to Alden & Soko (2005), the country’s economy is developing and 
South Africa is now a biggest investor in the African continent. In the meantime, Inglis 
(2008) remain dismissive of the insinuation that trade asymmetries result to South Africa 
being perceived as an African hegemon.               
 
Attainment of national democracy is one of the central foreign policy principles in South 
Africa’s foreign policy. This is aimed at addressing humanitarian problems in the continent. 
As a “new” democracy itself, South Africa is determined to democratise African states. It 
applies the same modus operandi it applied to get its own democracy, the “democracy 
through peace deal model”. According to Curtis (2007) and Vines (2010) there are 
prerequisites for this kind of democracy, they include protection and promotion of human 
rights, political will to negotiate and liberal democratic values to name just a few. Hudson 
(2007) holds the view that it is not likely to be easy to realize this dream because it is not 
easy to democratise foreign policy. The reality has proven that it is difficult to attain 
democracy especially in countries that are perceived as authoritarian like the neighbouring 
Zimbabwe. It is difficult because these countries do not meet the requirements as 
highlighted above. According to Landsberg (2000), the supposedly use of ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
in Zimbabwe’s conflict by South Africa under President Thabo Mbeki was bound to 
negatively affect South Africa’s ambitions to democratize in the continent. Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2002) believe that South Africa’s foreign policy heavily relies on abstract ideas 
as regional democratisation and forgets about proper execution strategies. South Africa is 
also dedicated to upholding Africa’s interests both political and socio-economic (DIRCO, 
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2009b). South Africa played a central role in the establishment of NEPAD and the 
transformation of the OAU to the AU. South Africa’s muscles were clearly demonstrated 
when it coordinated the NEPAD Secretariat meetings and to chairmanship of the AU 
2002/3 term of office. It also aligned itself with bodies like the Pan African Parliament 
(PAP). This is a clear indication that South Africa is dedicated in partnering with other 
African states (Schoeman, 2007).      
 
South Africa’s foreign policy has been a subject of criticism mainly for only spelling out its 
goals and not further providing implementation strategies. According to Hudson (2007) 
South Africa idealizes foreign policy as opposed to being practical. Venter (1997) believes 
that it is South Africa’s broad identity the “rainbow nation” which is problematic. This 
broad identity results to South Africa’s foreign policy ambiguity. This ‘rainbow’ foreign 
policy does not suffice; South Africa just cannot afford to be seen as everything to 
everyone. This approach of wanting to be everything to everyone is unachievable. Instead, 
it will turn South Africa into being nothing to everyone including to itself. The centrality of 
human rights, democracy and economic development issues is undeniable; however, South 
Africa needs to carefully choose fewer priority issues to focus on regarding its continental 
commitment. This will enable South Africa to have an identifiable notion of the self (Van 
der Westhuizen, 1998).  
 
Hudson (2007) labelled the country’s post -1994 foreign policy as inconsistent and 
incoherent. He suggests that such incoherence is as a result of policy makers who possess 
wholly different mind-sets. Different as they are, they are still entrusted with the 
responsibility to formulate one coherent foreign policy. Contrary to Hudson (2007), Spence 
(2004) holds that the country’s post -1994 foreign policy is fairly coherent and goal -
oriented. The principles discussed above generally examine ethical guidelines for South 
Africa’s foreign policy. They offer a solid base for South Africa’s foreign policy 
formulation. According to Hill (2003:51) “Foreign policy actions cannot be understood 
without an appreciation of their implementation phase, which is at least as important as that 
of decision-making”. Due to this, against the outline of the above principles, it is important 
to deliberate on South Africa’s foreign policy actors.      
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4.4 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Actors  
Foreign policy is two-sided just like a coin; it relates to both internal and external matters of 
the state. It concerns itself with local issues, processes and institutions which are an integral 
part of foreign policy making and also concerns itself with external issues on which the real 
foreign policy decisions rest (Carlsnaes, 2008). In the post-apartheid South African context 
for an example, foreign policy making takes place at the national level. However, there is 
government’s emphasis on its projected regional goals and objectives. According to Hill 
(2003:28) “… foreign policymaking is a complex process of interaction between many 
actors …” During the foreign policy making process of any given state in international 
relations, different actors have different roles to play. It is generally acceptable to find some 
players playing a more prominent role than others (Carlsnaes, 2008:86). It is usually the 
state actors like politicians who usually dominate non-state actors like civil society (Kent-
Brown, 2002). Foreign policy actors are different from one state to another; as such they 
have different responsibilities and titles. According to Hill (2003), some states have 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Presidents as the most important players in foreign policy, 
but in the US they have the Secretary of the State and in Great Britain they have the Prime 
Minister as their most primary actors. In line with the above structure, the head of 
government and the Foreign Affairs Minister are the most primary actors in the foreign 
policy decision making. International law recognises the head of government as the 
authoritative and legitimate head of foreign policy making and implementation. The 
Minister in Foreign Affairs is responsible for supporting a head of government and renders 
advisory services. Regardless of the actor’s title, level of engagement and influence the 
actor possesses, all participants need to be recognised for the role they are playing. This 
section discusses South African foreign policy actors and their functions. Actors include the 
Presidency, DIRCO, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Parliament and other actors.      
 
4.4.1 The Presidency       
The former president of the US Harry Truman once stated that “the President makes foreign 
policy” (Frankel, 1963:21). Hills (2003) agrees with President Truman that almost all heads 
of governments indisputably form a large and an integral part of foreign policy making and 
execution. Heads of governments devote large amount of time on foreign policy issues. 
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This is uniform in all countries like South Africa and France where the president is both the 
head of state and government. According to Suttner (1996), in South Africa, the president 
of the country is the most powerful figure in policy making. This however does not mean 
that the president is the only foreign policy actor. According to Landsberg & Masiza (1995) 
and Kent-Brown (2002), certain limited powers are allocated to the Deputy President and 
few strategic ministries.  
 
Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk (2004) suggest that President Mandela was prominent in most 
of the foreign policy matters he entered into. This was mainly because of the personality 
and international prestige he possessed. Accordingly he secured himself a label “Colossus 
of Rhodes”. He got the name because there was a growing notion that South Africa’s 
foreign policy had started to reflect his public opinions and profile as opposed to reflecting 
on his leadership based on already established foreign policy frameworks (Mills, 1997). 
Landsberg and Masiza (1995) point out the fact that when President Mandela visited the 
neighbouring Namibia he unilaterally took a decision to cancel Namibia’s R 80 million debt 
to South Africa. He took such a drastic decision without consulting the ruling party, the 
ANC, parliament or the executive. Another outstanding action under President Mandela’s 
tenure was the call for sanctions on Nigeria. This was the reaction to the killing of the 
Ogoni nine in 1995. This call for sanctions did not yield any results as other African leaders 
did not support it. In terms of the established procedure, the president of South Africa ought 
to consult the executive on current major issues. This clearly shows the amount of powers 
vested in the President of South Africa.  
  
A number of scholars in the field of international relations including Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2004) criticize President Mandela’s unilateral approach to foreign policy. They 
argue that it undermined and compromised the role to be played by other actors. Suttner 
(1996:65) attempted to contextualize why the South African president’s role in foreign 
policy is so confusing. He articulated:              
…in South Africa it is not clear exactly how the Office of the State 
President relates to the foreign structures. It is not clear how the foreign 
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policy structures advise the State President before he makes any decisions 
on foreign policy. 
 
Despite the fact that President Mandela’s foreign policy was generally haphazard and 
lacked direction compared to President Mbeki’s, it had its own successes. During South 
Africa’s reappearance in the international relations Nelson Mandela was at the forefront of 
that process. He became the most celebrated political prisoner of the 20th century and 
subsequently became the face of South Africa in the international relations. It was his 
personal profile which overshadowed other actors like the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This 
resulted in the clear and evident discrepancies in South Africa’s foreign policy making and 
implementation. In line with this, Mills (2000:286) argued that President Mandela’s 
personal profile led to the “… inconsistencies in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign 
relations …” (Mills, 2000:286). 
 
Compared to Mandela’s, President Mbeki’s foreign policy was more coherent and 
consistent. According to Landsberg (2006a), President Mbeki used his impressive and 
influential diplomatic skills during his tenure in the Presidency. He had attained sharp 
diplomatic skills over the long period when he served as the Chief International 
representative and diplomat of the ANC in exile. His foreign policy saw the reconfiguration 
of South Africa-US relations, South Africa-EU relations and SA-Africa relations. The latter 
includes the active participation in the promotion of the concept “African Renaissance” and 
the formation of NEPAD (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:252; Le Pere & Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2004:123-124). Schoeman (2007) credits President Mbeki for transforming 
South Africa’s unilateral approach towards multilateralism.  
 
In 2012-2013 the Presidency remained the primary actor in South African foreign policy 
formulation. However, it did not enjoy the same prominence it has had before in the formal 
diplomatic circle. Instead the president bordered himself with the group of capable advisors 
to take charge of different issues. For example, Lindiwe Zulu was appointed the 
International Relations adviser; the presidency’s current spin doctor Mac Maharaj 
participated in the Zimbabwe mediation effort; the High commissioner in Mozambique 
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Charles Nqakula was also co-opted to the Zimbabwe group and Welile Nhlapho came back 
from Washington DC to take the President’s National Security Advisor post but later joined 
the Diamond Kimberley Process as the chairperson (Landsberg, 2012). Following his defeat 
at the Mangaung ANC’s 53 National Conference the then Deputy President Kgalema 
Mothlante’s role was down-sized. He was only limited to ceremonial duties like receiving 
other heads of states.   
 
Based on these facts presented above one can conclude that the president of South Africa 
can have supreme powers to direct South Africa’s foreign policy to either hegemony or 
partnership. This all depends on the president’s personality and preferences. A number of 
international relations scholars have been raising dissatisfaction in relation to the 
presidency’s role in foreign policy making comparing it with DIRCO’s role.                                  
 
4.4.2 The Department of International Relations and Cooperation  
In almost all countries, the department responsible for the international relations becomes 
one of the major actors in foreign policy making. The ministers in this office come and go 
with governments but the foreign policy is a continuous process. According to Frankel 
(1963), the ministry responsible for the international relations works hand in hand with 
other departments concerned with foreign policy formulation and implementation. It is a 
general practice that the international relations ministry put other cabinet ministers abreast 
with all new foreign policy developments (Hill, 2003). Frankel (1963) reiterates that all 
other ministries have to be briefed on new developments even if they are ignorant on 
foreign policy matters. In such a case an advise of an expect can be sought. Hill (2003:53) 
stresses that international relations ministers partake in foreign policymaking “… by virtues 
of specializing in external policy but … they are always likely to be trumped by a head of 
government who decides to take a direct interest in foreign affairs”. Hill (2003) then put 
forward key functions which should be uniform to all international relations ministries:  
  
 Routine Information-Gathering: The ministry responsible for the international 
affairs usually depend on its diplomats for information gathering and analysis. The 
diplomats gather information about other actors and analyse it on behalf of the 
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department. They work with the intelligence services to collect the information but 
sometimes they also use the media.  
 Policymaking: While politicians deployed to head DIRCO rely on the assistance of 
their party (the ANC) in executing their duties, they also need assistance from 
expects in the field of foreign policy. This is to allow for proper and efficient 
decision making and implementation in the department. It would be an absolute 
disaster to find the minister receiving, analysing and processing data as this is a 
complex and demanding exercise.    
 Memory: DIRCO officials have an important role to keep records of the 
department’s activities. This includes keeping records of treaties state enter into, 
bilateral and multilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding. These 
records become useful when it comes to policy making in the future. For example it 
will likely be difficult to recall in years to come that Africa was  “… the second 
largest export region after Europe, with a R16.7 billion trade balance in 1994 in 
South Africa’s favour had the very data not been kept in the system in spite of the 
changes in government since 1994 (Venter, 1997:85). 
 
 During the first democratic tenure, Alfred Nzo was at the helm of DIRCO. In this period 
DIRCO faced a number of intra-departmental challenges like all other “new” ministries. 
According to Suttner (1996), the first challenge was informed by the racial composition of 
staff within the department. Between 1994 and 1999 DIRCO was mainly dominated by 
white officials in its ranks. Alden and Le Pere (2004) claim that by 1997 DIRCO still had 
60% of its officials being whites and blacks constituted only 40%. It is further noted that 
most of the white officials were holdovers from the apartheid regime. There were now 
expected to mix with the “new” ANC appointees in servicing the ANC. During Minister 
Alfred Nzo’s period in DIRCO the most challenging part was to basically find an ethnic 
equilibrium in the department. The second challenge was gender imbalance in the 
department’s staff. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004) share the same sentiment with 
Suttner (1996) that from 1994 the department had a huge gender imbalance. The 
department was dominated by men (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004). However, with the 
introduction of Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 things turned around. In 1999, the 
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number of female staff was 1270 while that of males was 1083 (DIRCO, 2009b). This was 
the drastic change in the department brought by the human resources division in line with 
the new laws.    
 
The third challenge which was the threat to DIRCO’s functioning was ideological 
differences. This brought about major divisions in the department and nearly brought it into 
collapse. The major rivalry groups were the “neo-mercantilists” against the 
“internationalists”, respectively (Van der Westhuizen, 1998). According to Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk (2004), the former group was mainly the holdovers who believed heavily on the 
past regime’s trade and self-interest. This was based on the neo-realism and new diplomacy 
values. The latter group constituted mainly of the ANC members who had just returned 
from exile. This group was of the view that South Africa should show a large degree of 
solidarity with African developing countries (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). According 
to Van der Westhuizen (1998), this group further pursued pro- human rights foreign policy 
taking into account the country’s human rights history.  
 
The fourth challenge related to the leadership of the department and its foreign policy 
coordination (Cilliers, 1999). The then minister in DIRCO, Alfred Nzo, was not able to 
provide a clear direction. He lacked boldness and assertiveness; as a result he could not take 
bold decisions relating to foreign policy formulation and pursuit of staff transformation 
(Alden and Le Pere, 2004). His leadership weaknesses were widely credited to his shy 
personality. Muller (1997) recalls that the Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad ended up doing 
more job than Alfred Nzo. Alfred Nzo’s submissive character created an impression that he 
was not executing his duties properly. Nzo’s lack of leadership qualities together with other 
challenges led to the department’s failure to formulate a coherent and consistent foreign 
policy informed by clear strategic purposes (Muller, 1997). The diversity of attitudes and 
personalities in the department contributed to the poor policy formulation and execution. 
Suttner (1996) and Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk (2004) both suggest that the large number of 
different players within DIRCO was always a recipe for disastrous foreign policy. This is 
because different individuals and camps have different interests which can be contradictory 




The last challenge for DIRCO has always been its hostile relations with the Portfolio 
Committee on International Relations and Cooperation in parliament and other departments 
like the Department of Defence (DOD) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
According to Landsberg and Masiza (1995), the relations between the portfolio committee 
and DIRCO were more hostile than that of DIRCO and other departments. The portfolio 
committee complained about being side-lined by DIRCO and the ruling party, the ANC. 
The Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation seems to be 
ineffective compared to other portfolio committees in parliament.               
 
DIRCO plays a very important role in the execution of South Africa’s foreign policy 
through diplomatic means. Diplomacy is the modus aparandi adopted by the South African 
government in communicating and relating to its neighbours in the SADC region. This is 
the unit within DIRCO which is directly responsible for pursuing the country’s national 
interests. South Africa’s representatives abroad play a crucial part during implementation. 
The officials include ambassadors, consular officials and diplomats.              
 
In line with the South African government’s foreign policy framework, DIRCO has a 
responsibility to consult with all other departments partaking in foreign policy making. 
However, it has not established any good relations with DTI which is one of the major 
players (SAGI, 2008). The sour relations between DIRCO and DTI in South Africa is not 
something new, they were there even prior to 1994. Over a period of time the DTI has been 
raising concerns relating to governments budget allocation. The DTI alleges that the 
government is allocating more resources to DIRCO. In 1994 the DIRCO-DTI personnel 
ratio was 7:1 and the “new” government seemingly is ready to address. The high officials of 
the abovementioned departments have a history clashing personalities. One practical 
example is that of Rusty Evans and Zav Rustojee, the then Directors General of the two 
departments, respectively. The infightings were usually cited as the one of the major causes 




Recently DIRCO was headed by Minister Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma who now has been 
replaced by Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane (from 2009 to-date). Since DIRCO is a 
bureaucratic overseer of the South Africa’s foreign policy, it envisions a peaceful, 
democratic and united SADC region which can massively contribute towards establishing a 
stabilized Africa (DIRCO, 2009). DIRCO has an inherent responsibility to promote South 
Africa’s interests abroad. It is also entrusted with the responsibility to pursue the African 
Renaissance agenda and uphold values like patriotism, Ubuntu and Batho Pele.  
 
Suttner (1996) suggests that the political head of DIRCO, which is the minister, should be 
at the forefront of foreign policy decision making. However, due to various reasons this is 
not the case. The power is concentrated in the presidency. Among others is the fact that the 
minister is usually not in the country. As reflected above, Hugh (2004) suggests that 
DRICO and DTI have shown that they are engaged in a bureaucratic competition. The 
conflict between the two is further fuelled by the overlapping duties. These are some of the 
challenges that need to be addressed to ensure a smooth process in foreign policy 
formulation and implementation.    
                  
4.4.3 The Department of Trade and Industry 
In South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
has been seen as the major overseer of South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment relations (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). It is worth noting that there is a 
slight difference between trade policy and foreign policy. As a result, there is a strong 
relationship between the DTI and major actors like the presidency and DIRCO. According 
to Suttner (1996), most of the policies crafted by the DTI directly or indirectly influence 
South Africa’s foreign policy. There are three major trade policy units that drive the DTI’s 
participation in foreign policy. At the centre there is the International Trade and Economic 
Development Division (ITED) as a chief negotiator. The International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) serves as the administrator of the trade policy. Trade and Investment 
South Africa promotes investment and exports (Draper, 2005). In a nutshell these three 





In comparison to DIRCO, the DTI is generally performing better and has quite a number of 
good deals. According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004:124):                          
 
…the DTI spectacularly succeeded in bargaining free trade agreement 
with the EU. Consequently, it also occupies an increasingly high profile in 
the WTO in spite of departmental capacity limitations emanating from 
lack of personnel and inexperienced trade negotiators and many other 
administrative and operational issues. 
 
In 1995 DIRCO projected that in 2014 it would have had “… a restructured and adaptive 
economy characterised by growth, employment and equity, built on the full potential of all 
persons, communities and geographic area”. After all, the DTI has an important role to play 
especially on trade- based matters. Schoeman (2007) characterizes South Africa’s 
interaction with the rest of the continent as remarkable and impressive. South Africa uses 
different businesses to sustain its partnerships; they include tourism, banking, mining and 
telecommunications sectors (Games. 2010). All these businesses function behind the banner 
of DTI. However, the operation of South African companies in SADC and the continent at 
large is not without criticisms. South Africa is criticized for wanting to be a self-interested 
dominant player and for pursuing hegemonic aspirations. The argument is that South Africa 
is not seeking partnership instead it want to dominate and become a hegemon. According to 
Schoeman (2007), these criticisms are fuelled by South Africa’s big businesses like MTN 
and Shoprite who are conquering the neighbour’s market with dodgy trade patterns which 
benefit South Africa.            
 
4.4.4 The Department of Defence  
The Department of Defence (DOD) is one of the most active actors in South Africa’s 
foreign policy formulation (Kent-Brown, 2002). It is the key actor when it comes to 
decisions relating to military interventions. For an example, before a decision to intervene 
or not to intervene militarily can be made, the DOD takes into account mainly two things. 
Firstly, the human rights record of the concerned country. Secondly, the general security 
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assessment is made. The final decision to intervene or not to intervene is the discretion of 
the DOD in conjunction with the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) and the Presidency. The 
SANDF operates under the DOD to fulfil South Africa’s peace missions outside of the 
country. The SANDF is the unit which is more concerned with execution as opposed to the 
actual formulation of the foreign policy (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004).  
 
 
Regardless of a number of prior concerns raised in relation to SANDF’s capacity to execute 
all its mandates effectively, in March of 2009 the SANDF’s operation in the DRC was 
extended. SANDF’s personnel were deployed to provide training to the local army and it 
was to run up to March 2010. The deployment was approved by the cabinet. In the same 
vein, an extension to the deployment in Burundi was also approved regardless of the 
concerns relating to the capacity of the SANDF. In June the same year there was a slow 
withdrawal of SANDF’s armed personnel in Burundi which was concluded in August with 
the total withdrawal. This marked the end of the operation which began in 2001 at the 
request of Nelson Mandela during a civil war period. In Burundi a handful of SANDF 
members were left behind after the withdrawal to help in the post-construction period 
(Vines, 2010). Vines (2010) further claims that it was South Africa’s contribution through 
the SANDF that ensured the end of the fifteen-year civil war in Burundi. The end of war 
saw political parties contesting elections which were generally seen as free and fair. A 
successful intervention in Burundi showed that South Africa is capable of taking a leading 
role although its resources are overstretched. In accordance with the deployment framework 
SANDF should only deploy one battalion for peace operations. However, in 2009 South 
Africa exceeded this and deployed three battalions: 1 330 soldiers in the DRC, 973 soldiers 
in Burundi and 636 in Darfur (Vines, 2010). According to Vines (2010: 59) in addition to 
these deployments the executive further deployed the SANDF to other operation in the 
continent:                           
 
These include the AU Mission in Northern Uganda (Operation Bongani), 
the South African Detachment Assisting with Integration, and Training in 
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the DRC. Also, the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID), the Specialist and Advisory Team in the DRC (Operation 
Teutonic), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic, and the 
United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC, Operation Mistral). 
 
These are some of the practical roles played by SANDF in the African continent. SANDF’s 
involvement on a number of operations intensifies the discussion on whether South Africa 
is a partner or hegemony in Africa in general and SADC specifically. Kent-Brown (2002) 
concurs with Van Nieuwkerk (1994) that there are common areas of concern which need to 
be taken into account when instituting peace in Africa. These include the establishment of 
regional security regime to effect the SADC defence pact and enhancement of intelligence 
services. 
 
All the decisions by the DOD affect South Africa’s foreign policy towards SADC in one 
way or the other. However, according to Suttner (1996) there is a lack of central point 
where all interventions are to be coordinated. This will ensure that all interventions are in 
line with South Africa’s foreign policy principles.   
 
4.4.5 The African National Congress (ANC) 
The ANC is one of the most important actors in South Africa’s foreign policy formulation 
and execution. Its contribution is highly valued and influential as the ruling party. Mid-2012 
the ANC held its National Policy Conference to prepare for its National Conference held 
later the same year. Within the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC there are 
a number of sub-committees and one of them is the Sub-Committee on International 
Relations (Kotze, 2012). In the period from Polokwane and Mangaung National 
Conferences the committee was headed by Mr Ebrahim. However, after the last conference 
he was then replaced by Mr Obed Bapela, who by all means has no traceable background or 
experience in international affairs. It must be noted that Lindiwe Zulu President Zuma’s 
international relations advisor at the time was part of the committee but not as its head; 
instead she was the head of the Sub-committee for Communications and Media. The 




In the SADC region bilateral relations are usually conducted through party to party relations 
as opposed to official state diplomatic avenues. It is because of this reason that the ANC 
needs a fully functional committee. Currently the committee comprises the following 
members:   Obed Bapela (Chairperson), Ebrahim Ebrahim, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Miriam Segabutla, Thenjiwe Mthintso, Billy Masetlha, Collins 
Chabane (The late), Rob Davies, Lindiwe Zulu, Sue van der Merwe, Charles Nqakula, 
Bheki Cele, Joyce Moloi-Moropa and Dipuo Letsatsi-Duba (ANC, 2013). The ANC as a 
party focuses more on African issues on its foreign policy making. It usually leaves other 
issues like climate change, trade, technological developments and tourism to DIRCO. 
However, in relation to policy hierarchy, the ANC’s National Conference remains the most 
influential body making decisions including policy decisions.          
 
The ANC’s policy discussion document put more emphasis on reinforcing African 
institutions and leadership (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013). “Governance of states and their 
institutions – especially in the form of good governance, democracy, and management of 
the African Peer Review Mechanism – received attention” (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013:56). 
The ANC is further committed to the formation of one government for the whole continent. 
However, the ANC’s vision is not the same as that which was envisioned by the late 
Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013). The ANC made a strong 
point for the reinforcement of the regional economic communities in general but SADC 
specifically. The ANC is of the view that Southern Africa should be an absolutely a free 
trade zone. The discussion document acknowledges that the SADC region is faced by peace 
and security issues which become more and more complicated. As a result of the re-
occurrence of peace threatening conflicts the ANC has proposed ‘African solutions to 
African conflicts’ approach. This suggests that the local citizenry of the concerned country 
should come up with their own solution to their problems. This proposal has not been fully 
discussed within the ANC. However, there are clear implications for such a proposal if it is 
passed. While it will shift away the criticisms of the UN’s approach to African conflict, it 
might be criticized for giving the opportunity to domestic elites to mediate in the conflict. 
This will mean that the general citizenry will be side-lined (Hagg & Nyamnjoh, 2013).   
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4.4.6 Parliament   
In apartheid South Africa parliament could not be fully involved in foreign policy making. 
It could not even indirectly influence it (Suttner, 1996). This really does not matter because 
even if it did have any contribution it was going to be the contribution of the minority white 
supremacy. It was going to side-line the majority of the general citizenry which was already 
oppressed. According to Muller (1997), during the P.W. Botha tenure it was the State 
Security Council and a few departments which were identified as appropriate for South 
Africa’s foreign policy making. 
 
With the democratic dispensation in 1994 the parliament like all other institutions 
underwent a number of changes. A Portfolio Committee on International Relations and 
Cooperation was established, and it was a multiparty in nature. The major objective of the 
formation of this committee was to monitor the operations of DIRCO in relation to foreign 
policy making (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004; Kent-Brown, 2002). According to 
Hudson (2007), this marked the integration of South Africa’s parliament in foreign policy 
making. The parliament is the legitimate structure which represents the general citizenry on 
a number of issues including foreign policy. According to Schmitz, 2005:3:  
More often anywhere around the world where parliament is inferior to a 
national constitution, concrete parliamentary participation in international 
issues such as foreign policy implementation usually counts very little in 
determining state actions. Parliamentary and public contributions have 
practically had less influence on the organisational and other mechanisms 
of foreign policy execution. 
 
 In South Africa, parliament has been raising concerns that its input during the foreign 
policy making process is being perpetually side-lined. The Portfolio Committee on 
International Relations and Cooperation is also faced with a number of challenges in 
executing its mandate (Suttner, 1996). Suttner (1996:67) laments “… often a decision is 
taken before the committee even gets a chance to meet”. This is just one example of many 
challenges which make it almost impossible for the committee to fulfil its rightful mandate 
of overseeing DIRCO. Hudson (2007) proposes that the side-lining of parliament in foreign 
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policy making will continue and there is a reasonable doubt that things will turn in favour 
of parliament in the near future. The public’s only chance they have to air their views is 
when they talk among themselves in the absence of DIRCO.    
 
Taking into account the frustrations faced by the Portfolio Committee on International 
Relations and Cooperation it can be inferred that parliament has a very minimal solid role in 
South Africa’s approach to SADC and the entire continent to determine whether it is a 
partnership or hegemony.       
 
4.4.7 Intelligence 
In his first term of office President Jacob Zuma heavily featured the national intelligence as 
one of the most prominent actors in South Africa’s international affairs. The then State 
Security Minister Dr. Siyabonga Cwele was part of almost all of Zama’s visits to SADC 
countries. He also formed part of Zama’s team to attend summits and other visits. He 
appeared next to the president even when his DIRCO counterpart was absent. This 
approach is likely to be informed by his history in the ANC where he had served as the 
head of its intelligence and security in exile. This enabled him to know the intelligence and 
security field. According to Kotze (2012):        
 
It could also suggest a particular style or approach to international 
relations which relies on security defined and articulated information as 
most relevant or appropriate for international relations – reliance on 
confidential information – in preference to public processes of debate, and 
a more closed-group approach to the processes. 
 
Immediately after assuming the office President Zuma took charge of the intelligence 
services. He started by removing high ranking officials from the office which including 
Moe Shaik and Mbeki’s staunch loyalist Barry Gilder. The latter was the coordinator of the 
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC). The National Strategic 
Intelligence Amendment Act 37 of 1998 gives wide-ranging responsibilities to NICOC, 
including to “produce and disseminate intelligence which may have an influence on any 
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state policy with regard to: the detection and identification of any threat or potential threat 
to the national security of the Republic, or the protection and promotion of the national 
interests of the Republic, for consideration by the cabinet”. Studies relating to the role of 
intelligence services in the international affairs are rarely undertaken. However, given 
Zuma’s approach to include intelligence services in the international affairs necessitates 
more studies to be done.     
 
4.4.8 Civil Society  
McGowan and Nel (2002) suggest that all actors which fall outside the ambit of the state 
are non-state actors and they constitute civil society. These can be the media, religious 
groups, corporations, individuals, NGOs, academia and labour unions to name a few. 
Specifically, these are role players like “the South African Non-governmental Organisations 
Coalition (SANGOCO), research institutions such as South African Institute for 
International Affairs (SAIIA), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)” (McGowan and Nel 2002: 
24). In addition to that is the print media such as the Sunday Times, Mail & Guardian, City 
Press and digital media like e-News Channel. The former category continually publishes 
articles relating to South Africa’s foreign policy formulation while the latter hosts and 
broadcasts discussions on the issue.  
 
A number of these non-state actors are capable of making quite a large contribution using 
seminar presentations, publication of research findings and engaging other actors involved 
in foreign policy making. The role of non-state actors must be clearly understood; they do 
not directly participate in the foreign policy making process as they lack locus standi. 
However, they have the ability to influence and shape the psyche of policy makers or at 
least they aim to do so. Although the civil society is not a legitimate representative of the 
citizenry as it has no official mandate from the public, it however represents their views and 
informs them on foreign policy matters. At times it works together with the legitimate 
representatives of the people, the parliament, to criticise government decisions and their 
implementation (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:125). For example, a number of non-
state actors heavily criticized the ANC’s South Africa’s Foreign Policy Discussion 
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Document. The argument is that this discussion document is indeed well crafted but it is 
very idealistic. One of the prominent actions undertaken by the civil society was its 
participation in the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines (Naidoo, 2004).  Le Pere & 
Van Nieuwkerk (2002) also note the civil society’s contribution in conceptualization of the 
DOD’s peacekeeping framework and also the South Africa-EU free trade agreement.              
 
Regardless of the attempts by the civil society to fully participate in the foreign policy 
making process, it faces many challenges including deliberate rejection by the state actors. 
Its rejection can be equated to that which is faced by parliament. A number of scholars 
believe that civil society should feature in foreign policy making but Suttner (1996: 73) 
claims that “… there has not been regular and consistent involvement of civil society in this 
regard”. From the above discussion one can conclude that civil society’s participation in 
South Africa’s foreign policy making is without obstacles. Perhaps this is just a reflection 
of the secretive nature of South Africa’s foreign policy.                 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The chapter gave an overarching outline of South Africa’s foreign policy formulation and 
implementation since the democratic dispensation. The chapter was two-fold; it presented 
the outline of the doctrines which foreign policy should rest upon and the actors involved in 
the foreign policy formulation, respectively. The former part dealt with principles like 
promotion and protection of human rights, respect for the international law, continental 
democracy and the development of African interests. These are some of the key principles 
which South Africa’s foreign policy should be based upon.  
 
The latter part dealt with the role-players which are part of both foreign policy making and 
implementation. In the post-apartheid South Africa, it became evident that the president 
who is both the head of government and the head of state is the most primary actor on 
foreign policy decisions. It is mainly because traditionally in most countries the head of 
government is the integral part of foreign policy making and implementation. This by no 
means suggests that the president is the only actor responsible for foreign policy making. So 
far three presidents have been at the helm of the post - apartheid South Africa, Nelson 
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Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (the researcher deliberately leaves out Kgalema 
Motlanthe)2. From the events and processes that have unfolded within the foreign policy 
circles it is apparent that the incumbent president has a major influence in deciding whether 
South Africa embraces partnership or hegemonic approach towards its neighbours in the 
SADC region. A number of events stood out during Mandela’s tenure. These include his 
unilateral decision to cancel Namibia’s R 80 million debt to South Africa without 
consulting or informing his party the ANC, the executive or the parliament. He also called 
for the sanctions to be imposed on Nigeria after the hanging of Ken Saro- Wiwa and the 
Ogoni nine. The chapter has argued that President Mbeki was a forerunner in the revival of 
the concept of African Renaissance and the establishment of NEPAD. He committed 
himself and South Africa in finding lasting solutions in the region through multilateral 
forums. He was a key figure in SADC, the AU and the UN. 
 
The chapter has also demonstrated that a number of government departments participate in 
the foreign policy making and implementation processes but that the major participants are 
DIRCO and DTI. DIRCO plays an important role in foreign policy formulation mainly 
using diplomacy as a tool. Diplomacy refers to the method employed by the government to 
interact with its neighbours. It is this departmental unit which is responsible for pursuing 
South Africa’s national interests through its personnel like the diplomats and ambassadors. 
They are key players in advancing the county’s interest whether in partnership terms or 
hegemonic terms.     
 
There is no clear distinction between foreign policy and trade policy; as a result it is 
important that the DTI and DIRCO together with other actors like the presidency work 
closely. This is mostly important because a number of trade policies engineered by DTI 
largely affect foreign policy in general. The country’s economic relations are sustained by 
means of the country’s businesses like tourism industry, mining industry and 
telecommunications industry to name just a few. All the businesses operate behind the DTI 
banner. South Africa is criticized for wanting to be a self-interested dominant player and for 
                                                          
2 Kgalema Mothlante took over as the president of the Republic of South Africa following the resignation of 
his predecessor Thabo Mbeki after the ANC’s decision to replace him. He took over in September 2008 to 
finish the term of office which ended in 2009.    
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pursuing hegemonic aspirations. The argument is that South Africa is not seeking 
partnership instead it wants to dominate and become a hegemon.  
 
In relation to the DOD, before a decision to intervene or not to intervene is made two things 
are taken into account. Firstly, the human rights record of the concerned country is 
considered. Secondly, the general security assessment is made. The final decision to 
intervene or not to intervene is at the discretion of the DOD in conjunction with the 
SANDF, NCACC and the Presidency. The SANDF operates under the DOD to fulfil South 
Africa’s peace missions outside of the country. The SANDF is the unit which is more 
concerned with execution as opposed to the actual formulation of the foreign policy.     
 
The parliament participates in foreign policy making mainly through the Portfolio 
Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. The committee is responsible for 
DIRCO related affairs in parliament. It is responsible for discussing policy related issues 
long before they can be considered for passing into law. It also performs an oversight 
function on DIRCO. The parliament’s participation on foreign policy formulation and 
execution is very limited. It is confined to discussing and airing the public’s view while it 
has no direct influence on what constitutes the actual foreign policy making and 
implementation. Lastly, the role played by the civil society is not very distinct to that of 
parliament. Civil society seeks to represent the general public in many forms; it can be 
academia, businesses and NGOs, to name but a few. It does not really have a direct 















5 SOUTH AFRICA’S MULTILATERAL RELATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
 It is a general assumption by realism theorists that all states have their own national 
interests, but in the international arena they are sometimes expected to moderately 
compromise their national interests especially if they contradict the international law or if 
they are not in line with multilateral institutions. The latter view is espoused especially by 
both liberalism and institutionalism. South Africa’s foreign policy is articulated such that it 
complements its capacity. According to Spies (2008), South Africa falls under the emerging 
middle power category in terms of the ranking of countries. Middle powers usually align 
themselves with the multilateral institutions in search for solutions in international affairs. 
Middle powers have an important contribution to make within international organizations 
such as the UN and regional organizations. The former DIRCO Minister Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma used to stress that multilateralism is the most “effective” and “efficient” 
mechanism to address international issues. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore South Africa’s multilateral engagements in SADC 
in particular and in Africa in general. The chapter is centred on South Africa’s multilateral 
affiliation and its contribution in multilateral engagements in Africa. It makes a preliminary 
evaluation on whether post-apartheid South Africa has adopted the partnership or 
hegemonic approach in its engagements within multilateral institutions in Africa. In a 
nutshell, the discussion will revolve around South Africa’s foreign policy operations within 
African institutions such as SACU, SADC, AU and NEPAD. South Africa’s role in the 
development of the concept of “African Renaissance” will be discussed as a way of testing 
the country’s view on multilateralism. It is the view of the researcher that South Africa’s 
role in the UNSC is necessary even though it falls outside of the African vicinity. It is 
relevant because while serving in the UNSC South Africa represented the African continent 




5.2 South Africa’s Multilateral Relations in Africa 
Multilateral institutions to a certain degree have the ability to indirectly reshape the states’ 
national interests or their priority to ensure that they conform to the international standards. 
A lay example is apartheid South Africa. Due in part to increasing external pressure from 
the international community, the apartheid government had to compromise its apartheid 
national interests and opted for democratic principles (SAGI, 1996).          
 
Suttner (1996) proposes that in the multilateral engagements there must be multilateral 
agreements including all concerned parties. At a certain point in time the South African 
apartheid government lost its membership in many multilateral institutions because of its 
domestic policies. Its numerous attempts to regain its membership in international 
multilateral institutions were perpetually rejected. However, just after the dismantling of the 
apartheid system in 1994, the entire international community welcomed democratic South 
Africa’s government to the international community. It was allowed to re-join multilateral 
institutions like SACU, SADC, AU, UN and the Commonwealth. According to Le Pere and 
Van Nieuwkerk (2002:265) “since 1994, South Africa has actively engaged in multilateral 
issues such as human rights, economic and social development, disarmament, peacekeeping 
and global security, refugees and migration, and illegal drug trafficking”. One of South 
Africa’s goals is to represent developing counties and also to protect them against 
malevolent products of globalization. For Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2002) South Africa 
is more effective in implementing its foreign policy objectives when operating within 
multilateral institutions. Moving from this premise, the discussion on South Africa’s role in 
multilateral institutions is necessary in order to establish whether it is a partner or 
hegemony. This is important because there is no consensus on these evidently diametrically 
opposed viewpoints.           
 
5.3 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) emerged out of dissolution of its 
predecessor organization, the Sub-Regional Custom. The Sub-Regional Custom was formed 
in 1889 and it was transformed to SACU in 1910 amid the formation of the Union of South 
Africa.This move was aimed at enhancing economic development by means of regional 
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coordination trade (Gelb, 2002). SACU remains the oldest and most functional economy-
orientated organization in the Southern African region. Its member states are: Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. In 1969 member states deliberated and 
signed SACU Treaty which allowed for “duty-free” movement of goods and services with 
an exception of labour force among all member states. SACU member states are at liberty 
to apply common external tariffs; this is the shared tariff to non-member states (McGowan, 
2006).          
 
The end of apartheid in South Africa neutralized the hostile environment between SACU 
and South Africa which served as a base for the review of both the 1910 and 1969 SACU 
Agreements (Alden and Soko, 2005). This change also enabled South Africa to engage its 
neighbours on a number of issues. Such engagements were not possible under South 
Africa’s apartheid regime. Instead, the popular view was that South Africa should not 
affiliate itself with any integration organization but attempt to assume SACU’s role in the 
Southern African region. This attempt or view “forced” post-apartheid South Africa to 
quickly align itself with SACU and fully partake in regional affairs (Gelb, 2002). Former 
President, Nelson Mandela came out harshly criticizing SACU’s Agreement. He referred to 
it as “a reflection of the colonial oppressors’ mentality”. President Mandela further 
condemned South Africa’s apartheid regime’s action to bully its neighbouring states (Alden 
& Soko, 2005). South Africa’s mission was to democratize SACU and to transform its 
“colonial” perspective. This was evident in South Africa’s prioritization of SACU’s 
transformation.                     
 
Following robust discussions SACU member states finally agreed on revised the agreement 
on 21 October 2002. The revised agreement comprises three units: “a customs component, 
an excise component, and a development component” (Alden & Soko, 2005:371). South 
Africa has committed itself to playing an administrative role since SACU has no secretariat.         
It has been observed that “Its Board on Tariffs and Trade recommends common tariff levels 
while the Departments of Customs and Excise, and Trade and Industry collect most duties 
and coordinate all SACU functions” (McGowan, 2006:324). SACU member states were 
committed to working toward establishing a Free Trade Area (FTA). FTA was endorsed by 
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the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government which was convened in 2008. 
This initiative is one of many initiatives which seek to establish and enhance mutual trade 
partnership among member states (GCIS, 2009). 
 
Despite South Africa’s effort to ensure mutual trade partnership, its partnership with other 
member states has been characterized as imperialist (Alden and Soko, 2005).                    
According to Alden & Soko (2005:371), “…notwithstanding generous relations between 
South Africa and the entire SACU community, recently incorporated trade, financial and 
other noneconomic proposals (with reference to, for instance, infrastructure) bind SACU 
affiliates closer to South Africa, compromising their individual sovereignty”. It has been 
criticised for creating and implementing bias trade policies and practices. Such policies 
include protectionism policies which restrict access to its market, thus benefiting South 
Africa at the expense of other SACU member states. South Africa has an advantage because 
it “is responsible for recommending tariff levels and administering all excise, customs, and 
other duties” It is reported to have “… often blocked its neighbours’ industrialisation 
efforts” (Adebajo, et. al. 2007:22).  
 
Even lately, South Africa continues to be criticised for being a bully on its neighbours. That 
is, it is responsible for both hindering growth and economic crises in countries like 
Swaziland and moderately Lesotho. Most of these perceptions are entirely not true while 
some are distorted. It is therefore important to rebuke some of the common myths regarding 
South Africa and SACU. 
 
5.3.1 Changes in the Revenue Sharing Formula  
The revenue sharing formula is very important in SACU’s operations because it is a 
mechanism which is used to regulate and determine cash inflow distribution among 
member states. It regulates money from all customs and other cash inflows (Flatters & 
Stern, 2006). The three elements which are taken into account when deciding how much 
each member state gets are: customs, excise and development. The formula is quite 
complex and the prevailing one came into effect in 2006 after years of deliberations. Since 




The 2008-2009 global crises led to a major reduction of funding given to countries such as 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The global crises directly affected 
SACU’s revenue pools especially customs duty collections (Grynberg & Motswapong, 
2010). This decrease was inevitable since there was a decrease of the global demand and 
commodity prices. Although South Africa is responsible for collecting and distributing 
most of the cash inflow, it does not have unilateral control over the entire revenue. It 
therefore cannot dictate who gets what, but the adopted formula prevails (Grynberg & 
Motswapong, 2010). The process of sharing the cash inflow is managed and overseen by 
domestic Finance Ministers of all member states.  
 
5.3.2 South Africa Benefits from SACU to the Detriment of other Member States  
 South Africa is the biggest benefactor in SACU’s revenue pool. This is informed by the 
fact that South Africa is the major trader and is the biggest economy in the Southern 
African region. According to Grant and Chapman (2011:21):  
 
The three components as mentioned above are distributed as follows: the 
customs component is allocated according to each “country’s share of 
total intra-SACU trade, including re-exports; the excise component, net of 
the development component, is allocated on the basis of GDP and lastly, 
the development component is fixed at 15% of the total excise pool and 
distributed to all SACU members according to the inverse of each 
country’s GDP/capita. Nevertheless, in 2008 and 2009 alone South Africa 
accounted for over ZAR45 billion which equate to 98% of the overall 
revenue pool but only got a share of ZAR21 billion.   
  
A shallow analysis of the distribution of money within the SACU framework does not give 
an accurate story. Therefore, an in-depth analysis is necessary. Given that South Africa has 
a bigger trade surplus compared to its BLNS counterparts, the customs element is 
intertwined to intra-SACU imports. Some authors argue that “This helps to reward BLNS 
for the cost-raising and polarization disadvantages of being in SACU with powerful South 
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Africa”. These transactions escalated to ZAR27 billion in 2008 which equate to 1.15 % of 
South Africa’s GDP (Grant & Chapman, 2011).   
 
A number of scholars including Dr. Mzukisi Qobo suggest that this amount to “aid” from 
South Africa to the BLNS. They suggest that it is a form of development since the money is 
taken from the same pool of money which can be used to address South Africa’s socio-
economic problems (Grant & Chapman, 2011). If indeed this is an aid, then, South Africa is 
among the biggest donors in the world. This conclusion takes into account the fact that most 
of the developed counties fail to meet their assistance of targeted 0.7% of GDP. This state 
of affairs gives scholars and other commentators enough to ruminate about as far as South 
Africa’s relations with her neighbours through SACU is concerned.   
    
5.3.3 South Africa is the Only Destination for Investment in the Region 
  
It is undisputable that there are huge differences among SACU member states’ economies. 
South Africa remains the dominant economy in most aspects (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010). 
Nonetheless, South Africa is not the only country capable of attracting foreign investors 
within SACU. A number of investments and industrial developments have occurred in the 
SADC region but outside South Africa. For example, Namibia has attracted significant 
interest from emerging partners from China and Russia who are looking to invest in mineral 
resources projects and other sectors such as the investment in Ohorongo Cement which is 
valued at 2.5 billion Namibian Dollars (N$).  Some six investments worth N$1.5 billion 
were approved in the manufacturing sector and an additional six, worth N$1.177 billion, in 
the construction industry (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2010:33). 
 
In addition to that, South Africa should not be treated as if it is the only SACU member to 
give incentives to appeal to investors and give local industries support. Botswana for 
example, at one point gave support to textile manufactures and it remains one of the risk 





5.3.4 South Africa Wants to Collapse SACU  
South Africa through the South African National Treasury (SANT) has forwarded a 
proposal for the review of the current revenue sharing formula, but this does not mean it 
wants to collapse SACU as some believe. This allegation cannot be sustained; South 
Africa’s presence in SACU seeks to bring about a high level of economic stability in the 
Southern African region. According to South African officials the proposed amendments to 
the revenue sharing formula will see BLNS states achieving a higher level of stability on 
cash inflow from SACU’s revenue pool. By not having all of the SACU revenue linked to 
trade “there is a greater chance to ensure more predictable funds for the member states” 
(Hichert, at al 2010:21). Certainly, South African representatives have on more than one 
occasion been frustrated by SACU especially during the Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiations with the EU. But such obstacles have been turned into positive by member 
states as they afforded them a chance to engage one another thoroughly. A proper analysis 
of SACU will reveal that it is facing a number of challenges. A major one is the declining 
revenue pool and the attainment of inclusive economic growth which can decrease the high 
level of unemployment.   
 
In line with the above discussions, Alden and Soko (2005) suggest that SACU offers an 
appropriate example where South Africa’s presence is characterized by historical 
contradictions and economic dominance. There is a view that South Africa has previously 
acted as an imperialist “malevolent hegemonic power”, while it is striving to uphold the 
image of a “benign” regional hegemon” (Hichert, at al 2010:18). Despite these and many 
other challenges South Africa is expected to provide leadership in SACU.  
 
5.4 Southern African Development Community (SADC)  
After the democratic breakthrough in 1994 South Africa joined SADC and immediately 
became one of the major actors in that regional block. According to Landsberg (2006), 
South Africa is entrusted with the leadership responsibility in the SADC region. It is then 
expected to spell out its leadership plan. What is worth noting is that South Africa 
coordinates Finance and Investment units and also participates in the Peace and Security 
Council of SADC. According to Adebajo, et al (2007:26) South Africa “… should strive to 
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achieve regional economic development by utilising the instrument that is ready at hand, in 
the form of SADC”.   
 
In relation to regional economic cooperation or integration, South Africa declared that it 
would adopt a careful step by step approach using cooperation as opposed to direct radical 
approach. It resolved that it would be guided by principles of equality, communal 
partnership and non-hegemonic tendencies as the means for foreign policy implementation. 
Regional economic integration as opposed to market integration is likely to be 
advantageous, especially for the low-income countries as it is likely to come with important 
economic opportunities and benefits. Market integration has the tendency of leading to 
regional economic polarization which in turn leads to uneven and unsustainable 
development (Alden & Soko, 2005).   
 
Contrary to the popular realist perspective, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa 
was reshaped to match today’s political dynamics. This is despite the fact that it is still 
based on political and economic interests. Today South Africa’s economic interests in the 
continent are based on the accelerated trade and investment. It flows from South Africa to 
the SADC community and thereafter to the entire continent, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The major goal of this approach is to increase domestic economic growth and create 
employment opportunities in the SADC region. This is evidenced by South Africa’s 
commitment in encouraging its NGOs to fully participate in development and construction 
projects in the SADC region (Gelb, 2002). According to Adebajo, et al. (2007), South 
Africa remains the biggest foreign investor in SADC and it has committed itself to the 
revival of SADC as an institution. Large degree of resources has been directed specifically 
to the implementation of free trade protocols, politics, defence and security. When South 
Africa was given a chance to chair the Summit of the SADC Heads of State and 
Government in 2008, it stressed the necessity to establish the Free Trade Area (FTA). That 
summit opened the way for the launch of FTA afterwards. Above that, a number of treaties 
were signed including the Agreement of Amending Article 20 of the Protocol on Trade, the 




A number of scholars including Prys (2009) acknowledge that South Africa has made a 
commendable contribution to the Southern African community directly and indirectly. Prys 
(2009) claims that President Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” ensured regional unity and 
stability. She holds that it would have amounted to “foreign” tendency to join the West 
imperialists in condemning its neighbouring states. At this point Southern African states 
had already been victims of prejudicial criticisms for different issues including South 
Africa’s denialist approach to HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless it must be acknowledged that South 
Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” almost ruined it international credibility. South Africa was seen 
as a unifying symbol when it led a boycott on the SADC-EU Ministerial Summit in 2002. 
The meeting was to exclude Zimbabwe, however, due to the boycott the EU had to 
reschedule the summit and move it from Denmark to Mozambique to accommodate 
Zimbabwean officials.                                
 
 Despite South Africa’s efforts to attain regional integration it has received a plethora of 
criticisms. According to Du Plessis (2002) the status quo of underdevelopment of the 
Southern African region clearly attests to South Africa’s foreign policy failure towards the 
region. He holds that South Africa needs to reconsider its focus on SADC and intensify its 
engagement with SADC institutions. He further suggests that South Africa needs to be at 
the helm of the entire regional integration process.        
 
Murphy and Smith (2002) argue that regional economic cooperation is not likely to be 
achieved particularly in the developing world. Their argument is based on the fact that in 
the early stages of regional economic cooperation weak economies are likely to depend on 
their relatively stronger counterpart for bailout. For example, a middle income country like 
South Africa might be expected to assist low-income countries like Lesotho. Due to this 
fact, South Africa will have to adopt a liberal approach as opposed to a conservative 
approach in the allocation of resources. In the meantime, South Africa’s critics continue to 
lash South Africa for regional trade inequalities. The citation below buttresses this 




Arguably, South Africa’s competitive trade advantage has culminated in regional business 
domination and imposed an unbearable pressure on the local manufacturing capacity of the 
other SADC states. As a result, trade imbalances between South Africa and the rest of its 
regional counterparts also compromise the primary vision of SADC, which is grounded in 
the principles of “equity”, “reciprocity”, and symbiotic relations (Alden & Soko, 2005:376). 
 
According to Gelb (2002), South African foreign policy makers do not seem to consider 
SADC as an important medium for implementation of their regional agenda. They have 
raised a number of concerns relating to SADC’s bureaucratic obstacles and the wastefulness 
experienced within SADC administration. SADC’s lack of commitment to effectively 
engage on developmental issues has undermined the collective efforts to develop the entire 
continent. In the same token, South Africa was widely criticized for failing to provide 
leadership on the then Zimbabwe’s chaired SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security 
(Gelb, 2002). To put this into context, since post-apartheid South Africa’s involvement in 
SADC there has been perpetual rivalry between Zimbabwe and South Africa for leadership 
positions. This contestation was evident on continuous problems facing the Organ on 
Politics, Defence and Security of SADC. The rivalry in question had boomerang effects, 
particularly in civil conflicts in the DRC and in Lesotho. It further facilitated the 
deteriorating relations between South Africa and other SADC counterparts (Schoeman, 
2000). 
 
In relation to the 1998 Lesotho’s intervention, South Africa’s intervention was denounced 
and condemned by many. It was condemned despite the fact that South Africa did not make 
a unilateral decision but intervened under the umbrella of SADC and the AU. South 
Africa’s action received criticisms based on different reasons from different players. One 
view was that the aggression and coercion used is not in line with South Africa’s position 
on conflict resolution strategy, not to mention the rationale of the decision itself and the 
modus oparandi of the intervention. According to Schoeman (2000), South Africa attracted 
a series of criticisms because of its publicly known position on peaceful solutions, at least 
in principle. However, South Africa categorically stressed that in line with SADC 
standards, it is prepared to adopt forceful means where democracy is threatened or is under 
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imminent threat. Schoeman (2000) suggests that none of the above two civil clashes 
fulfilled this precondition. Also, during this time South Africa had already occupied a high 
position in SADC, so there was no point for it to convey its military strengths.   
 
5.5 The African Union (AU) 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed on 25 May 1963; it is the 
predecessor organization of the AU. Its headquarters is situated in the capital city of 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. The predecessor organization was formed with the specific goal to 
organize inter-state relations in the continent, build and sustain unity and pursue economic 
integration (Gelb, 2002). Throughout its existence, the OAU was consistently criticized by 
different players for a variety of reasons relating to its operation. Its detractors pointed out 
that it was caught in lingering functional defects. This was prominent in the 1970s and 
1980s when it opposed coups d’état as the mechanism for resolving national leadership 
crisis amongst member states. At the helm of the OAU was the principle of non –
interference in the domestic issues of the member states. A number of weaknesses were 
attributed to the organization’s charter which explicitly states that the organization “… 
would not interfere in the domestic affairs of its members, and would protect their territorial 
integrity and defend their sovereignty”. The organization’s rules like this one indirectly 
undermined its capacity to fulfil its mandate and appeared as a toothless dog before law 
violators (Le Pere & Van Nieuwkerk, 2002). 
 
In light of the overwhelming security related problems like human security, conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping there was an urgent need to transform the organization. As a 
result, in the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of African Heads of State and 
Government Summit held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999, the decision to transform 
the OAU into AU was taken (Landsberg, 2006a). According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk 
(2002) the following year, 2000 marked the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union. The act provides for the establishment of the following organs within the UN:      





 Executive Council 
 Specialised Technical Committees 
 Financial Institutions (the African Monetary Fund and the African Central Bank) 
 Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) 
 Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
 Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Council (Ecosoc) 
 African Court of Justice 
 African Court on Human and People’s Rights; and 
 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (GCIS, 2009a:243). 
 
The AU was officially launched on 09 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. South Africa had 
a privilege of being both the host and the inaugural chair of the newly established AU. In 
the same meeting, member states set their objectives which included “upholding the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member-countries; ensuring 
continental peace, security and stability; and developing the principles of democracy, good 
governance and public participation” (Schoeman, 2002:219). According to Landsberg 
(2006a) South Africa was determined and central in the process of formulating the 
organization’s goals and objectives. So far, South Africa has attracted a series of criticisms 
for allegedly taking into account the national interests of certain states while abandoning the 
national interest of others. The then South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki took upon 
himself to pursue “his” vision of African Renaissance by heavily lobbing and to the certain 
extent “dictating”  for its integration into the AU. On the idea of the African Renaissance, 
South Africa has always enjoyed the support of countries like Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Ghana, Algeria, Senegal and Nigeria among others. Alongside President Mbeki was the 
then Minister of DIRCO Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, together they dominated both the 
Assembly and Executive of the AU. South Africa was also instrumental in the AU’s 
Permanent Representatives Committee to such an extent that in 2004 it was named as the 




Since South Africa re-joined the organization it has been at the forefront in prioritizing the 
need to “… strengthen AU actions in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, with 
… emphasis on peace support missions …” in war- torn parts of the continent (Landsberg, 
2007). This move is contrary to the OAU’s position which was deeply entranced in 
“military-defined state”. Under the auspices of the “newly” formed AU’s PSC South Africa 
heavily lobbied for the prioritization of human security and social justice. South Africa 
proposed the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and a Military Staff 
Committee. This was a clear indication that South Africa wanted to abandon the OAU’s 
principle of non-intervention and replace it with the interventionist AU. Both these 
structures were to operate as functional units of the AU’s PSC. These initiatives required a 
large amount of financial and human resources. As a result, relatively stronger economies 
like Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Egypt pledged to give more from their reserves. 
Each of the above mentioned countries’ levies increased to reach 8.25% individually of the 
overall AU’s annual funds. They further committed in increasing their annual levy by 
6.75% reaching a sum of 15 % levy individually. After all, the continent’s superpowers 
collective levy amounted to 75% of the AU’s annual budget (Landsberg, 2007). Despite its 
contribution South Africa continued to be faced by resource and capacity related issues 
which are likely to diminish its capacity to lead within the AU (SAGI, 1996). 
 
 South Africa is determined to treat all other AU member states as “equals” irrespective of 
size, military strength and economic muscles they may possess. This is one of the 
cornerstones of South Africa’s foreign policy. It seeks to avert any hegemonic tendencies 
under the auspice of the AU (SAGI, 1996). Landsberg in SARPN (2003:6) argues that 
“South Africa rejected any hegemonic aspirations and is committed to forging a partnership 
and alliance with African states. South Africa is expected to work towards championing the 
cause of Africa and of the South at large in spite of its hegemonic tendencies questioned by 
some African countries”. Alden and Soko (2005) claim that the hegemonic perception is 
created by the fact that South African businesses are continuously spreading to the whole 
continent. These businesses seem to be dominating the market and they have huge 
economic influence.     
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South African companies operating abroad are alleged to breach the code of ethics in host 
countries. Bahlungu et al (2007) refers to South African companies which continued with 
extraction of resources especially during 1996 and 1998 DRC’s civil war). According to 
Games (2003), South African companies have secured for themselves labels like exploiters 
and neo-colonizers as evidenced in the case of Zambia where Shoprite was accused of 
exploiting workers to the extent that the Zambian government had to intervene. This is in 
line with neo-Marxist scholars who hold that capitalism by nature is exploitative and 
disregards host countries in pursuit of profit. Other actors who label South Africa as a sub-
imperialist are not fooled by the pretence of the African Renaissance project.  
 
Landsberg (2007) cautioned South Africa to refrain from giving overarching support to 
NEPAD over the AU. South Africa is accused of focusing on NEPAD which is the 
functional unit as opposed to the bigger structure, the AU. The concern is that NEPAD 
remains the AU’s project which should function under its auspice as it is not an independent 
project. This biasness by South Africa led to rivalries between the two concerned 
institutions and partially diminished the AU’s reputation. Details on South Africa’s 
participation in the NEPAD will be explored in the next section. 
 
5.6 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
In a quest to attend to a number of socio-economic ills in the African continent the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was formed in July 2001 in Zambia’s 
capital, Lusaka. It was endorsed by the 37th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. NEPAD’s major mandate is to provide for vision and policy framework for 
hastening economic co-operation and integration among member states. This is one of the 
recent efforts by the African states to promote economic and social development in the 
continent. According to Ezeoha & Uche (2005: 7) “Essentially, the long-term objective of 
NEPAD is to eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually 
and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the 
marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation arena”. 
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 Landsberg (2007) concurs with Gelb (2001) that as much as NEPAD was a product of 
collective engagement by the South African government and other African states, it highly 
embodies former President Thabo Mbeki’s idea of development. It is clear that it was 
President Mbeki who lobbied other African countries like Egypt and Nigeria to actively 
advocate for the formation of NEPAD. It was also South Africa’s idea to have NEPAD 
headquarters in South Africa. Notwithstanding the overwhelming proof of South Africa’s 
hegemonic domination in NEPAD, it continued to search for mutual partnership relations as 
opposed to domination (Gelb, 2001). Through the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki 
aimed at closing the gap between the North and the South. He also intended to root out 
Afro-pessimistic views as held by most of the already developed countries. He wanted to 
improve the North’s participation in African development by cancelling debts, building 
leadership capacity, increasing foreign investment and improving infrastructure. Thus, Gelb 
concludes: “It is therefore the objective of NEPAD associates to reduce power and 
development inequalities between developed and developing countries on political, 
economic, social, and other fronts through the very backing of the First World” (Gelb, 
2001:241).  
 
Bischoff (2003) believes that South Africa as the custodian of NEPAD must take the 
responsibility to ensure that it develops. Nonetheless, being the custodian of NEPAD does 
not mean immunity to leadership challenges. For example, trying to instil values of good 
governance can be a very challenging exercise in the African continent. Any attempt to 
democratise African states is likely to be faced with hostile responses to certain countries 
especially by absolutist authoritarians and dictators. By its nature, exportation of democracy 
is a difficult and challenging task; a clear example of such is the US’s attempt to export 
democracy to Iraq (Hudson, 2007). This suggests that a number of African states will not 
embrace aims and objectives on the NEPAD idea. At this point in time, a number of 
African states see South Africa as the West’s outpost which seeks to pursue Western 
interests on the African soil (Bischoff, 2003).                    
 
Despite that, the South African government still believes that the execution on NEPAD 
ideals is important especially in the consolidation of the African Agenda. Following a 
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proposal by NEPAD Heads of State and the Government Implementation Committee, 
“NEPAD was integrated into the AU during the NEPAD Brainstorming Summit that was 
held in Algeria in March 2007” (GCIS, 2009a: Internet, 246). Just after its inception South 
Africa articulated its plan to transform the NEPAD to integrate other issues relating to good 
governance. These are inclusive of collective security and protection and promotion of 
human rights (Alden & Soko, 2005). In addition to that, the South African government 
under the leadership of President Mbeki collaborated with other African national 
governments and established an inseparable link between politics and economics through 
NEPAD. Given that some parts of Africa remain faced with different challenges like 
poverty, civil wars and other socioeconomic problems NEPAD set up the Peace and 
Security Cluster, Democracy and Political Governance Cluster and Economic and 
Corporate Governance Cluster to address these social ills. President Mbeki believed that it 
was the high time for Africa to stand up for itself to face its problems as oppose to keep on 
blaming the West for its miseries. According to Landsberg (2007), President Mbeki was 
quite confident that NEPAD could be used as a useful marketing mechanism to market 
Africa abroad.                   
 
According to Alden & Soko (2005), the commitment displayed by the South African 
government towards the development of NEPAD is noticeable. It went out of its way to 
ensure that other African states become part of NEPAD. It made it clear that NEPAD would 
give an indication to potential investors that Africa as a continent is ready to accept FDI. 
Gelb (2002:36) argues that:       
 
South Africa seems to be the only country in the NEPAD leadership that is concerned about 
NEPAD processes and assuring that it prospers. For this reason, one of South Africa’s 
national interests on the continent is to ensure continental development of which good 
governance is the crucial first step. Another critical step for South Africa is to ensure that 
states commit themselves to governance improvement programmes, independent peer 
assessment, and punitive measures in the case of under-performance. The commitment to 
these principles by African leaders is essential to develop NEPAD’s reliability, particularly 




Following President Mbeki’s departure from the presidency in September 2008, his short-
lived successor President Kgalema Motlanthe announced that in terms of policies it was 
going to be business as usual because he was there to finish “Mbeki’s” term of office. After 
that, the highly anticipated President Jacob Zuma assumed duties as the President of the 
Republic of South Africa in 2009. There were wide speculations relating to NEPAD’s 
future given the scattergun approach to foreign policy by the incumbent President Zuma’s 
policy makers. President Zuma’s administration got into office in 2009 but it was only in 
2012 that it came out publicly to pledge its support for the NEPAD. It had been mumbling 
for three years which to some signalled the abandonment of NEPAD. It would have been 
bizarre that a front runner state in the formation of NEPAD would quickly turn its back to it 
because of the change in administration. South Africa reluctantly committed itself to 
NEPAD, betterment of continental socio-economic conditions and placing Africa on the 
global agenda (Nkoane-Mashabne, 2009a).  
 
5.7 African Renaissance  
The founding President of Ghana (1951-1966), President Kwame Nkrumah reportedly 
made reference to the concept of the African Renaissance. However, this does not mean 
that he coined it but the concept was based on his philosophy. The founding President of the 
Republic of South Africa also proposed the idea of African Renaissance in his visit to 
Tunisia. It was the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki who took upon himself to adopt and 
popularize the idea of African Renaissance. He claimed the 21st century as the African 
century. When he defined the notion of the African Renaissance he refers to a “… common 
vision in favour of African unity and solidarity, African development and renewal, and an 
end to the marginalisation of our Continent” (Alden & Soko, 2005:383). 
  
After Mbeki’s advocacy the term African Renaissance has been the centre of attention for 
many African statesmen. However, this seems to dwindle as a result of the departure from 
office of its advocates like South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki, Libya’s Muammar Kaddafi, and 
Nigeria’s Olusegun Obasanjo. These statesmen were at the forefront leading the road to the 
African Renaissance. Since President Mbeki resurfaced the term there has been an attempt 
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to analyse and to define it (Okumu, 2003). The concept has no specific meaning. However, 
in simple terms, African Renaissance refers to the state where Africa’s culture and economy 
experiences development (Hornby, 2010). In essence African Renaissance stresses that the 
African future is in the hands of the Africans themselves. This means that Africans ought to 
face socio-economic and political challenges that characterize the African continent 
(Maloka, 2011). As mentioned above, in the South African context the term African 
Renaissance emerged following the election of President Mandela as the head of state in 
1994. It was thereafter popularized by the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki particularly 
when he addressed the Constitutional Assembly. In his speech titled ‘I am an African’ 
Mbeki (1996) noted: 
 
I am born of a people who are heroes and heroines ... Patient because history is 
on their side, these masses do not despair because today the weather is bad. Nor 
do they turn triumphalist when, tomorrow, the sun shines. ... Whatever the 
circumstances they have lived through and because of that experience, they are 
determined to define for themselves who they are and who they should be.   
 
 He further noted “I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, 
the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that 
define the face of our native land. …” (Mbeki, 1996). Mbeki was seriously worried about 
the continual conflicts in Africa in the age of an economically globalizing world (Ajulu, 
2001). More concerning was that the African continent has vastness of natural resources 
like gold, copper and uranium, to name few, but is still at the periphery of the world 
economy (Ayittey, 1999).   
 
According to Mbeki in order for the African Renaissance to succeed decision makers and 
policy makers need to focus on social cohesion, democracy and economic rebuilding. In 
addition to that is the institution of Africa as an important player in the geopolitical issues 
(Ayittey, 1999). President Mbeki’s aid, Vusi Mavimbela (1998), characterized African 
Renaissance as a third moment in post-colonial Africa. The first moment is decolonization, 
the second moment being the widespread of democracy during the 1990s, and the third 
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moment being the African Renaissance. As much as President Mbeki recently promoted the 
idea of African Renaissance, the ability of Africa to rise above its seemingly embedded 
challenges was identified long time ago. Addressing the audience at Columbia University in 
1906 one of the founders of the ANC Pixley ka Seme (1906) noted: 
 
The brighter day is rising upon Africa...Yes the regeneration of Africa 
belongs to this new and powerful period. The African people...possess a 
common fundamental sentiment which is everywhere manifest, 
crystallizing itself into one common controlling idea...The regeneration of 
Africa means that a new and unique civilization is soon to be added to the 
world. 
  
The idea of renaissance itself pre-existed before Pixley ka Seme’s period; it can be traced as 
far back as the fifteen century in Europe. During the renaissance in Europe there was a 
renewal of Europe’s interests in Greek culture (Lotter, 2007). (Obonye, 2012) believes that 
the notion of African Renaissance is not a new development. He makes reference to 
Africans who have also talked about the same idea; they include Kwame Nkrumah, Julius 
Nyerere and Robert Sobukwe. They preached among other things self-reliance, democracy 
and sustainable development as the centres of African Renaissance. While the idea of 
African Renaissance is not a new invention, it remains one of the best ideas to emerge from 
the Africans themselves today.    
 
South Africa’s quest for being the leader of the continent Africa and beyond is in line with 
President Mbeki’s doctrine as articulated in the idea of African Renaissance. South Africa’s 
leadership responsibilities in the renewal of Africa is carefully implied and clearly spelt out 
in this doctrine. A careful consideration of South African officials when relating to the 
notion of the African Renaissance reveals that they consistently used “we” and “us”. This 
clearly indicates South Africa’s commitment to Africa as a whole not just itself as a country 
in the realism context. When South Africa was awarded the presidency of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), President Mbeki proclaimed “as South Africa assumes the presidency 
of the NAM, we need to ask ourselves a question: in what way can the NAM enhance the 
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drive towards the restructuring of the world order and the project of the African 
Renaissance?" (Schoeman, 2000: Internet). The rationale behind the use of inclusive words 
is to neutralize the widely held perception of being a hegemon or a dominant player towards 
implementation of the African Agenda (Gumede, 2006). This perception of being a 
hegemon is generally held within and outside South Africa. However, Landsberg (2006b:8) 
believes that African states view South Africa “as a leader and a reliable partner, 
cooperating with African states, and not as some hegemon dictating the terms to the 
continent”. Also, Adebajo, et. al. (2007) believes that South Africa’s foreign policy reflects 
some of the African Renaissance agenda features. The basis of his conclusion is on South 
Africa’s participation on number of peace missions and democratization in the region. 
 
In mid-1997 the Office of the President of the Republic of South Africa through the then 
Deputy President realized Thabo Mbeki issued a document titled “The African 
Renaissance: A Workable Dream”. According to Taylor & Williams (2001:267) the 
document highlighted South Africa’s commitment towards “addressing and entrenching 
democracy in Africa; accelerating the process of globalisation on the continent; the 
“emancipation of African women from patriarchy”; the sustainable economic development; 
the rallying of the youth; and retrieving African history and culture. President Mbeki aimed 
at using the African Renaissance idea to offer solutions to problems facing continent Africa 
(Taylor & Williams, 2001).    
 
Taylor and Williams (2001) believe that the African Renaissance is a wish list for Africa’s 
development based on traditional liberal approach to international development. For this 
reason, Mbeki’s African rejuvenation concept “also embodies coercive but liberal markets, 
trade and “polyarchic” organisations on the continent” (Du Plessis, 2002:126). They argue 
that the idea of African Renaissance will remain a wish list if the SADC region and the 
entire continent remain uncoordinated. Another issue with this idea is that it is more of a 
mere promise than it is an actual policy. It lacks a clear mechanism for accountability of 
different governments to their domestic electorate. According to Bischoff (2003), it only 
acknowledges states as the important actors excluding non-state actors. Despite his 
departure from the Presidency, Thabo Mbeki continues with his direct involvements in the 
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African renewal programmes. He launched two institutions: the Thabo Mbeki Foundation 
and the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, respectively. These institutions are there 
to facilitate Africa’s revival. According to Ncana (2010), President Mbeki holds that Africa 
as a continent is on the right route to good governance and economic growth but the major 
problem is the shortage of human resources for implementation.      
 
 
5.8 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)  
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was formed in 2003 as a self-monitoring 
instrument. It comprises the AU member states that voluntarily singed the memorandum of 
understanding. The mandate of the APRM is to tackle issues pertaining to the lack of 
service delivery, corruption and poverty in African states. The APRM strives to bring about 
stable political and economic environment, and sustainable development (GCIS, 2009b). 
According to Landsberg, (2006:259), APRM is aimed at “… exposing underachievers by 
identifying government flaws, where there are any, and bringing about ways through which 
such leadership shortcomings can be rectified through government evaluation”. Just like in 
the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki played a pivotal role in the formation of APRM. 
Member states which have already undergone the review process include Algeria, Benin, 
Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa (GCIS, 2009a).  
                
South Africa’s review was in 2005. Given that governments get to review themselves there 
has been an outcry from the civil society. Such outcry is accompanied by an extensive 
lobbying for the increased public participation. This is to ensure that the host government 
does not “dictate” and “dominate” the review process.  In line with the APRM regulations, 
civil society has a major role to play in the review process (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). 
Due to this “requirement” the South African government under President Mbeki brought 
diverse stakeholders on-board. In 2006 for example, a panel comprising NGOs and 
academics was formed and participated in the peer review process. The panel received and 
discussed draft reports on diverse issues like corruption and leadership efficiency. The 
November 2006 report titled Country Review Report: Republic of South Africa revealed that 
there is a minimal consultation between government and the citizenry. This lack is 
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prominent especially at the local and provincial spheres of government, respectively. 
According to Landsberg (2007:207), the report further recommends that:      
 
South African government fixes its focus on contentious issues 
incorporating capacity constraints and inefficient delivery of public goods 
and services; corruption; crime; diversity; HIV/AIDS; land reform; 
unemployment; women and child abuse; and racism and xenophobia. The 
government must attend to these issues if it were to be successful in terms 
of the requirements of the APRM. 
 
In the 7th Summit of the African Peer Review Forum 2007 held in Ghana, South Africa was 
applauded for having completed its Self-Assessment Report. Other countries acknowledged 
that South Africa’s review process was inclusive and participatory. President Mbeki 
received praises for leading the government which is able to conduct an open and unbiased 
peer review within the allocated period (DIRCO, 2007). According to Tjemolane 
(2011:106), upon receiving such praises President Mbeki asserted:      
 
the innovative approach included shortening the questionnaire and its 
translation into all languages, inviting research institutions to participate 
as partners, the validation process of the 2nd National Conference, 
involvement of civil society through the SA ECOSOC10 chapter, the 
establishment of Provincial Governing Councils, the role of Community 
Development Workers in enhancing popular participation in the APRM 
process, the use of outside broadcasts, the APRM song and blitzes in taxi 
ranks and major street corners to popularise the APRM process.  
 
In line with the APRM expectations, South Africa submitted its second report highlighting 
progress made as far as the APRM’s programme of action is concerned (Gruzd, 2014). The 
report mainly responded on the recommendations made in the previous Country Review 
Report (CRR) released in 2007. The previously recommended areas of attention included 
advancement of gender equality, fighting corruption and access to information relating to 
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human rights and justice. The second report also featured two areas which were not part of 
the first report which are the institutionalisation of democracy and the institution of 
traditional leadership, respectively. Early in 2014 the meeting of the AU Heads of States 
and Governments received a third report from South Africa. In this meeting, once again 
South Africa led by example as it was commended for numerous best practices including 
financial management system and tax collection system (Gruzd, 2014). The South African 
government further stated that South Africa was ready to share its experience and expertise 
when requested to do so. President Mbeki said information sharing would boost the peer 
review mechanism.   
 
5.9 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  
South Africa’s multilateral engagements and representation of Africa goes as far as 
reaching the “supreme” international platform, the UN. However, for the purpose of this 
study only South Africa’s role in the UN’s functional wing, the UNSC is being assessed. 
According to Spies (2008) the UNSC is the most relevant body of the UN with regard to 
African issues and it is the most contested terrain. Despite the “hot” contestation between 
South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, South Africa was awarded the non-permanent seat in the 
UNSC in 2006. South Africa was to start serving in the 2007 term of office. Its appointment 
came as no surprise due to its peace and security credentials, especially in Africa. It had 
conducted a number of interventions including countries such as Burundi, the DRC, Cotê 
d’Ivoire and other conflict torn countries. South Africa’s commitment to comply with the 
international law was evident when it voluntarily dismantling nuclear program and signed 
NTP (Spies, 2008). Even if South Africa is anti-hegemonic, it is equally not aiming to be 
just another player in the global arena especially in Africa. South Africa had displayed its 
capacity and willingness to partake even in international security issues.  
 
In the same vein, South Africa keeps on dodging allegations of having hegemonic 
tendencies leveled against it. Such allegations are further fuelled by its status of being 
Africa’s representative in the UNSC. Some scholars note that “Those who interpret a 
concept of “hegemony” as referring to nothing else but “state leadership” believe South 
Africa harbours ample hegemonic elements because it is conceived of as an African leader 
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in the UNSC” (Habib, 2010:46). According to Habib (2010) South Africa’s performance in 
the UNSC in its first term of office was underrated. He submits that South Africa was very 
enthusiastic, representing Africa and the whole world. It was able to secure African issues 
on the agenda of the UNSC meetings. South Africa actively participated in the UN reform 
engagements but when came to decision making it usually followed its diplomatic route. 




This chapter has argued that after joining SADC in 1994 South Africa became one of the 
major players in reviving and reforming it. South Africa was given a responsibility to 
coordinate both Peace and Security Council and Finance and Investment sector within the 
organization. South Africa’s relations towards Africa are based on principles of mutual 
partnership as opposed to hegemony. Equality also features as one of South Africa’s 
principles on which foreign policy rest. South Africa’s target is to develop and encourage 
local economic growth which leads to job creation in SADC member states. South Africa 
remains the biggest foreign investor in the SADC region. It is further committed to the 
execution of politics, defence and free trade protocols. It provided leadership in the Summit 
of the SADC Heads of State and Government; the very summit which saw the signing of 
several treaties and laid the foundation for the Free Trade Area. Nonetheless, South African 
foreign policy makers do not seem to consider SADC as an important medium for 
implementation of their regional agenda. They have raised a number of concerns relating to 
SADC’s bureaucratic obstacles and the wastefulness experienced within SADC 
administration. SADC’s lack of commitment has undermined the collective efforts to 
develop the entire continent.    
 
This chapter further argued that SACU is generally seen as the most functional and 
organized body in the region, however, President Mandela lashed on it for embodying 
characteristics of the former colonial oppressors. President Mandela further condemned 
South Africa’s apartheid government for its attempt to economically dominate its relatively 
weaker neighbouring states. In 2010 most SACU members raised their dissatisfaction 
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relating to trade asymmetries in the region. They argued that the regional trade currently 
favours South Africa at their expense. This is because of South Africa’s protectionist 
policies and bias trade tendencies. In addition to that, South Africa-SACU relations to a 
certain extent are seen as imperialist because of the newly integrated trade and financial 
proposals.  
 
Some SACU member states have threatened to withdraw from the organization if South 
Africa continues with the status quo which “unfairly” benefits it. They do not consider 
South Africa as a mutual partner in the organization but considers it as an aggressive 
economic hegemon. They claim that South Africa’s engagement in SACU is informed by 
past inconsistency and domination. South Africa in the past had acted as an imperialist 
“malevolent hegemonic power” while it considers itself as a “benign” regional hegemony.  
 
In relation to the AU, South Africa has been careful that it engages its counterpart on the 
basis of “equals”. It is committed to guarding against hegemonic aspirations on its side, 
thereby pursuing mutual partnership. It is committed to making strategic partnerships with 
all countries within the AU irrespective of size and power. On one hand South Africa is met 
with allegations of wanting to be the hegemony in Africa. On the other hand, it is expected 
by African states to champion the cause of Africa in particular and the South in general. 
The hegemonic aspiration allegations are fuelled by the country’s business advancement in 
the continent.   
 
The South African government under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki played a 
pivotal role in formulation of the AU’s goals and objectives. Despite that, it was largely 
criticized for inconsistences in the AU. It took other’s interests into account while at the 
same time side-lines other states’ interests. South Africa vow to strengthen the participation 
in peace related missions in the continent. It believes that all African states should shift 
from military to human defined state security and social justice. It further lobbied for the 
establishment of the Africa Standby Force and a Military Staff Committee as a clear 




However, South Africa must guard against prejudiced support to NEPAD over the AU. 
South Africa is accused of focusing on NEPAD which is the functional unit as oppose to 
the bigger structure, the AU. The concern is that NEPAD remains the AU’s project which 
should function under its auspice as it is not an independent project. This biasness by South 
Africa led to rivalries between the two concerned institutions and partially diminished the 
AU’s reputation. Although NEPAD was a product of collective engagement by South 
African government and other African states, it highly embodies former President Thabo 
Mbeki’s idea of development. It is clear that it was President Mbeki who lobbied other 
African countries like Egypt and Nigeria to actively advocate for the formation of NEPAD. 
Through the formation of NEPAD, President Mbeki aimed at closing the gap between the 
North and the South. 
 
Using APRM South Africa played an important role in transforming African governments. 
South Africa inaugurated its annual APRM in 2005 under the leadership of President 
Mbeki. Prior to the review process, there were scepticisms from the civil society relating to 
the openness and transparency of the process. However, South Africa was applauded for 
conducting a review widely open for public participation. South Africa also promotes the 
idea of the African Renaissance which seeks to revive the African continent. It played a 
significant role in the revival of the concept and continues to keep it alive. The Mbeki 
presidency in particular was consistent in using inclusive words and phrases to refer to 
broader Africa as opposed to just South Africa. By doing that, it hoped to dismiss allegation 
of hegemonic aspirations levelled against it.  
 
Having explored South Africa’s multilateral engagements in SADC in particular and in 
Africa in general the following chapter will assess South Africa’s foreign policy making 
and implementation in the SADC region, using Zimbabwe as a case study. This will be 








6 SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SADC REGION: THE CASE OF 
ZIMBABWE 
6.1 Introduction  
The relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe has deep roots. Ian Smith had strong 
relations with South Africa. Cecil John Rhodes, whose grave is in Zimbabwe, made a 
fortune in South Africa. During the struggle for liberation, liberation fighters from 
Umkhonto we Sizwe and Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) fought side-by-side 
with Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) which later merged to form Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Recently, South Africa has played a mediating role in 
Zimbabwe when ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) could not 
see eye to eye leading to a volatile political situation in that country. All these events show 
that indeed the relationship between the two countries has deep roots. To be sure, there have 
been some turbulence every now and then but these have been addressed through 
diplomatic engagements. This chapter looks at South Africa’s foreign policy on Zimbabwe 
over the years citing key episodes in Zimbabwe’s eventful history. 
The land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe in the form of forced removals of white 
farmers led to violence and economic crisis. Zimbabwe’s crisis which started in the early 
2000’s attracted a lot of attention from the continent and the international community. 
However, it was South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach towards the crisis which fuelled 
the situation. President Mbeki insisted that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe while meeting 
with concerned parties behind closed doors in an attempt to resolve the crisis. His approach 
came to be known as “quiet diplomacy”.  The ‘failure’ of “quiet diplomacy” in Zimbabwe 
reflects the institutional and structural shortfalls embedded in quiet diplomacy as a 
mediation approach. It is also evidence of SADC’s unwillingness to take a bold step 
towards finding solutions and maintaining lasting peace in Zimbabwe in particular and on 
the African continent in general. South Africa’s choice of quiet diplomacy over megaphone 
diplomacy might be justified on many bases, but it does not seem to deliver the desired 
outcomes. This has a direct implication on South Africa’s identity in the region.  This 
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chapter seeks to assess the gravity of the Zimbabwean crisis and SADC’s intervention 
through South Africa with the intention of establishing the country’s (South Africa) 
identity. It will also reflect on the merits and demerits of South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy”.     
6.2 The Genesis of Zimbabwe’s crisis  
In the ‘newly’ independent Zimbabwe more funds were injected into the health and 
education sectors, respectively. However, colonial remnants were clearly visible especially 
when it came to land ownership. These colonial remnants were particularly visible in the 
politics of economy which remained the same as in the colonial era. For example, 
agriculture remained the driving force of the economy as had been the case under the 
colonial government (Mkhize, 2008). During the 1960s, 70% of land was in the hands of 
white Zimbabweans. In the early 1990s, 75% of agricultural land was still owned by white 
Zimbabweans despite the change of the regime; ownership had increased by 5% from what 
it was about three decades earlier. Land redistribution was not successful because of a 
number of reasons including lack of capacity from the native Zimbabweans to manage the 
farms. Due to historical this injustice, the land reform programme had to be put in place in 
order to reverse this situation.                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
A land reform programme aimed at bringing about just and equal land redistribution started. 
The programme itself was a product of the Lancaster House Agreement3. Initially the 
parties involved agreed on the willing buyer “willing seller principle”4. According to the 
then country’s constitution the property rights were protected up to ten years and land could 
                                                          
3 The negotiations which led to the Lancaster House Agreement brought recognised independence to 
Rhodesia following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965. The Agreement (signed in 
December 1979) covered the Independence Constitution, pre-independence arrangements, and a ceasefire. 
The parties represented during the conference were: the British Government, the Patriotic Front led by 
Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African 
National Union) and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ian 
Smith. It was signed on 21 December 1979  
 
4 The concept of “willing buyer-willing seller principle” means a completely voluntary transaction between a 
buyer and a seller. In this regard, the principle accurately denotes the lack of compulsion on landowners”. 
The underlying assumption is that there are willing buyers and willing sellers who are involved in transaction 




only be acquired based on the willing buyer willing seller principle. The constitution further 
guaranteed twenty seats to the whites for a period of seven years in the county’s hundred 
seats parliament. The white farmers who wanted to exit Zimbabwe immediately were 
bought out by government using funds provided by Britain. This move to redistribute land 
by President Robert Mugabe’s government proved to be futile and fruitless due to the 
Lancaster House Agreement’s failure (Mkhize, 2008). By 1999, everyone could tell that the 
Lancaster House Agreement had failed to deliver its desired outcomes which among others 
were to give support to emerging farmers. However, the major reason for that was not just 
Britain, but President Mugabe. There was a clear unjust and unequal redistribution of 
acquired land by the government. Land obtained was unfairly given to President Mugabe’s 
allies. The initial agreement was amended to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation (Mkhize, 2008). In 1999, President Mugabe came with a more militant 
approach by amending the country’s constitution to legitimize the above- mentioned 
changes. He was quite confident that this was the most effective strategy as it allowed him 
and his allies to remove white farmers by use of force.  President Mugabe was confident 
that his strategy was going to be effective than the 1980’s willing buyer willing seller 
strategy which failed dismally.  
 
It can be argued that President Mugabe had long been annoyed by the inequality of land 
ownership in his country which seriously disadvantages the natives. Leading to the 1990 
elections, President Mugabe articulated his concerns thus: “It makes absolute nonsense of 
our history as an African country that most of our arable and ranching land is still in the 
hands of our erstwhile colonisers, while the majority of our peasant community still live in 
squatters in their God-given land” (Meredith, 2002:121). Meredith (2002) also 
acknowledges that from the onset the 1990s land reform programme was unorganized and 
haphazard. There was no proper consultation of the concerned parties. According to Peron 
(2000), President Mugabe had always been saying that his decisions could never be 
deterred or ignored. What led to more hostility and sensitivity on the issue of land reform 
was President Mugabe’s decision to politicize land reform. He galvanized his support for 
the June 2000 elections using the land reform programme. He portrayed land reform as the 
ultimate goal of the year 2000 elections. Kriger (2003) suggested that going towards the 
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2000 elections President Mugabe’s regime was in trouble and this was evident in his 
decision to join forces with the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans' Association 
(ZNLWVA). President Mugabe’s new allies practically led the actual invasion and removal 
of white farmers (Campbell, 2003). This move seemed to have instilled a certain level of 
fear among white farmers. 
 
In the economic sphere, the removal of white farmers led to the breakdown of the 
Zimbabwean economy. As stated above, Zimbabwe’s economy heavily relied on the 
agricultural sector. According to Campbell (2003) the economy in Zimbabwe is depended 
on agriculture, manufacturing and mining. Amid the economic collapse, the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe warmed of three major blows. Firstly, it was a withdrawal of Bretton Woods 
Institution’s support. Secondly, it was the withdrawal and decline of foreign investments. 
And lastly, the farmers were to default their loans to banks leading to a financial 
catastrophe. Outside of the disastrous warnings of the Reserve Bank, the economy remained 
unstable. It was unstable to the degree that during the 2002 Presidential Elections the 
country could not afford to print new ballot papers. By that time, the inflation was going 
closer to 400% (Brown and Saunders, 2004).  
 
Most of the industries including manufacturing and mining suffered and some had to close 
down and agricultural production suffered a major decline. This is demonstrated in the 
figures below. The decline in agricultural production was partly credited to the ‘new’ farm 
owners who had minimal or no experience at all of commercial farming. Responding to the 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe, Van Buuren (2004:123) stated that “While the rest of the 
celebrated the arrival of the new millennium, Zimbabweans was descending into the worst 
economic crisis of their country's 20 year history”. In 2008, the inflation was more than 











Table 6.1: Manufacturing output index from 1980 to 2005   
 




Table 6.2: Gold production volume from 1997 to 2006 
  
Source: Coltart (2007) 
 




Source: Coltart (2007)  
 
In the political sphere, President Mugabe remained unshaken by allegations of being a 
dictator and that of rising political conflict (Meldrum, 2004). According to Chan (2003) 
President Mugabe, ZANU-PF and their allied war veterans were determined to do anything 
including the use of violence and intimidation to secure ZANU-PF victory. Violence, 
intimidation and state suppression continued which led to the government being labelled as 
authoritarian. Political debates were characterized by high level of intolerance and hostility 
between ZANU-PF and opposition parties. This drew the international community’s 
attention toward Zimbabwe. Peron (2000) claimed that the intimidation and suppression 
marked the manifestations of President Mugabe’s entrenched conviction that opposition 
parties’ existence is pointless because ZANU-PF represents everyone. The environment 
was further worsened by ZANU-PF’s alleged targeting of the opposition parties’ 
membership. This was perpetrated by the arrest of opposition leaders including MDC’s 
Morgan Tsvangirai. Campbell (2003) divulged that Tsvangirai had escaped a number of 
murder attempts. He was beaten by both the war veterans allied to ZANU-PF and police 
while other police officers were watching. Technically, it was alleged that Tsvangirai had 
been planning to forcefully remove President Mugabe from office (Campbell, 2003). MDC 
saw this move by ZANU-PF as a political strategy not only to rig elections but to eliminate 
the MDC. 
 
President Mugabe embraces socialism as his preferred ideology. For Peron (2000), 
President Mugabe is deceived to believe that socialism amounts to treating people like 
infants and denying them their fundamental individual rights under the guise of public 
good. President Mugabe was indoctrinated with socialism when he studied at the University 
of Fort Hare in South Africa. In 1983, President Mugabe addressing his party rally said that 
the party will rule forever. He further urged party members and supporters to grow and 
strengthen it while preparing for its one party role (Peron, 2000). Due to the volatile 
political and economic environment, Zimbabwe attracted the attention of the international 
community. Campbell (2003) believes that various civil society stakeholders played a huge 
role in exposing political violence in Zimbabwe which led to mammoth political and 
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psychological damage to the society. The stakeholders included but were not limited to the 
independent media, NGOs and IGOs.     
 
6.3 The 2008 Zimbabwe General Elections  
  
After all the intimidation and violence which characterized the 2002 elections ZANU-PF 
emerged victorious. However, the MDC did not receive the defeat well given the hostile 
political environment during the elections. Contrary to the 2002 elections, the 2008 
elections were not characterized by high level of violence and intimidation. Instead the 
problem was caused by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission’s (ZEC) failure to release 
all results on time. Parliamentary results were released showing that President Mugabe’s 
ZANU-PF had lost to Tsvangirai’s MDC by 97 to 99 seats, respectively. This presented a 
major challenge for President Mugabe, to be defeated by a seemingly weaker opposition 
party (Ofodile, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, the Presidential results were not released. During that delay MDC 
supporters started claiming that they won the elections by 60% based on half votes counted. 
President Mugabe was following behind with 30%, the MDC claimed. The deferrals of 
releasing the results confirmed the allegations of the then imminent vote rigging. This was a 
cause for concern by the international community once again, especially SADC and the 
AU. ANC president, Jacob Zuma, raised his concerns regarding the delay of the results and 
the potential threat it posed to peace and stability. He argued that appropriate rules needed 
to be applied. Addressing the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, South Africa’s 
President Zuma said “we once again register our apprehension about the situation in 
Zimbabwe” (Chinaka, 2008:1). Each day passing without the results worsened the anxiety. 
Zuma argued for SADC mechanisms and guidelines to be used to address the impasse.     
 
Amid the midst, a cargo filled with weaponry was caught in the Durban harbour. The 
weapons varied from ammunition, mortar bombs and rocket grenades among other things. 
These weapons came from China destined for Zimbabwe (Ofodile, 2009). The then Head of 
South African Government Communications, Themba Maseko, said the government was 
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aware of the cargo but had no plans to stop it and they (government) were being careful on 
the issue. Meanwhile, the official opposition was concerned that should South Africa give a 
green light to the passage of the weapons, that would affirm the general notion that South 
Africa’s government was losing grip on Zimbabwe issue (Daily Sun, 2008). Upon failing to 
off- load in South Africa it was believed that it was the same cargo which was off-loaded in 
Angola thereafter the weapons made their way to Zimbabwe. In addition to that, the ANC 
head, President Zuma, argued that SADC could not cope with the deteriorating situation 
given the cases of violence which started to be reported. At home in Zimbabwe the 
opposition party was certain that this was just another Mugabe dictatorial strategy to rig 
elections again. They pleaded with SADC and the AU to intervene.  
 
At state level, the South African government had to respond to the crisis. Under Thabo 
Mbeki’s presidency, South Africa chose to adopt a quiet diplomacy approach towards the 
Zimbabwean crisis. Quiet diplomacy is a soft approach since it lacks the use of force, but is 
based on dialogue. According to Mkhize (2008:15), “quiet diplomacy” includes “discussing 
problems with officials of another country in a calm way usually without informing a media 
about it”. The former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair once adopted quiet diplomacy 
towards China regarding human rights issues. In 1998 Tony Blair, went to China to 
“quietly” talk to the Chinese government officials pleading for the release of Xu Wenli, a 
known pro-democracy activist. He did this without any fanfare (Mkhize, 2008). Graham 
(2006) suggests that President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy attracted lots of criticisms and 
speculations especially when contrasted with his notion of African renaissance and good 
governance in the continent. It generated a public outcry and became a contested terrain. In 
essence, President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy was aimed at bringing conflicting parties 
together to the discussion table.     
 
6.4 Quiet Diplomacy in Southern Africa 
The idea of quiet diplomacy came under the spotlight when South Africa adopted it as its 
preferred foreign policy approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. It is therefore within this 
context that it is discussed here. Quiet diplomacy as a concept refers to the amalgamation of 
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different soft diplomatic approaches which are conducted behind closed doors with an 
intention to reach a conciliatory deal. According to Mhango (2008:16):                 
In the case of Zimbabwe, these included bilateral meetings between heads 
of state and senior officials, South Africa’s shielding of Zimbabwe from 
public criticism in international organizations, endorsement of 
questionable election results, persistent negotiations dubbed ‘constructive 
engagement’, and provision of economic packages with an aim of 
motivating change within Zimbabwe by Zimbabweans. 
Here the idea is that being out of public domain increases the likelihoods of reaching an 
agreement through diplomatic avenues. This is contrary to Woodrow Wilsons’s doctrine 
that “diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view” (Graham, 2008:19). 
In some circles quiet diplomacy is labelled as ‘softly- softly’ approach. This is because of 
the way in which it is executed. South Africa treated Zimbabwe in this manner during its 
‘constructive engagement’ (Graham, 2008). The process of engagement was characterized 
by patience relating to President Mugabe’s nonconformity and renegade opposition. The 
parties involved believed that through consistent dialogue President Mugabe would crack 
and allow for amicable solutions to be found to the prevailing crises. 
Theoretically, quiet diplomacy resembles preventive diplomacy. The idea of preventive 
diplomacy was conventionally attached to multilateralism. According to Stedman (1995:17) 
“Preventive diplomacy refers to concerted action designed to resolve, manage, or contain 
disputes before they become violent”. A third party who must seem impartial is required to 
act as a mediator in solving the conflict. However, in order for it to be effectively executed, 
all conflicting parties need to agree on resolving the conflict through negotiations (Orth, 
1997). Upon reaching an agreement, all concerned parties abide by the agreement and ought 
to implement it. Orth (1997) suggests that the merits of preventive diplomacy are that the 
results are measured by the commitment from all parties to implement it. This is the 
opposite of megaphone diplomacy whereby negotiations are conducted through the media 
and announcements between conflicting parties.  
Accordingly, quiet diplomacy is an embodiment of a contextualized adaptation of 
preventive diplomacy efforts widely practiced in Southern Africa. It embraces and respects 
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the principle of state sovereignty and it is based on the political dynamics of the region 
which include a shared legacy of the politics of liberation. This sense of togetherness as a 
result of shared liberation experiences leads to the culture of tolerance among heads of 
states in the region (Kagwanja, 2009). In Southern Africa, there is a culture of brotherhood 
among heads of states. According to Kagwanja (2009: 29) “This molds a sense of solidarity 
which perpetuates the imperatives of fraternity and comradeship, underpinned by the 
unspoken rule that African governments do not openly criticize sovereign governments, 
even when they abuse the rights of their citizens”. In line with that, Tajudeem Abdul-
Raheem wondered in Mhango (2008: 18) “Why can’t these Westerners understand that the 
more they shout about Mugabe the stronger such leaders become and the more difficult it is 
for an African leader to condemn him openly for fear of being seen as a Western puppet?” 
This further testifies to the deep rooted culture of brotherhood which is entrenched in the 
Southern African region.    
In order to fully grasp this idea of quiet diplomacy, it is necessary to locate it within 
SADC’s peace-making mechanism. As a point of departure, the UN acknowledges the 
important role of regional bodies in the peace-making process (UN 1995: para. 4). Article 
52 of the UN Charter entrusts regional bodies with the responsibility to find non-forceful 
means to resolve domestic conflicts. Regional bodies are seen as central in conflict 
resolution. This is mainly because they enhance communication among member-states, 
promote collective action and ensure alignment to general norms and standards on good 
governance and conflict resolution (UN 1998: para. 41). This is particularly true when a 
national conflict has a potential destabilizing effect beyond its borders. The regional body 
in question (in this case SADC and its peace keeping mission) is based on the Organ for 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The history of peace-making in the Southern 
African region shows that there is a lack of consensus among SADC member-states. Due to 
lack of consensus among member-states, SADC has occasionally found itself trapped 
between two different approaches to conflict resolution. The two approaches are military 
intervention and the use of diplomatic avenues (Nathan, 2010 & Adelman, 2004). This 
situation has resulted into SADC assessing each case on its merit as opposed to having a 
uniform approach to all cases of conflict resolution.  
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Quiet diplomacy has been allowed in Southern Africa to the extent that it has started to 
show the lack of standards and values governing mediation. This is based on the fact that 
SADC has established institutions and a broader framework for conflict resolution but it is 
not clear how to actually mediate. There are no clear terms of reference for mediation and 
the method which mediation must be carried out is also not clearly defined. This leaves 
SADC with no formal approach. As such, mediation strategies often depend on 
personalities as opposed to institutions. The absence of a clear mediation framework leads 
to spontaneous mediation which is also excessively dependent on power politics (Ancas, 
2011). This leaves the system open to exploitation. Some of the relatively powerful 
member-states have used a more personalized diplomatic approach. This can be used as a 
justification for South Africa’s choice of quiet diplomacy in the Zimbabwean crisis even 
though other SADC member-states did not approve of this approach. A closer analysis of 
South Africa’s mediation effort in Zimbabwe will reveal that South Africa’s quiet 
diplomacy is not inconsistent with principles and norms of dispute resolution within SADC. 
It is just an additional evidence of the vacuum in SADC’s peace-making mechanism.  
 
Upon returning to the international system, South Africa emerged as a leader in terms of 
economy, political stability and military capabilities. This meant that other Southern 
African states relied on its role to lead in socioeconomic and political advancement. Due to 
this new development, many states were determined to enter into bilateral relations with 
South Africa, a trend which has continued unabated to-date. Mandela’s main concern was 
the idea of universal human rights (Barber, 2005). His administration took a harsh position 
against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. In 1996 Mandela, openly called for the sanctions 
to be imposed against Nigeria’s Sani Abacha. This stance was a response to the execution 
of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni nine (Vale and Maseko, 1998; Baregu and Landsberg, 
2003). This call for sanctions was not supported by other African heads of states. South 
Africa went on to withdraw its representative in Nigeria. In turn, South Africa suffered a 
blow when Western superpowers continued to buy oil from Nigeria despite South Africa’s 
call (Barber, 2005). South Africa has also been seen as a unilateral actor in pretence of high 
moral ground. According to Kebemba (2006), when Laurent Kabila in the DRC was 
attacked by opposing forces Southern African states intervened but South Africa isolated 
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itself and maintained neutrality. This non-participation in the collective intervention is 
usually contrasted with the country’s military intervention in Lesotho to halt the 1998 
military coup.  
During Mbeki’s tenure as president, South Africa took a conscious decision of being part of 
the continent. He consulted with other heads of states in the decision making process. This 
signalled a clear shift from unilateralism as embraced by Mandela’s administration towards 
multilateral decision making (Buhlungu, et. al. 2007). It can be argued that Mbeki’s quiet 
diplomacy towards the situation in Zimbabwe should be understood in this sense. South 
Africa openly pronounced that foreign policy decisions relating to the region and the 
continent will be taken within the mechanisms of SADC and AU, respectively.  
 6.5 Merits of South Africa’s Quiet Diplomacy 
It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that South Africa’s foreign policy 
among other things is based on the promotion of peace and security and respect for the 
international law. It is also based on the democratization and promotion and protection of 
human rights (Sachikonye, 2005). In line with these values President Mbeki pledged to join 
the fight against human rights abuse. Perhaps the human rights violations which came as a 
result of the land reform failure in Zimbabwe presents one of the most difficult human 
rights dilemmas post-apartheid South Africa had to face in the continent. When intervening, 
the South African government took quiet diplomacy as a preferred route. This meant that it 
had to rely on talks and dialogue, particularly between two major rivalries, the ZANU-PF 
and the MDC. Quiet diplomacy by its nature is not a codified policy but means to steer talks 
between opposing parties. The rationale behind it was to afford the Zimbabweans the 
opportunity to find solutions for themselves without outside influence. This is in line with 
the principle of state sovereignty as enshrined in the international law. In its classical 
definition, sovereignty refers to the ultimate legal and political authority of the state to 
govern its own affairs without any external interference. Due to South Africa’s respect for 
international law, quiet diplomacy was adopted (Kagwanja, 2006). South Africa respected 




Among those who came out and endorsed South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach was 
former President Mandela. In one of his interviews with the BBC Radio he reasoned: “an 
approach through diplomatic channels without much publicity is more likely to bring about 
a positive result. In fact, the major principle behind ‘quiet diplomacy’ is that it should be 
quiet. To achieve this, it should take place away from critical public and media scrutiny” 
(Mhango, 2014:19). Kagwanja (2006) claims that quiet diplomacy is informed by the 
African spirit as opposed to ‘megaphone diplomacy’ based on liberal values which 
demonize African values. Above that, South Africa chose quiet diplomacy partially because 
had it chosen economic leverages the consequences would have been dire for the 
Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe largely relies on South Africa for electricity supply. The most 
unfortunate part is that the consequences of any contrary approach would have been felt by 
ordinary citizenry as opposed to the executive who take decisions.     
 
In line with that, Graham (2006) offers the rationale behind South Africa’s choice of quiet 
diplomacy towards Zimbabwe as follows: 
 
 South Africa’s scepticism to apply harsher measurers is based on historical 
bonds between the ruling ZANU-PF and the ANC as the liberation movements. 
ZANU-PF falls within the ambit of frontline states which supported ANC’s 
liberation struggle for democracy. South Africa therefore has a sense of being 
indebted to Zimbabwe, particularly President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF. These 
are sister organizations which confronted colonialism in their own respective 
countries.  
 
 South Africa’s primary objective to soft approach was to avoid complete crisis 
of authority in the troubled Zimbabwe. President Mbeki pointed out that “we 
cannot afford a complete breakdown. I don’t know how we would cope with it”. 





 The post-apartheid South Africa pledges to posture itself as a true African 
country. This is important especially because of the two previous experiences, 
apartheid and South Africa’s position in Nigeria’s Ogoni nine incidence. South 
Africa was characterized as un-African and inspiring bully for calling for 
sanctions against Nigeria. It is in that context that South Africa’s choice for 
“quit diplomacy” should be understood, the fear of being seen as a bully if 
taking or adopting punitive actions. The former DIRCO minister, Dr. Dlamini-
Zuma reiterated that quiet diplomacy by its nature is an African style of 
conducting foreign relations. She also stated that she will never condemn 
President Mugabe’s administration.  
 
  President Mbeki had always been fascinated by an intra-African approach to 
Zimbabwe. While most of the international actors were disappointed by South 
Africa’s reaction to the neighbouring Zimbabwe, President Mbeki remained 
convinced that the issue of Zimbabwe was an African issue to be resolved by 
Africans. He however acknowledged the need for the presence of the SADC or 
AU mediator.          
 
For Lodge (n.d), South Africa’s choice for quiet diplomacy over economic leverages 
against Zimbabwe is highly justifiable. He suggests that economic sanctions would have 
had boomerang effects as they would have ensured concurrent collapse of economy and 
political authority. Poverty, high rate of unemployment and high inflation are the key 
indicators of Zimbabwe’s economic crises. Landsberg (2007) concurs that South Africa’s 
approach based on hard power would have worsened the already volatile environment. 
From the British and other westerners’ point of view, a failed Zimbabwean state would 
have hit hard on South Africa. There would have been a dramatic increase of refugee influx 
and general disorder in South Africa-Zimbabwe border. Kagwanja (2006) agrees with 
Lodge (n.d). He suggests that South Africa chose to compromise democracy in favour of 
stability. This was informed by South Africa’s lack of political will to have a totally failed 
state as its neighbouring state. However, it seems as if by 2008 Zimbabwe was already a 
failed and collapsed state. Taking into account the high inflation rate, human rights 
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violations and political violence one might suggest that it was a failed state long before 
South Africa’s intervention. Hard or soft diplomacy made not much significant change. The 
currency was already too weak to suffer any significant decline. Violence was widespread 
to get any worse. Almost everything had gone out of control.  
 
An additional element which explains South Africa’s position towards Zimbabwe is 
President Mbeki’s Africanist posture. Throughout his tenure, South African foreign policy 
was informed by the idea of reconstruction and reform of the continental institutions. Such 
institutional reconfigurations were aimed at enhancing regional economic cooperation and 
democratization (Graham, 2006). Some of the achievements in this area include President 
Mbeki’s successful lobby of the G8 to put funds in the African Renaissance programme 
(Lodge, n.d). More pro-“quiet diplomacy” advocates include the International Crisis Group 
which holds that President Mugabe was the centre of the conflict because of his 
mismanagement of the economy, structured violence and deliberate undermining of 
democratic principles (Dube, 2003). However, according to Loge (n.d) the only positive 
result of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy was the meetings between ZANU-PF and the 
MDC as organized by South African officials – something which could have not happened 
had hard power been preferred to soft power epitomised by quiet diplomacy.     
 
6.6 Demerits of South Africa’s Quiet Diplomacy  
 
Criticisms were levelled against South Africa as the reaction to its adoption of quiet 
diplomacy as an approach to the Zimbabwean crisis. Quiet diplomacy detractors 
complained that it was not addressing important issues like President Mugabe’s dictatorial 
government and violation of human rights. As a result, it could not bring about any tangible 
change. Critics claimed that after South Africa’s intervention with its quiet diplomacy the 
situation became worse than it was before. South Africa’s quiet diplomacy became the 
subject of ridicule inside Zimbabwe, in Africa and in the international arena. The policy 
moves from the premise that President Mugabe has undermined democratic principles and 
institutions and therefore needs to be softly engaged in order to alter his behaviour. In 
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Zimbabwe, President Mbeki was heavily criticised by the independent media for utterly 
failing to resolve the crisis (Graham, 2006).       
 
As a result of a number of criticisms, South Africa was pressured to alter its approach 
towards Zimbabwe. In the media for example, the ANC as the ruling party was pressured to 
distance itself from President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy. Unfortunately the ANC itself had 
been careful not to openly confront abusive regimes. It must be taken into account that it 
had suffered a blow for doing that during President Mandela’s tenure (Laverty, 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, President Mandela had called for sanctions against Nigeria but his call 
was not accepted by other African countries. Instead, South Africa was labelled as an un-
African bully. Taking into account President Mbeki’s commitment to NEPAD South Africa 
was not prepared to be isolated again (Laverty, 2008). South Africa as a perceived regional 
and continental leader had to avoid any bullish or hegemonic tendencies. At the same time 
economic sanctions against Zimbabwe would have intensified the suffering of the general 
citizenry. Sanction would have had no significant effect to the country which had the 
inflation running very high and high unemployment rate (Soko & Balchin, 2009). More 
drastic intervention would certainly have had unintended consequences. The only effective 
solution than quiet diplomacy would have been an early intervention. Failure of quit quiet 
diplomacy in this sense painted a negative image for South Africa as it was widely expected 
by the international community to provide leadership in the region. South Africa was 
expected to lead mainly because of its high moral standing and its economic muscle. It was 
these high expectations which made South Africa’s quiet diplomacy a dismal failure (Soko 
& Balchin, 2009).  
 
By all means, South Africa’s failure was directly based on the pointless insistence in 
attempting to get President Mugabe to change his behaviour. President Mbeki was 
perpetually met with stubbornness and resistance but never changed the strategy (Nathan, 
2010). President Mugabe and his cronies would simply deny any agreements they reached 
or deliberately default them and easily get away with it due to the secretive nature of their 
meetings. Seemingly South Africa had no alternative approach to the Zimbabwean crisis as 
it had ruled out any confrontational approach stating that it would hurt the general citizenry. 
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At the same time, South Africa’s approach dented both President Mbeki’s and South 
Africa’s image as a leader in the region and economic power-house (Nathan, 2010).                 
 
Perhaps outside of quiet diplomacy South Africa should have opted for targeted sanctions. 
Targeted sanctions as the word suggests are only directed to specific individuals not the 
country. These can include travel bans and freezing of bank accounts. In this case the 
targeted individuals would have been President Mugabe and his cronies. However, this 
might prove to be difficult to distinguish between President Mugabe’s supporters and 
MDC’s supporters. Maybe all the actors who expected President Mbeki to act harshly on 
President Mugabe were over ambitious. The first step should have been for him (President 
Mbeki) to accept that there was a crisis in Zimbabwe. Acknowledging the crisis would have 
served as hope that real solutions were coming. The denial of the crisis was despite the 
MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai’s withdrawal in the Presidential re-run elections due to 
violence, unlawful arrests and intimidation directed to MDC’s supporters.  
 
6.7 The 2013 Zimbabwean Elections 
In the route leading up to the 31 July 2013 elections in Zimbabwe, South Africa played a 
crucial role as a SADC facilitator, a role none wished for. Although President Zuma and his 
delegates acted under the auspices of SADC, the whole African continent and the general 
international community had their trust and faith on them. They were entrusted with a 
difficult responsibility to revive democracy in a “broken” democratic society (Lalbahadur, 
2014). South Africa was widely trusted because other attempts had failed. Previous 
unsuccessful attempts include the Commonwealth initiative, the US-EU targeted sanctions 
which had minimal effects and other western orientated attempts. South Africa was to 
provide African solutions for African problems as earlier envisioned by President Mbeki. 
Beside the international community’s expectations, South Africa as a country had to 
intervene due to a number of domestic issues. The increasing migration rate of 
Zimbabweans to South Africa was unbearable. The strategic location of Zimbabwe 
especially when it comes to trade and integration is very important to South Africa 
(Lalbahadur, 2014). Additionally, a seemingly stabilized neighbouring Zimbabwe was 




South Africa had already been applauded for brokering a deal which saw the formation of 
the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe following the 2008 elections. With 
that, South Africa had cemented its role as a leader in the SADC region. The deal facilitated 
by South Africa saw ZANU-PF and two separate factions of the MDC forming the GNU. It 
was this arrangement which broke political stalemate in the country (Muzondidya, 2013). 
Further to that it came with sort of a relief to the tumbling economy which started in early 
2000’s. This process was to end with the drawing up and adoption of the country’s new 
constitution and subsequently the revival of democracy. South Africa injected large 
resources to ensure a proper implementation of this process a decision for which South 
Africa was commended.                          
  
Leading to the July 2013 elections, President Zuma personally led the team facilitating in 
Zimbabwe (Hengari, 2014). The team did an impressive groundwork putting in place a 
support base for their initiative. It is worth noting that this operation was initiated and 
executed in the office of the president and not DIRCO as some would have expected. This 
was contrary to his (the president’s) usual practice where he heavily relied on diplomats, 
ambassadors and relevant government departments for policy making and implementation. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, he personally led the team. Therefore, Zimbabwe can be taken as 
an exceptional case (Hengari, 2014). President Zuma’s approach was different to that of his 
predecessor, President Mbeki. After the elections which were relatively quiet compared to 
the 2008 elections, South Africa through President Zuma was among the first to endorse 
both the process and the results. The SADC community quickly joined in and declared the 
elections as free and fair. The AU followed suit and President Mugabe was returned to the 
helm of his country. The welcoming back of President Mugabe was evident when SADC 
awarded him with chairpersonship in August the same year (Hengari, 2014 & SADC, 
2014). The AU could not be left out, it awarded him the Vice-Chairman seat in January 
2014 and subsequently the Chairmanship. It seemed as if South Africa together with its 
SADC fellow member states with an exception of Botswana were relieved of a huge 
burden. Botswana was clearly not happy with the outcomes of the July 2013 elections but 
became a lone voice (Hengari, 2014).      
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6.8 Security a Priority for South Africa  
Upon entering the presidency in May 2009, President Zuma caused a stir of opinions from 
different actors both domestically and internationally relating to South Africa’s approach to 
foreign policy making and implementation. A dominant assumption was that President 
Zuma was going to be more domestically focused compared to the outgone President Mbeki 
(Vickers, 2010). This assumption was against the fact that President Zuma had prior 
experience on African issues taking into account his role as a mediator even under President 
Mandela. He was never seen as a person who would be an active advocate of the pan-
Africanist agenda. Later, the assumptions against President Zuma proved to be inaccurate 
as he continued to advance the pan-Africanist agenda and gave Africa priority in South 
Africa’s foreign policy (Vickers, 2010).                
 
In relation to Zimbabwe there was an expectation from the SADC region and Zimbabweans 
themselves that President Zuma would be an impartial mediator compared to his 
predecessor President Mbeki. President Mbeki was seen as biased towards ZANU-PF in his 
mediation efforts (Gruzd, 2009). He did not have much respect for the opposition party the 
MDC. Moreover, Mbeki’s perception of the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was 
mainly described as ‘disdainful’. In addition, President Mbeki believed in ZANU-PF’s 
populist stance that the MDC was nothing but a western imperialist mouthpiece in Africa. 
Certainly, President Mbeki, the man of the African renaissance, would have not allowed 
such sentiments to pass unscrutinised. Contrary to President Mbeki, President Zuma 
showed a certain level of sympathy towards the opposition and its leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai (Gruzd, 2009). This gesture suggested that there would be a great deal of 
impartiality on his side compared to his predecessor.  
 
Contrary to the above, South Africa’s decision together with other SADC member-states to 
give a go-ahead to the July 2013 elections and the subsequent approval of results raised 
eyebrows in some circles (Tensi, 2013). There were general concerns relating to not 
following the SADC road-map to the fullest and the failure to take stronger measures in 
addressing the reported irregularities. It remains unclear why the two issues were just put 
under the carpet. However, as articulated above, South Africa in particular and SADC in 
141 
 
general had a sense of relief. The amounting pressure to resolve the Zimbabwean crisis was 
over (Tensi, 2013). However, this alone does not really give a sense of South Africa’s 
position. It is understood that South Africa’s immediate response to the July 2013 elections 
was informed by South Africa’s quest to restore security and stability in the neighbouring 
Zimbabwe (Munyaka, 2013). South Africa’s policy choices seem to be largely based on 
intelligence and security related issues. This is evident in South Africa’s quest to minimize 
the plethora of migrants flowing from Zimbabwe and also its commitment in eliminating 
any possibility of military confrontation in Zimbabwe.  
 
However, it is not easy to assess the legitimacy of South Africa’s position regarding the 
security issue in Zimbabwe. According to Munyaka (2013), some of the military office 
barriers of the Zimbabwean army had reportedly pronounced that they would not 
acknowledge any victory other than that of the ZANU-PF. This alone might be interpreted 
as an indication of potential military takeover in case the MDC won the elections. This may 
have been a cause for greater concern for South Africa. However, it can be argued that this 
view was only held by few senior military officers not the entire army. A military takeover 
in Zimbabwe would require the participation of low ranking officers too to ensure that the 
base was solid. In addition to that, during the July 2013 elections not much of violence and 
intimidation was reported compared to the past elections. Therefore, no real security threat 
was imminent which would have been a great concern for South Africa (Munyaka, 2013 & 
Makokera, 2015).                   
 
Perhaps South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe can possibly be credited to 
security concerns and to a certain extent to political stability. Not much of the attention has 
been given to the economic component of the situation facing Zimbabwe and the entire 
SADC (Kisiangani, 2012). With the GNU at the helm, a certain degree of economic 
stability was achieved in the country. Tandai Biti who headed the Ministry of Finance 
scrapped the country’s currency and initiated a staff-monitored programme with the IMF. A 
number of finance institutions like the African Development Bank and other western 
funders started to have interests to support Zimbabwe’s socio-economic programmes 
(Kisiangani, 2012). However, his tenure of office came to an end before his initiatives could 
142 
 
fully mature. In line with the July 2013 elections results, any hope to continue with the 
economic recovery in Zimbabwe vanished. The emergence of ZANU-PF as the winner of 
the elections meant discontinuation of the past administration of the government of national 
unity (Maroleng, 2014). On the economic point of view, ZANU-PF’s victory was the worst 
possible result the business fraternity had wanted to avoid. Reintroducing a Mugabe 
government was equal to reintroducing a government which lacked international 
legitimacy, especially with the country’s ‘new’ friend China which was not seen to be in 
par. The noticeable setback with the GNU was that it was mainly the MDC through Tandai 
Biti which was responsible for economic policy, so the ZANU-PF easily sabotaged or 
undermined the policies Biti had put forth (Maroleng, 2014).    
 
The current ZANU-PF administration will have a difficult task trying to redress the 
financial crisis. It needs all the support but its reputation will make this difficult. Zimbabwe 
is under serious liquidation with fiscal pressure increasing on the country’s budget. The 
major part of the budget itself is reserved for paying salaries of public servants. For a long 
time President Mugabe has used patronage to cling onto power and mobilise support 
(Maroleng, 2014). President Mugabe’s cronies and loyal ZANU-PF members have been 
rewarded with high positions in government and state parastatals in the same manner that 
President Daniel arap Moi did in Kenya when he rewarded his KANU cronies. The party’s 
ability to strike a balance between holding political power and having at least a semi-
functional economy proves to be getting weaker every day. The consequences of this are 
not different to those of the popular uprising and military coup (Maroleng, 2014). The only 
difference is that for the latter two they are immediate. Unfortunately the consequences will 
be bad for the region but dire for South Africa both as a neighbour and a regional leader and 
facilitator.            
 
6.9 South Africa’s Economic Diplomacy 
Zimbabwe is a good example of South Africa’s policy choices when it comes to economic 
diplomacy and its position in continental relations. For both Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
economic diplomacy comes second after security and political issues (Nye, 2009). For 
South Africa, this is evident in its scepticism to apply its economic muscle within the region 
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to enhance the development of its neighbours. In most cases South Africa chooses to 
operate within regional institutions. It does that even in cases where it has deviant national 
interests or where it would have had more leverage at its disposal should it choose bilateral 
relations (Nye, 2009). According to Makokera (2015), Zimbabwe provides an example of 
this. South Africa-Zimbabwe trade relations’ rate is high coupled by huge investment in 
Zimbabwe by South African businesses and parastatals. Zimbabwe is also important for 
South Africa for its strategic geographic location. It links South Africa and other areas in 
the region, which are important markets for South Africa’s increasing export. For some 
time, South Africa has been using different measurers of economic diplomacy on its 
engagement with Zimbabwe. They include the promotion of trade and investment and 
invoking discussion around SADC Protocol of Trade. Despite the large amount of South 
Africa’s businesses in Zimbabwe, South Africa’s initiatives to Zimbabwe are not a wider 
strategy jointly drafted by the government and the business community (Makokera, 2015). 
This is a gap that needs to be filled. According to Makokera (2015:4):   
 
Mistrust continues to exist between these stakeholders and, as a result, the 
overall approach South Africa takes on issues such as Zimbabwe does not 
benefit from information on the broader picture, especially the likely 
economic impact of its approach. To be a true regional power, South 
Africa needs to first look internally at its ability to leverage its own 
resources (including those of the private sector) for mutually agreed 
regional development objectives (Makokera, 2015:4).  
 
This is an indication of the lack of interaction between policy makers and the private sector 
in foreign policy making and implementation processes. For South Africa to be a true 
hegemon it needs to demonstrate its willingness to lead, this proves difficult because it 
confines itself within the collective efforts.    
   
6.10 Conclusion  
Despite everything which has happened between South Africa and Zimbabwe there are 
strong signals indicating long deep history and years of cooperation and working together. 
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The history of the liberation movements like Umkhonto we Sizwe and APLA which fought 
side-by-side with ZAPU and ZANU which later merged to form ZANU-PF cannot be 
ignored or swiped away. This is one of the major reasons South Africa is now prioritizing 
party to party engagements with Africa’s liberation movements like ZANU-PF.  
 
Zimbabwe’s crisis which started in the early 2000’s attracted a lot of attention from the 
international community. However, it was South Africa’s quiet diplomacy approach 
towards the crisis which fuelled the situation. The idea of finding an African solution to 
African problems proves to be problematic and ineffective in the absence of vigorous 
peace-making mechanism. The ‘failure’ of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe reflects the 
institutional and structural shortfalls embedded in quiet diplomacy as a mediation approach. 
It also serves as evidence of SADC’s unwillingness to take a bold step towards finding 
solutions and maintaining lasting peace. South Africa’s choice of quiet diplomacy over 
megaphone diplomacy might be justified on many bases but it does not seem to deliver the 
desired outcomes. Instead it is a manifestation of the existing gap relating to mediation and 
peace-making mechanism in the region. As a perceived leader in the region, South Africa 
failed to take a bold decision against Zimbabwe as expected of a leader. Its hegemonic 
status remains unclear due to its failure to take a lead role. What transpires is that South 
Africa’s long relations with Zimbabwe makes it difficult for South Africa to discharge its 
hegemonic powers against it neighbour. This makes it to be a hesitant hegemony as 
opposed to real hegemon.  
 
However, drawing from the comparison of Presidents Mandela and Mbeki’s approach to 
South Africa’s position on continental matters, the context within which quiet diplomacy 
was adopted becomes clear. We could say that President Mbeki was trying to avoid a repeat 
of the 1996 incident when President Mandela took a firm stance against Sani Abacha’s 
activities in Nigeria only to be blamed by his fellow African leaders. The truth of the matter 
is that given the different perceptions Africans and the international community have about 
South Africa, no foreign policy position will satisfy everyone. It is in cases like these where 





7 DATA PRESENTATION  
7.1 Introduction  
The interviews conducted for the purpose of data collection for this study included both 
South African and non-South African academics working in South Africa. The other people 
interviewed included civil society representatives, NGOs and the ruling party in South 
Africa the African National Congress. The interviews enabled the researcher to get first-
hand information directly from the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. This 
methodology also attests to Neuman’s (1997) assertion that structured open-ended 
interviews have better success. The interviews allowed the interviewees the opportunity to 
expand on the point being made, which gave the researcher a clear insight on South 
Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa. In order to get adequate information and 
for the purpose of consistency the researcher divided the questions into five standard 
questions which were asked to all informants in the same order in which they were 
arranged. It was these questions which served as a guiding framework during the 
interviews.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse data as collected from the informants. 
The presentation of data is as per the sequence of standard questions which guided the 
interviews. The standard questions are as follows: How would you characterize South 
Africa’s relations with Southern Africa?; Assess South Africa’s foreign policy options in 
Southern Africa; How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the 
region?; Who are the major actors in South Africa’s foreign policy making? Is South Africa 
ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor in the multilateral 
setting? This seek to complement the literature in this project in understanding South 








7.2 Data Presentation  
 
Q.1 How would you characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa? 
 
The diversity of responses came as no surprise given the diversity of the respondents and 
the general controversy surrounding South Africa’s foreign policy making and 
implementation. As indicated in the chat below, 55% of the respondents thought that South 
Africa is a regional hegemony while 27% thought that it has both hegemonic and 
partnership tendencies. The remaining 18% felt that South Africa has the characteristics of 




One ANC official working with the party’s international relations sub-committee responded 
by saying that the country’s foreign policy making is complex, therefore have no single 
identity. He articulated:     
 
Our foreign policy is multifaceted, it can be seen as partner in certain 
circles and as a hegemon in others. It really depend on which angle you 
coming from. Take for example the Zimbabwe’s crisis, South Africa fully 
supported ZANU-PF’s call for the west to back-off with its pressure. 
However, the opposition complained that while the crisis was continuing 
South African business interests were catered for. I think the soil is fertile 
for South Africa to discharge some hegemonic tendencies. It cannot be 
blamed for it, the soil is fertile (Ruling Party Official). 
 
Another informant suggested that South Africa is a regional hegemony not only in terms of 
the economy but its dominance extends to other aspects of life. He claimed that South 




If you have been in some of SADC countries’ capitals, you could swear 
you are still in South Africa. In parts of Mozambique for example you can 
use South African currency to purchase. Indeed South Africa is a regional 
hegemony. It has long been a political and economic hegemony, its 
dominant (NGO Senior Researcher, a Foreign National). 
 
He added:   
 
South Africa is definitely a hegemon, anyone who ever attended a SADC 
meeting you will get what I mean. South Africa is always on a mission to 
shape the direction of the meeting to suit its preferences. What I know is 
that Botswana has a long memory. It can never forget that SADC is the 
product of SADCC which was always an obstacle to South Africa’s 
dominance (NGO Senior Researcher, a Foreign National). 
         
Other informants responded as follows:  
 
I doubt it can be characterized as partnership; if it is, then it is a 
partnership of the select few. South Africa interferes in the domestic 
issues of its neighbours. It is busy supporting PUDEMO by housing it and 
through its solidarity support of its (PUDEMO) protests. These are just 
hegemonic tendencies (Academic, a Foreign National).    
 
From here, enter the nearest Shoprite store and look for expired goods. 
You will not get them because they are not sold to South Africans. Ask 
me if I have seen expired goods at Shoprite stores back in Zambia, yes 
every shelf has one. Double standards for South Africa are very high, 
hegemonic or not, South Africa is not good (Think Tank organization 




South Africa has complicated relations with its neighbours because of its 
past and it has a leading role to play in order to make up for its wrong past 
deeds. Being partners does not mean equality is all aspects, its means 
working together. South Africa is very popular in the international 
community, it represents the continent very well. Take (2010 FIFA) 
World Cup for example, it was not a South Africa’s World Cup but 
Africa’s Wold Cup. (Think Tank organization researcher).    
 
 
We are just more than partners, we are brothers and sisters take the people 
of the Kingdom of Lesotho for example. We are a one big extended 
family (South African academic).     
 
Figure: 7.1: Characterisation of South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa  
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 









There is a general agreement among the respondents both South Africans and foreign 
nationals that South Africa has two reasonable foreign policy options: selfish hegemon and 
partnership respectively. These response further re-affirms South Africa’s confined 
conceptualization role in the region. Although many people, the respondents and in the 
literature are sceptical of South Africa’s role in Southern African region they rather have it 





It all makes sense that partnership is the way to go. Look at the world we 
living in it is becoming one. The world is globalizing and the continent is 
going towards regional integration (South African academic).     
 
An exploiter and selfish giant nothing more nothing less (Think Tank 
organization researcher, Zambian National). 
 
 
Our country has never been well placed to lead the regional integration 
programme than it is today. South Africa is pursuing and should continue 




Looking at the political and economic power it possess, it had to be a 
hegemony. You can’t forget South Africa’s military strength, it has a big 
military capacity. It is relatively stronger than us, it is up to it how it uses 
its power. It can be selfish if it want to be. Remember power corrupt. The 
level of partnership is determined by South Africa because of its power. 
You can’t expect its partnership with Zimbabwe to be the same as with 
Malawi (Academic, a Foreign National).          
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Source: Author’s compilation 
  
 
Q.3 How important, if at all, is South Africa for the development of the region?                   
 
It is a reality that partnering with foreign players can enhance development but their 
national interests are not likely to allow for transformative development. A clear divide 
between relatively weaker economies and stronger economies is visible. South Africa is 
seen as important to the development of the region by small economies like Lesotho, 













Its undeniable, South Africa is the key voice for the region in global arena 
but when it comes to regional integration it is equally important as 
Swaziland or Zimbabwe (Academic Foreign National).    
 
South Africa is the superpower in the region, Angola, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe are following the lead. It is central in the implementation of 
the African Agenda, we definitely need it towards achieving central 
developmental goals. South Africa’s contribution to SADC is immersed 
(South African academic)   
 
Important? What importance? All states are important, they all have their 
own contribution to make. South Africa is no exception, Angola for 
example is an emerging key player (Think Tank organization researcher).  
 
 
South Africa is a leader not only in the SADC region but continental 
wide. But its dominance is relative to its regional counterparts. In the new 
global order the country is as powerful as its weakest link (Think Tank 
organization researcher (Zambian National).  
 
…Why South Africa? Its neighbours Botswana is acknowledged as the 
country with stable economy in the SADC region. Check World Bank 
Human Development Report 2009, Botswana comes before South Africa 










Figure: 7.3: South Africa’s importance for the development of the region  
 
 
   




Q.4 Who are the major actors in South Africa’s foreign policy making?  
 
Notably the parliament has slim or no direct role to play in foreign policy making. It 
participates in foreign policy making discussions mainly through the Portfolio Committee 
on International Relations and Cooperation. The committee is responsible for DIRCO 
related affairs in parliament. It is responsible for discussing policy related issues long 
before they can be considered for passing into law. It also performs an oversight function 
on DIRCO. The parliament’s participation on foreign policy formulation and execution is 












Almost all the informants credits the President as the most important player even those who 
seem not to be happy with that. The testimony of this lies on the literature and the following 
interviews excerpts.  
  
The president of the country is privatizing this process. This is supposed 
to be the organization’s (the ANC) responsibility. We are losing grip over 
government, no one can even explain government’s decision regarding 
Libya’s invasion (Ruling Party Official).     
 
The president, DIRCO, DTI and DoD are the foremost actors in foreign 
policy making and implementation. For example, the president after 
consultation with DIRCO can decide to send peace keepers anywhere and 
the DoD will have to implement. Before such decision can be taken trade 
relations are taken into account and it is where DTI pictures in (South 
African academic).    
 
By its nature foreign affairs ministry deals with foreign policy issues. No 
other department is solely responsible for this function. (Think Tank 
organization researcher).        
 
It is not the sole mandate of certain individuals but government as a 
whole. Don’t be confused by the media, the president and DIRCO are 
merely leading the process (Ruling Party Executive Member).    
 
It’s a quasi-democracy, parliament have no say, the president decides for 
himself. Even interim presidents takes bold decisions in the presence of 
democratic institutions. The Zulu Prince invaded Lesotho and it was 
business as usual (referring to South Africa’s deployment of troops in 
Lesotho under the SADC umbrella (NGO Senior Researcher Foreign 




Figure: 7.4: South Africa’s foreign policy actors  
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
  
  
Q.5 Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one actor 
in the multilateral setting?   
 
South Africa’s future ambitions remain unclear as its current identity. However, there is a 
huge possibility that it would pursue its hegemonic interests. The major contributing factor 
to the quasi identity is the country’s rhetoric on the need to form a united region based on 
African cooperation while it wants to be a regional leader. This is in line with the 





…Yes South Africa is ready and prepared to be the regional hegemon. It 
just the matter of time before Angola and Zimbabwe realises this too. 











the continent. Ramaphosa just stabilized the situation in Lesotho (NGO 
Senior Researcher, Foreign National).  
 
Post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy is purely based on 
partnership and cooperation. This is exactly what the country seem to be 
maintaining. Thabo Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe says it all, 
doesn’t it? (Ruling Party Executive Member).             
 
It has all the required traits of being a hegemon but followership (South 
African academic).  
 
It is guided by principles of equality, communal partnership and non-
hegemonic tendencies as the means for foreign policy implementation 
(Think Tank organization researcher).   
 Figure: 7.5: South Africa’s future, partner of hegemon  
   
 
 










CHAPTER EIGHT  
8 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS   
 
8.1 An Allison–model Assessment of South Africa’s Foreign Policy Making  
 
The above data presentation clearly reveals the contradictions and ambiguities embedded in 
South Africa’s foreign policy making towards the Southern African region. It shows that 
neighbouring countries have different perceptions about the country’s foreign policy 
making and implementation. The various perceptions are not only shared by neighbouring 
states’ respondents but even South Africans have no common understanding of the 
country’s identity in relation to foreign policy making. Due to current inconsistences in the 
foreign policy agenda, it is difficult to predict the future path for the country in relation to 
foreign policy making and implementation.                  
 
After realizing that foreign policy making is a complex process with a number of different 
players, Allison (1971) came up with a method to simplify it. This model seeks to 
understand the level in which choice, routine and content shape foreign policy making. 
There is a view that “By using the Allison models, foreign policy decision-making 
processes can be ‘mapped’ or framed in three ways to explain what happens when groups in 
a government meet, deliberate and recommend options” (Naidoo, 2010: 189). The three 
Allison’s models are the rational actor model, the organizational process model and the 
bureaucratic politics model. These three are crucial and have to be understood by foreign 
policy makers as they simplify a complex foreign policy making process. This is not to 
suggest that the Allison models offer comprehensive answers on foreign policy related 
issues but to say they are helpful tools of analysis.  
 
8.2 An Allison–model Assessment of country’s Foreign Policy Formulation              
 
8.2.1 The rational actor model  
The rational actor model holds that the foreign policy making process involves identifiable 
actors. These actors have their own predetermined goals to achieve and have already 
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adopted a certain approach to be used to achieve such goals. There are a number of 
assumptions underlying the rational actor model. and they are: There exist a government 
with a centralized authority which seeks to maximize its value; actors’ behaviour are as a 
result of well knowledgeable and thoughtful leaders and governments’ actions emanate 
from opportunities at their disposal or threats from the global system. If South Africa is a 
principal player with thoughtful and knowledgeable leaders who make rational choices then 
it is confronted with a pretty easy scenario. South Africa’s foreign policy makers have to 
deliberate on four scenarios: Fragmentation, Exploitation, Partnership and Strategic 
Autarky. These scenarios are detailed in chapter two. Upon making a choice from these 
options, policy makers need to take into account the consequences of all possible options. 
Nonetheless, South Africa’s foreign policy is still identified as ambiguous and inconsistent. 
This suggests that policy makers hesitate to pick or adopt one position among many. In 
such a situation, it would be rather imprecise to generalize that policy makers are 
knowledgeable and they act out of rationality.                
 
One assumption of the rational choice model is that leaders are rational and well informed. 
This excludes personalized foreign policy which dominated South Africa’s foreign policy 
making during President Mandela’s tenure. There is nothing rational about personality 
when it comes to foreign policy making as ascribed by the rational choice model. The 
popularized rhetoric famously known as the Madiba Magic created a false impression that 
everything would go well just because President Mandela was involved. In reality, the 
participation of President Mandela meant maximum pressure for other actors to deliver 
desirable outcomes. This was the advantage of having him, not the magic that most 
commentators referred to.            
 
The final findings revealed that “Western media have grown particularly intolerant of 
President Mbeki and the country’s foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe, and they are 
increasingly linking crime, xenophobia and the power outages to a crisis of leadership in the 
government as well as the ANC” (Naidoo, 2010:58). It is worth noting that the removal of 
President Mbeki from office by his party in September 2008 caused panic among certain 
neighbouring heads of state. This was informed by uncertainties pertaining to the country’s 
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future foreign policy. The then AU Chairman Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania noted “It is a big 
loss for Africa to lose such a prominent leader… [who has] strong commitment to Africa's 
development…the New Partnership for Africa's Development was his brainchild” 
(Heitman, 2008:54). When South Africa started leading peace making and peace keeping 
operations in the region, President Mbeki was already in the presidency serving as President 
Mandela’s deputy. With President Zuma taking the highest office, there were various 
concerns that a popular leader might limit South Africa’s commitment to the region to focus 
on domestic issues to satisfy his left wing cronies who helped him in toppling President 
Mbeki. There was a general consensus in certain circles that with the departure of President 
Mbeki there would be ‘depersonalization’ of the country’s foreign policy.  
 
According to Kegley and Wittkopf (2001:40) a  “…rational decision-making is more of an 
idealized standard against which policy decision-making is made, rather than an accurate 
descriptor of behaviour in the real world. In reality, foreign policy making takes place in 
circumstances that are far from ideal”. This model does not accommodate the view that 
foreign policy might be formulated on the basis of advancing certain beliefs and values 
which falls outside of national interests. For example, NEPAD and the African Renaissance 
are the dominant ideas which influence South Africa’s foreign policy formulation. In 
retrospect, we can confidently say that the sceptics and pessimists were proved wrong 
twice. In the first instance, Kgalema Motlanthe who served as ‘caretaker President’ 
following President Mbeki’s removal from office carried out his predecessor’s foreign 
policy agenda. Secondly, when President Zuma took office in 2009, South Africa’s foreign 
policy direction did not change as some had anticipated. These developments ensured 
continuity and no change.  
 
8.2.2 The organizational process model 
 
The organizational process model holds that foreign policy formulation is a product of the 
routine behaviour of the institution concerned with foreign policy making. This model holds 
that the government is not the only actor in foreign policy formulation, instead government 
has a number of loosely associated actors. This model matches the complex relations of the 
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tripartite alliance which the ANC’s policies rest upon. This is mostly important in the South 
African context because of the lack of a clear distinction between the ANC and the state. It 
is clear that the post-apartheid government’s approach to policies reflects the nature and the 
experiences of the ANC. This model gives life to the shift from the militarized foreign 
policy of the apartheid era to the current civilian’s foreign policy.  
 
The organizational process is accommodative to various interests including those who fall 
outside of the state ambit like the independent media and corporations. According to Naidu 
(2010:208) “The impact of business interests on foreign policy in South Africa is 
particularly visible with regard to post-apartheid corporate expansion on the continent”. The 
media has usually been side-lined mainly due to its perpetual commitment to contradict the 
government. This is evident from the ANC’s decision to ‘regulate’ the media in what came 
to be famously known as the Secrecy Bill. Another example of such, although not related to 
foreign policy, is the attempt by parliament to jam signal during the State of the Nations 
Address in February 2015.   
 
However, one thing in common between this and the rational actor model is that they both 
do not accommodate the influence of personality in the foreign policy making process. This 
is regardless of President Zuma’s own words that “there is no difference in policy. Mbeki 
does not have a policy of his own. Zuma does not have a policy of his own, we all belong to 
the ANC, we all subscribe to the ANC policy” (Zuma, 2008:20). A number of key 
resolutions relating to South Africa’s foreign policy were taken in the ANC’s 2007 
Polokwane watershed conference. They include the          
 
 
[re-affirmation of] the ANC’s commitment to progressive 
internationalism as a response to the challenge of imperialism (where the 
system of capitalism is seen to be dominated by one ‘hyper-power’; 
support for the establishment of an AU government via processes of 
regional integration, for example, following a developmental approach to 
SADC’s consolidation; support for India, Brazil and China as strategic 
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partners; the ‘intensification’ of economic diplomacy; and a name change 
from DFA to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO) (Van Nieuwkerk, 2010: 102).  
 
This model clearly acknowledges the role and influence of political parties in foreign policy 
making. It must be noted that it does not only acknowledge the roles of the ruling party but 
also the opposition parties. For example, the opposition parties were very vocal on issues 
pertaining to President Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy, the Dalai Lama visa saga and the 
‘unauthorized’ landing of the commercial flight at the Waterkloof Military Base carrying 
the Gupta family and friends. However, this does not mean that the opposition parties have 
any meaningful influence in South Africa’s foreign policy making since the role of 
parliament is limited as discussed in chapter four of this dissertation.       
 
8.2.3 The bureaucratic politics model 
The bureaucratic politics model is centred on the conflict and cooperation among actors 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy. There is an 
understanding that all actors have their own specific interests and powers vested in them. 
And that policy formulation is about power relations and bargaining. In the South African 
context, DIRCO and DTI are competing for being the most influential players after the 
presidency. However it is the issue at hand which dictates which department should be at 
the forefront. On issues pertaining to peace-keeping the DoD is likely to be at the forefront. 
As reflected in chapter four, the role of the intelligence services is gaining prominence in 
President Zuma’s administration; it therefore cannot be left out. According to Pfister 
(2005), different apartheid administrations depended on different departments for foreign 
policy direction. Verwoerd heavily depended on the specialist from the Foreign Affairs 
Department; Vorster relied on intelligence services; with Botha relied on the military; while 
de Klerk heavily relied on Foreign Affairs senior staffers for advice relating to foreign 
policy formulation.    
 
The post-apartheid system is organized in clusters, and is therefore different from the old 
regime. The cluster model forces different departments to work as a collective. Different 
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national departments like DTI, DoD, State Security, Department of Home Affairs, DIRCO 
and the Presidency collectively form International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster 
(IRPS). This emphasis on cooperation does not mean the absence of conflicting interests. 
Each department within the collective has its own interests and powers. As much as this 
model accommodates the interests of different departments, it does not deal with different 
interests within one department. For example, on its conception DIRCO had ideological 
differences. This brought about major divisions in the department and nearly brought it into 
collapse. The major rival groups were the “neo-mercantilists” against the 
“internationalists”, respectively (Van der Westhuizen, 1998).  
 
According to Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk (2004), the former group was mainly the 
holdovers who believed heavily on the past regime’s trade and self-interest. This was based 
on the neo-realism and new diplomacy values. The latter group constituted mainly of the 
ANC members who had just returned from exile. This group was of the view that South 
Africa should show a large degree of solidarity with African developing countries (Le Pere 
& Van Nieuwkerk, 2004). According to Van der Westhuizen (1998), this group further 
pursued pro- human rights foreign policy taking into account the country’s human rights 
history. It is these competing interests which resulted to the ambiguous and inconsistent 
foreign policy making in South Africa. Thankfully, this situation was remedied and things 
became calm. 
 
8.3 Conclusion  
This chapter presented and analysed the data collected. As seen above the data was 
collected through open ended semi-structured interviews. The respondents included both 
South African and non-South African academics working in South Africa. The other people 
interviewed included civil society representatives, NGOs and the ruling party in South 
Africa i.e. the African National Congress. The interviews enabled the researcher to get first-
hand information directly from the scholars and practitioners relevant to the field. The 
questions were divided to five standard questions which were asked to all informants in the 
same order as they appear above. It is these questions which served as a guiding framework 
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during the interviews. These interviews served as an additional information to the literature 
in the preceding chapters.    
 
9 Concluding Remarks    
The major motivation for this study has been to engage the controversy relating to South 
Africa’s foreign policy towards Southern Africa, particularly its role in the sub-continent. 
For the purpose of the study the research problem was demarcated as follows: Firstly, it is a 
conceptual demarcation. This relates to the characterization of South Africa, whether it suits 
the concept of partner or that of hegemon. Secondly, it is a geopolitical demarcation. This 
relates to South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. Lastly, it is a temporal demarcation. This 
relates to the period to be covered which is from 1994 when South Africa became a 
democratic country to 2014 which marked 20 years of South Africa’s democracy. However, 
a reference to South Africa’s pre 1994 foreign policy decisions was made for background 
purposes and to provide the context within which the study could be understood. In pursuit 
of this, a number of questions guided the study. These were as follows:  How would you 
characterize South Africa’s relations with Southern Africa?; Assess South Africa’s foreign 
policy options in Southern Africa; How important, if at all, is South Africa for the 
development of the region?; Who are the major actors in South Africa’s foreign policy 
making? , Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one 
actor in a multilateral setting?  
  
Mills (2000:299) recalls Hans Morgenthau’s words that “The prestige of a nation is its 
reputation for power…What others think of us is as important as what we actually are”. 
Morgenthau’s words better describe South Africa’s foreign policy dilemma in the region. 
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Both the policy and the practice in the last twenty years of South Africa’s foreign policy 
have not been able to construct a new perception for the country. Hence many regional 
actors still have an old perception which was created by the apartheid regime. From this, it 
can be inferred that the country’s failure to effectively put into practice its developmental 
agenda is due to its failure to persuade their regional counterparts that it is necessary for 
their own development. 
 
During the interviews one respondent compared South Africa in the Southern African 
region with an owner of a big and luxurious house who is neighboured by less attractive 
houses. The owner of the big house pays for the security company which patrols the streets 
while the neighbours do not pay. Despite the fact that the neighbours do not pay, they 
benefit from the security company’s services. The comparison could be used to illustrate 
covert regional dislike for South Africa which arises from the country’s dilemma on 
regional foreign policy. The Southern African states in this comparison are presented as 
neighbours who envy the owner of the big house and see his security system as an 
indication over power above them. Some of the relatively powerful countries like Angola 
and Zimbabwe do not want to be seen as so unexceptional in the region. According to 
Marais (1999), President Mugabe once alluded to the fact that South Africa is treating its 
neighbours as its own provinces. In essence, South Africa’s failure to reconcile the region’s 
perception towards the country and the real intentions of the country renders the country’s 
foreign policy towards the region problematic.                        
 
Upon fully returning to international politics South Africa gained a lot of respect from the 
region, the continent and the entire world. Indeed such respect was likely to attract more 
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foreign investors and aid compared to its neighbours. This alone can be a source of dislike 
and hatred. So it came as no surprise that South Africa’s dominance has attracted political 
tensions from regional counterparts. According to Barber (2005:1085), “A major source of 
the tension stems not from the trade imbalance per se, but from a perception within the 
region that South Africa’s economic dominance is being achieved on the back of unfair 
trade practices”. South Africa is notorious for reneging liberalization policies which could 
put South Africa’s business at the comparative disadvantage. President Mugabe once 
alluded that “South Africa cherishes the notion that because it is the most developed 
country in the region it can use other SADC countries as receptacles for its goods while 
protecting its own industries” (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng, 1998:173). Seemingly, it is 
not only Zimbabwe which shares President Mugabe’s sentiments, countries like Namibia 
and Botswana too feel the same. They believe that South Africa is a selfish hegemon which 
is out to constraint their small economies and dominate them. However, they still need 
South Africa for their own survival and functionality. South Africa is also accused by other 
regional players of being the ‘puppet of the west’. This is a major concern for other regional 
actors which forces them not to accept South Africa as a leader despite its political, 
economic and military capabilities.   
 
Given the manner in which South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy attracts criticisms 
relating to its ambiguity, a number of reviews and self-introspections became necessary. 
Due to these reviews a number of academics and policy makers have started to point out 
what can be seen as errors. For example, Muller (2000) refers to the overlapping 
responsibilities between DIRCO and DTI and appeals for the establishment of a well-
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coordinated and integrated economic diplomacy. This issue of overlapping duties is well 
addressed in chapter four.  
 
In the current interdependent world, states in the form of governments are no longer the 
only important actors in the international system. The role of non-state actors like civil 
society and the business sector is becoming equally important. It must not be taken lightly 
that even non-state actors have their own foreign missions based on their policies, hence 
they have their own foreign policies. They also put efforts to ensure that they are properly 
implemented just like states do. For example, the South African retailer Shoprite Checkers 
has its own domestic and its own foreign policy towards Southern African. This retailer is 
quite dominant in the region. As a result, it is safe to assume that it has a policy guiding its 
operations in the region. Shoprite Checkers’ foreign policy towards the Southern African 
region is different from South Africa’s foreign policy but they operate alongside each other. 
This lead to serious exploitative tendencies.  
 
South African companies are a primary agent of regional perceptions in host countries and 
as such post-apartheid South African investors influence the way that host countries 
perceive South Africa’s regional role. Like business anywhere, the South African business 
sector is driven by typical corporate interests – profit, market share, elimination of 
competition, the urge to dominate and or monopolize.  
 
Due to this, it can be inferred that South Africa is not well positioned to lobby for 
progressive development in the Southern African region. It cannot be treated as a 
trustworthy partner who can bring about mutual development. The country’s neo-liberal 
166 
 
economic policies and practices largely hinder South Africa’s developmental agenda. In 
order for South Africa to make any meaningful contribution towards the developmental 
agenda it will need to gain confidence of its regional counterparts. This is a test South 
Africa has to pass.    
 
  South Africa is characterized as a hegemony because of different reasons offered by the 
respondents. South Africa’s ‘hostile’ relations with renegade Botswana came out on 
numerous accessions. Botswana under the leadership of Ian Khama seems to be problematic 
to South Africa’s vision for the attainment of one solid regional policy. This is evident in 
Botswana’s disruptive behaviour in SADC-EU summits. Botswana and its sympathisers 
accused South Africa of wanting to dominate the SADC agenda. This was clearly visible 
when South Africa endorsed Zimbabwe’s 2013 Elections. All other SADC member states 
followed suit except Botswana.  
 
South Africa is characterized as a hegemon because it takes interest on the domestic affairs 
of other countries. In Swaziland, for an example, South Africa was accused of interfering 
with domestic affairs by supporting the anti- Monarch groups. The support for PUDEMO 
and other pro-democracy groups by mainly COSATU is evidence of such behaviour. The 
respondents argue that now that South Africa has been democratized it now wants to export 
its idea of democracy to its neighbours and the continent at large. For the Zimbabweans, 
especially, South Africa is a partner with hegemonic tendencies. This is largely informed by 
the two countries’ aspirations to lead the region. During the apartheid era in South Africa, 
Zimbabwe played a seemingly leading role in the SADC region. This started to fade away 
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with the re-emergence of South Africa in the international and regional politics in the post-
1994 period.  
 
This contestation is also evident between South Africa and Angola, the long partners and 
‘brothers in arms’. Angola is slowly seen as positioning itself to take a leading role in the 
SADC region. However, due to strong relations between the two countries especially with 
President Zuma at helm there is a sense of partnership. The ANC also has renewed party to 
party bi-lateral relations with other liberation movements in Africa in order to strengthen 
their partnership in many areas. Only few perceived South Africa’s relations with its 
neighbours as a pure partnership. South Africa’s characterization of its relations with its 
neighbouring state in the Southern African region cannot be understood as having a single 
identity. This is mainly because of the need to pursue its national interests and leadership 
aspirations while attempting to posture itself as a ‘new-born’ player free of any of the past 
regime’s remnants.  
 
It is important to note that South Africa is not seen as a benign hegemon. Respondents 
clearly viewed partnership and hegemony as mutually exclusive. This alone has shed light 
on the reasons for South Africa’s perceived willingness to retain the current inconsistent 
world order as opposed to transforming it. Any country which is identified as a selfish 
hegemony is likely to maintain the system that works for it. The responses here are 
contradicting South Africa’s perceived benign hegemony which was mainly created by the 
country’s quiet diplomacy approach towards Zimbabwe as discussed in chapter six. The 
responses suggest that hegemonies cannot use partnership as a tool to pursue their selfish 




South Africa believes that its importance to the Southern African region is informed by the 
fact that Southern Africa is the priority in the country’s foreign policy making and 
implementation. However, a number of states in the region hold a contradictory view. 
Instead external partners like the USA and lately China are perceived as important 
developmental partners by these states. Unfortunately even a simple look at the two 
aforementioned countries’ foreign policy reveals that Southern Africa is not really a 
priority. This alone contributes to the broader difficulty South Africa is faced with in the 
region. The reliance on external developmental partners over South Africa can be seen as 
the after effects of the apartheid regime in South Africa.   
As for Zimbabwe and Angola these countries are important to South Africa mainly because 
it views them as its strategic partners. South Africa’s foreign policy choices towards these 
countries reiterate the view that they are equally important as South Africa in advancing the 
regional agenda. The responses suggest that South Africa has a difficult task to assure its 
neighbours that its interests are in line with those of the region. This alone suggest that 
South Africa needs to acknowledge that it needs the region. In making such 
acknowledgement South Africa should then align its foreign policy with regional 
integration goals.          
 
The president is seen as the most important actor in South Africa’s foreign policy making 
and implementation followed by DIRCO. It is mainly because traditionally in most 
countries the head of state is the integral part of foreign policy making and implementation. 
This, by no means, suggests that the president is the only actor responsible for foreign 
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policy making. The presidency is followed by DIRCO and DTI. DIRCO plays a very 
important role in the execution of South Africa’s foreign policy through diplomatic means. 
Diplomacy is the modus operandi adopted by the South African government in 
communicating and relating to its neighbours in the SADC region. This (diplomacy) is the 
unit within DIRCO which is directly responsible for pursuing the country’s national 
interests. South Africa’s representatives abroad play a crucial part during implementation. 
The officials include ambassadors, consular officials and other diplomats. As for the DTI, it 
has been seen as the major overseer of South Africa’s bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment relations 
 
South Africa has the potential and desire of being a hegemon but it is not accepted by other 
actors as a hegemon in the region. It is acceptable that it outplays its neighbours, militarily 
and economic wise. South Africa’s capabilities in relation to the enforcement of rules are 
undisputable. The country has worked hard towards the establishment of multilateral 
institutions like NEPAD and the AU. Despite this, it is a contested hegemon. It is worth 
noting that being a hegemon does not necessarily mean having absolute and incontestable 
power. It still relies on other states to accept or reject the hegemonic status depending on 
the kind of that particular hegemon and their own national interests. As long as South 
Africa’s neighbours such as Zimbabwe and Angola have ambitions of leadership, South 
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Question 5:  Is South Africa ready or willing to assume the role of being a leader or just one 
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